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This study reviews the historical development of the
socialist and communist movements in France, focusing speci-
fically on the origins and evolution of their attitudes re-
garding problems of national security and defense. There
is an investigation of the philosophical, social, economic
and political conditions which gave birth to socialism in
modern (i.e. post-revolutionary) France. This study attempts
to illuminate the differences, as well as the similarities
between the Socialist and Communist Parties, the two main
branches of the French Left. This study, also, demonstrates
the difficulty experienced by the two Parties in reconciling
their theoretical ideals with contemporary practical exigen-
cies. During the 20th century, the French Socialists and
Communists have already collaborated in two predominantly
Leftist governments. This study reviews the defense deci-
sions made by the Leftist ministers of those governments
and the defense plans elaborated by past and present party •
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INTRODUCTION
"Mitterrand: 43 . 4/Giscard: 32.8" - a prediction for the
March 1978 elections? No, these are the actual results of the
first ballot voting in the 1974 elections for president, in
which Francois Mitterrand, the candidate of the French united
Left (i.e. Socialists, Communists and Left Radicals) missed a
first ballot victory by only a few percentage points. With
the 1974 political race narrowed from ten to two candidates
in the second ballot, France became polarized, and Giscard,
candidate of the moderate/rightist forces, won by only one-
2
and-one-half percentage points, a mere 350,000 votes. Strong
popular support for the Left is not a recent phenomenon in
France. By 1914, the second largest single party in parlia-
ment was the French Section of the Workers' International (SFIO)
By 1932 the SFIO had become the single most popular party in
France, and from 1936-1938 a leftist Popular Front governed
the country. From 1944-1947, the French Communist Party (PCF)
could claim to be France's most popular party, for it had
3
emerged from the Second World War as a hero of the Resistance.
Looking thus at past and present election return statis-
tics, it appears that an increasing number of Frenchmen are
using their democratic freedom of choice to bring a socialist/
communist government to power. Why is this? Why does social-
ism have such appeal in a liberal democratic nation like
France—one where the importance of the individual and his
10

inviolable rights is held far above any consideration of com-
munity or group cooperation? This is to be one of the questions
addressed in this study.
In 1972, the Socialist and Communist Parties, together
with the Radical Left Movement (MRG), signed a common program
for the government of France. This marked the beginning of
an official union of the French Left, against the political
groups which had been ruling France for the previous 25 years.
The goal of the united Left was national power by electoral
means. In 197^ the goal was almost reached. After a further
demonstration of public support for the Left during the 1977
municipal elections, it appeared certain that a majority of
the French nation was ready to elect a Leftist-dominated
national legislature in 1978. This certainty dissolved,
however, in September of 1977 when the Left sufferred an
apparently irreconcilable split. But the fact remains: a
large segment of the French populace was supportive of the
united Left and its policies. Any foreign military analyst
desirous of understanding current French attitudes toward
issues of defense, cooperation and security must take into
account the positions advocated by the parties of the French
Left.
This study reviews the historical development of the social-
ist and communist movements in France, focusing specifically
on the origins and evolution of their attitudes regarding
problems of national security and defense. First, there is
an investigation of the philosophical, social, economic and
11

political conditions which gave birth to socialism in modern
(i.e. post-revolutionary) France. If one wishes to understand
contemporary French Leftist policy positions, one must under-
stand the reasons underlying the development and the appeal
of socialism in France. As the study proceeds to trace the
growth of the French socialist movement, emphasis is placed
on persons and events that have had the greatest influence on
the formulation of Leftist policy dealing with national
defense, the disposition of the armed forces, and French
participation in wars and war-materials development.
The modern development of the Socialist and Communist
Parties in France was significantly influenced by the appear-
ance of fascism, Stalinism and Gaullism, to name only a few
common factors. But this does not mean that the two parties
evolved in the same direction. One of the main purposes of
this study is to illuminate the differences, as well as the
similarities between the two main branches of the French
Left. Inherent to this study, also, is a desire to demon-
strate the difficulty experienced by the Socialist and Communist
Parties in reconciling their theoretical ideals with contem-
porary practical exigencies. Recently, these two parties
have been faced with the option of being flexible and com-
promising in order to reach political power, or of sacri-
ficing power for ideological purity. The Communists appear
to have opted for the latter. This is not the first time
the Socialist and Communist Party leaderships have faced
this dilemma. During the 20th century, the two Parties have
12

already participated in two predominantly Leftist governments:
the Front Populaire (1936-1939) and the postwar government
(1944-19^7) • The factors influencing governmental decisions
in those days are certainly different from those of today.,
but would some of the results be the same, at least in the
area of defense? The present study attempts to answer this
question by treating as completely as possible, on the one
hand, the defense decisions made by former Leftist ministers
and, on the other hand, the defense plans elaborated in the
Common Program and in Leftist party-leader pronouncements.
In order to minimize the cultural bias inherent to any
study of foreign phenomena, facts for this study have been
drawn from original French source material whenever available.
There does not yet exist a comprehensive survey of French
Leftist defense policy, but there are a number of particularly
astute interpreters of French policy living today in France
and the United States. This study makes extensive reference
to their works, as well as to the private opinions of senior
French and Allied military personnel interviewed regarding
particular topics of interest.
13

I. ROOTS OF FRENCH SOCIALISM (1789-1864)
A. PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS
France in the 17th century was in theory an absolutist
state: one king, one faith, one law. Authoritarianism,
censorship and intolerance were its primary characteristics.
The Church had a monopoly on thought: apart from its strict-
ly religious monopoly on faith, it also controlled the
schools and censored the press. Neither the person of the
King nor the institution of the Church could ever become the
object of direct criticism; disparaging remarks were toler-
ated only when they were worded in a sufficiently abstract
or indirect manner. Frenchmen, therefore, who wished to
criticize their society had to become early masters in the
art of philosophizing: constantly phrasing their criticism
in lofty, idyllic terms of that which could be, and not of
that which should be.
With the revolutionary discoveries in science during the
late 17th and early l8th centuries, a new wave of thought
washed over Europe. There was a sudden explosion of faith
in the wisdom of science and in the possibility of explain-
ing social phenomena through the objective, scientific laws
of the physical world.
The only foundation of faith in the natural sciences is
the principle, that the general laws, known or unknown,
which regulate the phenomena of the universe, are regular
and constant; and why should this principle, applicable
14

to the other operations of nature, be less true when applied
to the development of the intellectual and moral faculties
of man? (De Condorcet)^
A spirit of reason was beginning to take the place of tradi-
tional, religious faith. Replacing the fundamental principle
that Man is naturally sinful and that only God is perfect, the
new school of thought espoused the perfectibility of Man
instead : Man is inherently good; given free access to the
truth, he will make rational, objective decisions; progress
is an inevitable law of human development once the artificial
(social and political) roadblocks are cleared away.
Montesquieu, with his objective analysis of the French
laws and customs of his time, was one of the originators of
5the Enlightenment movement in Prance. Of greater significance
to the development of French socialism, however, are the
philosophies of Voltaire and Rousseau.
When Voltaire travelled to Great Britain in 1726, he was
astounded by the prevailing ideas of liberty and reform.
Returning to France, he was convinced that once the new ideas
were explained to the King and his councilors, changes would
be made for the betterment of all of French society. (The
King would be merely "enlightened." In this original stage,
there was absolutely no desire for the replacement of the
monarchy by some other form of government.) Voltaire was
extremely successful in popularizing the new ideas in French
society, for he was a favorite literary figure and able to
attack society and politics in his witty poems and plays.
15

But once the Enlightenment ideas fell firmly into French
hands, a metamorphosis occurred: the school of objective,
rational thought was suddenly transformed into a body of ab-
stract syllogisms. Charles Mallet has described this strict-
ly French phenomenon with invaluable insight:
The classical spirit with its finish, its certificability
,
its limitations, already dominant in France, set its
stamp on the new philosophy .. .A passion for philosophical
discussion took hold of the educated world, and carried
them past the facts which they ought to have noticed, to
theories which seemed more distant and consequently more
profound. All alike began... to enquire into the meaning
of many things, the current interpretation of which they
had determined no longer to accept; while the necessity,
from which all Frenchmen suffer, of never being dull,
encouraged superficiality in the new search for truth and
checked the close study of history, which alone could
have avoided error. .
.
As men learned how clear and simple were the laws of
physical nature, they determined that there must be other
laws of nature, to explain society and politics; and find-
ing this theory lamentably contradicted by the confusion
of institutions and abuses round them, ... these dreamers
fell back upon ideals of natural religion and natural law.
Far aloof themselves from actual politics, ... dissatisfied
with their own political customs, but disdaining to study
[the past], they proceeded to formulate, by the aid of
pure reason, theories which would... fit in with some
apparently more simple and scientific formula of life.
These [were] politics of the imagination, and the politi-
cal world in France found itself presently divided into
two camps, ... those who governed, ... those who discoursed.
A society devoted to letters and to conversation embraced
and disseminated the speculative literature ... and thus
the great literary men of the eighteenth century became
in France... the fountains of political inspiration, and
the real leaders of public thought.
7
B. ROUSSEAU AND THE GENESIS OF FRENCH SOCIALISM
The philosophical writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau are
among the most important influences on the development of






It was Rosseau's idea of Equlity that kindled the
fires of hope in the hearts of the poor in 18th century
France. In 1789 the bourgeoisie promised Equality as they
solicited the support of the working class for the cause of
the Revolution. (Gordon Wright maintains that, even though
illiteracy was between 20 and 95$ of all male Frenchmen at
the time, there is substantial evidence that by 1789 the
most thoughtful men of France - literate or not - had been
exposed to Rousseau's ideas; for, these had become a mood
o
or "temper" of the time.)
Rousseau believed that all men are born free and
9
equal . In their natural state, men are independent and
indifferent towards each other. Once man enters society,
he becomes dependent on others and this means he no longer
is their equal. Therefore, in order to restore man's basic
equality, there must be a Law that replaces each man's
individual will; in this way, no one will be able to be
anyone else's master. By means of this impersonal Law,
relations between people will be as relations between things;
this impersonal structure allows for the individual to retain
his liberty and dignity in society. In order to accomplish
this, each member of society must give himself and his rights
totally to all the community. And since each person gives
himself entirely, everyone is equal. If everyone is equal,
then no one has any reason to seek advantage over anyone
else. Everyone gives all his rights and liberties into a
17

common reservoir, and society redistributes the rights
equally among all in such a way that everyone remains equal.
This new "social contract" is perfect, for by giving
up oneself to everyone, one has given oneself to no one.
(Significant, however, is Rousseau's further stipulation
that if ever the contract is violated, then the individual
immediately takes back his natural rights and his natural
liberty. This belief has lead to the justification for
revolution and the overthrow of French governments.)
The supreme importance placed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau
on both the equality and freedom of the individual have
created a serious dilemma in the political culture of France.
As one jealously guards one's equality above all else, sus-
picion of another's actions prevails: is he trying to do
something that will rob me of my equality? There are few
if any important special interest groups in French society,
for they are regarded with suspicion by all, they are viewed
as mechanisms for furthering someone else's rights, to the
detriment of one's own. There is little enthusiasm for
collaborative action or community cohesion in France. One
seeks, purely and simply, to be free and independent.
On the one hand, a Frenchman considers a decentralized
governmental system the best way to ensure his independence.
He believes that, if governmental power is subdivided into
a myriad of local-level governments, no one person or insti-
tution can obtain a monopoly of power or influence. If one
looks at the organizational structure of the French government

today, one will see a central government located in Paris,
but also a perfect hierarchy of departement ale and municipal-
level government representatives. In theory, the French
government appears to be decentralized. But one must not
be deceived by appearances
.
For, on the other hand, a Frenchman distrusts the
political middle-men who stand between him and the central
government in Paris. Under the various constitutions of the
French Republic, the government elected by the people governs
with the will of the people. The existence of middle-men
appears to only enhance the likelihood of distortion and
corruption. Thus a tightly centralized form of authoritarian
government (such as Napoleon's First Empire or de Gaulle's
Fifth Republic) seems to be the best means of ensuring no
one receives special or preferential treatment.
In short, a Frenchman distrusts all governmental
arrangements of power, be it centralized or decentralized,
for neither will unconditionally guarantee his individual
freedom and independence.
2. The General Will
What was the impersonal Law referred to above? It
is the "general will" - the supreme authority of the commu-
nity. It is the will of the whole community, not just a
body of legislators. There is no separation of power; the
people are the state. The general will treats all men
equally - when it does not, then it has been perverted and
is no longer the general will. (There is therefore nothing
19

sacred about a particular group of legislators or cabinet
ministers; when they cease to express the "general will",
they are to be replaced. Here is, then, yet another aspect
of Rousseau's philosophy which has justified the swift, fre-
quent and easy toppling of successive governments in Prance.)
Rousseau's definition of the General Will was not
exhaustive, however. (Political scientist George Sabine
believes that Rousseau never envisaged a state on a national
12
scale.) The idea therefore fell subject to further inter-
pretation by post-revolutionary social reformers who sought
to use it as part of their blueprint for building a better
society.
The nascent French communist movement was one such
radical group. Using a very interesting interpretation of
Rousseau's nebulous General Will and verbally espousing the
principles of equality and freedom, the French Communist
Party (PCF) has been able to claim it is a national party,
one that is philosophically rooted in the ideals of the
French Enlightenment. For, according to the communist inter-
impretation, the General Will is the spirit that will inspire
all men in the way they should properly govern themselves -
that is, provided they are rightly and fully informed, and
no distorting factors exist to mislead them. In order for
right decisions to be made, there must be social, economic
and political equality. But until those right conditions
prevail, it could be that the General Will might be tempo-
rarily embodied in a minority of men (a vanguard) who know
20

what all men would desire if they could just be freed from
the encumbering social distortions created by evil institu-
tions. Therefore, it would be the duty of such a vanguard
to seize and hold power, if necessary in spite of the
majority, and make men happy and virtuous by setting up new
institutions and educating the people. Rousseau lends
credence to this interpretation by his statement that
Whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be com-
pelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing
less than that he will be forced to be free.
(This interpretation of Rousseau's philosophy was ultimately
combined with Marxism to form a unique brand of communism in
France today.
)
C. SOCIETY AND THE ECONOMY
As a state, France ranks as one of the oldest. A central
ruler has governed France, either directly or indirectly,
ever since 987 A.D., and most of the nation's racial and
cultural mixing was completed by 1000 A.D. As a result,
by the 18th century France had a firmly established societal
structure which - by virtue of age and tradition - appeared
impervious to any significant modification. By 1750, France
had become the most populous nation of Western Europe (22
million) and society consisted of an omnipotent king sur-
rounded by a court of powerless but hereditary nobles; a
bourgeois class flourishing from foreign trade and indus-
trial production; and finally, a mass of peasants compris-
15ing, along with the bourgeoisie, 98% of the population.
21

Although the feudal system had been abolished by the
monarchy and all real power had been transferred to the
central figure of the king, French society remained a collec-
tion of different classes, hierarchically arranged and sharp-
ly delineated by specific sets of ranks, rules and privileges.
The nobility, numbering some 140,000 persons, held claims on
one-fifth of all French land. These persons were exempt from
paying any taxes. And, in addition, they were assured a pre-
dominant position in society by the king: only they would
be permitted into the highest ranks of the Army and the
Church. The Church owned another fifth of all French land
and gleaned a comfortable existance from the tithes and
offerings exacted from the poor. The bourgeoisie (middle
class) had become highly organized into corporations and
craft guilds, in which one often had to be the son of a
master in order to succeed. This, the wealthiest class in
the 18th century French society, chafed under the inability
to accede to the highest ranks of privilege and prestige:
that of the noble aristocracy. Noted historian Gordon
Wright points out that this was not a capitalistic middle
class; they had no desire to innovate or expand; rather they
17
sought the socially unattainable. Their social dissatis-
faction was only intensified by the fact that the king,
unable to persuade his noble entourage to part with any of
its wealth, accepted substantial loans from the bourgeoisie
in an effort to regulate the national debt (which had bur-
geoned out of all control as a result of the expansionist





The bourgeoisie managed to evade taxation almost as
effectively as the nobles, so the brunt of the tax burden
fell ponderously onto the shoulders of the peasants. These
latter, although permitted to buy land, were seldom able to
afford a piece large enough to assure them any degree of
self-sufficiency. They hired themselves out, selling their
labor to noblemen on a 50-50 profit split basis. The funda-
mental difference was, of course, the nobleman's money was
clear profit whereas the peasant forfeited four-fifths of
his income to taxes of all kinds. This class, on the eve of
the French revolution, was completely devoid of any political
understanding, conscious only of its own misery, hopelessness
1 ft
and isolation from the privileged ranks of society. They
had lost the paternal care of their feudal overlords when
they had been made free men; this was the atomistic freedom
of a small boat left alone on the devouring waves of a raging
sea.
D. THE REVOLUTION
In 1789 Prance was emerging from a painful decade of
economic recession. Food prices had doubled; unemployment
was at 50$ in the major cities; one-fifth of the Parisian
populace was on a relief roll of some kind. Those who were
the first to become vocally disgruntled and revolutionary
were not the politically ignorant poor, but rather the small
19
shopkeepers and the petty bourgeoisie. The King suddenly
lost support from all sides.- The nobles felt threatened by
his moves to abolish their fiscal privileges. The bourgeoisie
23

resented the continued exclusion from the highest rank of
society. The soldiers in the Gardes Prancaises in Paris,
refusing to suppress the mobs demonstrating for food, muti-
nied against their officers and fraternized with the citi-
zens. The masses were encouraged by the bourgeoisie to join
and swell the ranks of this uprising against the established
order. Most importantly, they had been spurred into action
by the ethereal promises of Equality and Freedom.
Just before the outbreak of the revolution, the King had
called for a landmark meeting of the Etats-Generaux (States
General). Thus, although the bastions of the old order
(e.g. the prison of the Bastille) soon came under the con-
trol of the people, there was a national assembly in place
that could have begun building a new order. But the pre-
dominately middle-class elected officials had no practical
experience in governing, and herein lies one of the first
tragic weaknesses of the Revolution. The old order had
been destroyed to the cries of "sovereignty to the people"
and "the natural rights of Man"; but the Assembly had no
idea as to how these principles should be translated into a
new societal and governmental order. Thus, for lack of any
experienced political leaders or any generally accepted
plan for the future (the elected officials had not yet
learned the sophisticated political art of compromise), the
government of Prance fell into the now-benevolent, now-
maleficent hands of the various interpreters of the elusive
20




By 1791 the majority of Frenchmen were weary with the
disruption and disorganization of the Revolution. They
thought it was time for the chaos to end, for in their eyes
21
the worst injustices had been corrected. For the bour-
geoisie: class barriers had been broken. (Equality had
indeed been attained for the propertied: everyone who owned
land and paid taxes in excess of a specified amount was
accorded the right to vote). As for the agricultural poor,
they had been given land and were therefore ready to see
the Revolution end. They joined the ranks of the majority
in asking for a reinstatement of the King and a beginning to
life according to the conditions of the new order. A dis-
satisfied minority remained however: the vocal poor in the
cities. These people had obtained virtually nothing from
the Revolution and they demanded that the Revolution continue,
for it had not yet gone far enough. Herein lie the seeds of
the French proletarian class and the origins of the French
social reformist movement.
The jarring disparity between the "have" and "have-nots"
in French society is a phenomenon which persists up to the
present day and continues to fuel socialist and communist
political movements. The disparity is more than just a fig-
ment of the lower or working-class imagination. In France
today five percent of French society owns k0% of the nation's
wealth; another ten percent owns another 30%; and 85% of the
22
French population has to share the remaining 30%. The
25

propertied class still predominates in France: in politics,
society and education. Upward mobility is slow and awkward.
According to Henry Ehrmann in his 1976 book on French society
and politics, "the bourgeoisie accepts in its ranks only
those whom it considers worthy, those who resemble its own
sons and who have the same mentality." D
F. THE UTOPIAN SOCIALISTS
During the first half of the 19th century, as France
began to industrialize, a number of French thinkers focused
their attention on the plight of the burgeoning French pro-
letariat, in large part an offspring of the 18th century
class of urban poor. This was the era of industrialization
and growing working classes throughout Europe. French aris-
tocrats were afraid of the revolutionary potential of the
French workers. The bourgeoisie was therefore unopposed in
its oppressive treatment of the industrial working class.
There were some Frenchmen who deplored the current condition
of French society, but they unfortunately were "reformers of
25the heart rather than the head." Most of these Utopian
Socialists decided that since the conditions prevalent in
their actual surroundings did not coincide with that which
ought to be, according to the inviolable laws of reason,
they should create an entirely new society rather than try
to reform the present one.
An example of a Utopian Socialist society can be found
in the philosophy of the Count of St. Simon. St. Simon
26

believed progress could be achieved by applying the princi-
ples of rational science to the management of social pro-
27blems. The hierarchical pyramid of society should be
rearranged so that those who contribute the most to society
(i.e. the workers - les industriels ) receive its greatest
28
rewards. Gordon Wright explains that St. Simon's pyramid
was to be guided by an elite of engineers and entrepreneurs,
29
and all classes would work for the common welfare. St.
Simon, however, never said how this was to be accomplished,
and as a result, the tiny St. Simonian movement survived its
founder's death by only a few years. Later rulers of France
(e.g. Louis Napoleon) were to remember St. Simon's ideas of
productivity and welfare and try to apply them. But French
workers were not convinced of the desirability of being led
by a group of enlightened capitalists; besides, St. Simon's
utopia did not appear to include any guarantees of liberty
31
or equality for the individual.
Another French Utopian Socialist was Charles Fourier.
Like St. Simon, Fourier's ideal society was based on the
idea of class collaboration, but without a mangerial elite.
According to Fourier, industrial production would be decen-
tralized, creating many small communities in which the con-
ditions of life would be so pleasant, everyone would "rise
at three in the morning and... rush to work with passionate
enthusiasm." For, with a population consisting of two
people from each of the 810 different kinds of temperment
Fourier believed to exist, each community would be a
27

harmonious "free and voluntary association of capital, labor,
33
and talent." As nice as this might have sounded to Fourier,
French workers would have none of it.
One figure who did succeed in winning the support of the
French proletariat in the mid-19th century was Louis Blanc.
An advocate of decentralized and nationalized industry, Blanc
maintained that the competitive system of free enterprise
worked to the detriment of all by its wastefulness and its
34
continual crises. He proposed, therefore, the creation of
a society based on the principle of the producer's coopera-
tive. The government would organize national workshops with-
in the main industries; each workshop would be responsible
for delegating tasks and regulating production in the best
35interests of the working class. Blanc also proposed a
system whereby the government would loan workshops the
capital with which the workers might eventually take over
the ownership of their factory. (Louis Blanc soared to a
position of national preeminence on the back of the short-
lived proletarian revolution of 1848. He succeeded in
organizing a brief experiment with national workshops in
France, but abuse of the system by workers and lack of com-
mitment to the project by the other ministers of the pro-
visional government of France facilitated a conservative
victory at the polls just two months later and the aboli-
37tion of the workshops.)
28

II. THE NASCENT MOVEMENT (1864-1920 )
The well-meaning but ineffectual Utopian Socialists were
left behind as French social reformism moved into the latter
half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th. The
influences of this period were crucial in transforming the
French social reformist movement into one of French socialism:
advocating change by revolution. Blanqui, Proudhon, Marx,
Guesde, Jaures, Dreyfus, Lenin and Wilson; all these names
evoke important stages in the birth of the modern French
socialist movement.
A. FIRST INTERNATIONAL
In 1864, as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were founding
the First International in London, there was a delegation of
French workers there to help them. The First International
was organized "to afford a central medium of communication
and cooperation for those organizations that seek the pro-
tection, advancement and complete emancipation of the work-
ing class." Napoleon III was ruling France at this time
2
and making a certain number of labor reforms. Workers m
France had been denied the right to strike or to form unions
ever since the days of the Revolution, when these interdic-
tions were deemed to be in the best interests of "liberty."
The first major outbreaks of worker protest occurred in
France in the early 1830s, as factories had sprung up, wages
29

had dwindled and population growth had outstripped the food
supply. These were effectively put down, however, and it
wasn't until l84l that the government outlawed the employ-
ment of children under eight and shortened the hours for
those under sixteen. The ultimate failure of the 1848 revo-
lution was a bitter disappointment for all who had placed
their hopes of social reform in the person of Louis Blanc.
It was only with the advent of Napoleon III and the Second
Empire that a slow, but progressive stream of labor reforms
began. In 1862 he sent a delegation of French workers to
the London Exposition to observe English labor conditions;
in 1863 he established a credit organization to finance
cooperatives] and in 1864 he granted workers the right to
strike. In 1868 he let it be known that he would tolerate
the formation of labor unions . French workers had found a
certain degree of proletarian class-consciousness by 1870
and they constituted the largest branch of the First Inter-
national. (It should be noted, however, that at this time
workers made up less than half of the French population;
peasants and agriculture still formed the mass base of
3French society.)
B. PARIS COMMUNE
The first dramatic episode in modern French socialist
history occurred in 1870-1871: the defeat of Napoleon III
during the Franco-Prussian War, and the subsequent republi-
can refusal to surrender to the Germans. When i~he French
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people could hold out no longer, an armistice was signed and
elections held. Prance wanted peace and by now republicans
were considered warmongers; as a result only 200 republicans
were voted into the new government, versus 400 monarchists.
When some of the major cities, including Paris, still refused
to accept the surrender and the harsh peace terms, civil war
broke out. Paris was organized into a self-governing "Commune"
with 80 elected officials at its head. Approximately two-
thirds of these were Jacobins or Blanquists, that is, intense-
ly patriotic, anti-clerical, egalitarian and desirous of a
strong, centralized dictatorship like that of 1793. The other
third consisted of self-proclaimed socialists, mainly Proud-
honians, favoring a decentralized federal system.-5 *
Marx called the Commune the first proletarian dictator-
6
ship in history and Lenin picked up the same theme later on.
When the army of the Third Republic was sent in to crush the
Commune, Marx interpreted the action as a bourgeois suppres-
sion of a Parisian social reformist movement. Whether or not
*[Perhaps a few clarifications should be made at this point.
Jacobinism was the idea that there is a single "will of the
people" and that when the people express this general will
by choosing someone to represent them, this representative
is justified in ruling against all opposition. Such dicta-
torship is therefore a legitimate form of direct democracy.
Napoleon I's accession to power by plebescite was justified
by this Jacobin logic. ' August Blanqui was an advocate of
direct revolutionary action. No plans were deemed necessary
for social reform; one need only seize control of the state
and sweep away all the society's barriers to freedom and
education; everyone would then be equal and enlightened.
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon called himself an anarchist. He said
that workers must rely on themselves and use economic tactics
to gain power. He maintained that power always corrupted
those who hold it; therefore there must be a "federalist"
dispersion of power and property so that no one group can
dominate the others . ° In short, Proudhon wanted to eliminate
political power without using political means. 9]
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the Communards were, in fact, members of the working class
(and Gordon Wright says they were from a broad cross-section
of classes) , their violent demise at the hands of the
Republican army signaled the failure of Blanquism and Proud-
honism for the social reformers of late 19th-century Prance.
These latter now needed something new to believe in, and
Marxism became that "something."
C. GUESDIST MARXISM
Jules Guesde was a Proudhonian radical, exiled from
France for writing in support of the Commune." While in exile
he met Karl Marx and gradually became a follower of the new
"scientific" socialism (i.e. a socialism based on economics,
not vague concepts of "general will," etc.). After returning
to Prance, he worked three years to start a proletarian party
and finally, in 1879, the Third Workers' Congress in Marseilles
proclaimed itself in favor of the conquest of the State and
collectivization of property by political action. The program
for the new Socialist Workers' Party of France (PTSF) was drawn
12
up the next year in London by Guesde, Marx and Engels
.
The program was one of Marx's "minimum programs" (i.e. working
for immediate reforms rather than resorting to open revolu-
tion). -> After the elections of l88l, however, in which the
Socialists received a meager 60,000 votes, some members of
the PTSF voiced their displeasure with the party's program.
They said the party should be seeking partial reforms; the
program drawn up by Guesde and Marx was "born in [the] Thames
32

fogs ,... essentially anti-French ... and too inflexible to be
applied countrywide." At the party congress the next year,
Guesde was condemned as anti-French, unrealistic and dicta-
torial] and the majority of the party followed Paul Brousse
to found the Federation of Socialist Workers of France (FTSF)
The importance of this split is in its manifestation of what
Robert Wohl calls the French Socialists ? deeply engrained
aversion to foreign revolutionary doctrines, an insistance
on ideological homogeneity and a centralized party organiza-
15
tion. (He hints that this aversion has since been seen
again, in the French Communist Party).
Guesde was undaunted, however, and throughout the 1880s
he continued his drive for an overthrow of the bourgeoisie.
Personally, he believed this could only be accomplished by
violent revolution. Every means was to be used toward that
end: the struggle for reform would heighten the workers'
class consciousness and electoral campaigns would be a forum
for socialist ideas. (By 1893, however, his ploy of organ-
izing workers" and trying to win public office had irrevers-
ably influenced the party: his party, the Parti ouvriere
francaise
, moved toward reformism.) He believed that
revolution was inevitable and imminent. He hoped that world
revolution might result from the 1885 Russo-British "progres-
sive" war in Afghanistan: defeat for either one of the two
great reactionary powers would certainly result in domestic
revolution; this would divert reactionary aid away from
revolutions in other countries and these would thus be
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victorious. He even wrote a poem on the "fruitfulness" of
war:
Plow, flow, blood of the soldier
Blood of the Czar or the Queen
Run in streams or in fountains.
This time, Humanity „
Will benefit from the fruits of war. '
(Guesde's enthusiasm for party discipline, violent revolu-
tion and his belief in international revolution stemming





The final decade of the 19th .century saw the creation of
the Second International (1889) and the successful election
in 1893 of 48 French socialists to the national Parliament.
This political breakthrough was attenuated somewhat by the
fact that 18 of the delegates came from four different
socialist parties, and the remaining 30 were Independent
19
socialists. Of great significance among the latter, how-
ever, was Jean Jaures. Jaures had become a socialist just
the year before the election and was the product of a younger
generation than that of Guesde, who had known first-hand the
repression of the Commune experiment. Jaures had grown up
with democracy- and the republic. Whereas he agreed with
Guedse's idea that there should be a "univeral socialism"
(i.e. since capitalism is universal, socialism should be
also), he felt that it needed to be "adapted to our political
and economic conditions, to the traditions, ideas and spirit
of our country." Just as the French people are distinct
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within the human race, so must be their brand of socialism
within the international socialist movement. The socialism
Jaures dreamed of had its roots in French idealism - not
21German materialism.
At this point, especial attention must be paid to the
unique philosophy of this extraordinary statesman. As he
strove to unite all French socialists into one party and
carefully choose a middle road between revolution and reform,
Jean Jaures proved to be the single most important figure in
French socialism for more than half a century. Robert Wohl
has explained Jauressianism as follows:
Should a Socialist participate in a bourgeois government
in order to save Republican liberties? Jaures answered
in the affirmative: the Socialists were duty-bound to
march alongside bourgeois defenders of the Republic; the
proletariat would be responsible if the bourgeoisie com-
mitted an injustice that the working class might have
prevented. 22
Socialism was to be not the negation but the comple-
tion of the bourgeois Republic, the extension of the
Rights of Man from the political to the economic and social
spheres. This veneration for the Republic and democracy
shaped Jaures T s attitude toward revolution and reform...
Socialism was necessarily revolutionary.' That revolution
was the final goal must never be lost- from view. Simple,
day-to-day trade unionism was not enough. At the same
time, Jaures thought reforms were a means to revolution.
They brought closer the final collapse of the old order. . .
Though he never ruled out the possibility of a violent
revolution, Jaures clearly thought that it would be un-
necessary and regrettable...
Jaures 's Socialism [embraced] moral idealism. Though
fully aware of the material forces determining man's
existence, Jaures believed in the ability of men to shape
their fate. For him. .. idealism and materialism were...
complementary
.. Socialism was not only inevitable ... it
was also just. The victory of Socialism would thus not
be the victory of a single class... it would be the vic-
tory of Humanity and Justice. 23
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The Jauressian spirit of moderation and constant quest for
party unity lived on after Jaures's death in the person of
Leon Blum, the next leader of the French socialist party.
And even the future first General Secretary of the French
Communist Party, LO. Frossard, was to write in 19^3:
I did not discover the doctrine right away. Jaures
flooded me with light. I was captured forever by the
ideal he erected high up in the sky like a wonderful
triumphal arch. 2^
E. DREYFUS AFFAIR
In France, there is a curious love-hate relationship
between the Army and the French political Left. The Army
is a vestige of the old aristocratic order where, tradi-
tionally, all officers were drawn from the noble and upper
classes of French society. In the 19th century, Army offi-
cers, many conservative and pro-clerical, were not especial-
ly fond of the Republic; many, in fact, would have preferred
a return to the old, more distinctive, hierarchical order of
the monarchy. But it is important to note that throughout
the Revolution and the 19th century, the Army was able to
remain remarkably apolitical. Its duty was to serve the
government of France, whatever form it took. This is not
as comfortable for the French Left as it might seem. The
French Left, then and now, sees a strange duality in the
Army's character. On the one hand, the Left regards the
Army as the defender of the Republic and the ideals of the
French Revolution. The French military demonstrated its
loyalty to the French government during the Revolution by
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fighting off foreign, reactionary forces attempting to restore
the Bourbons to power in Prance; and the Army fought valiantly
to defend France against the Germans in the Franco-Prussian
War of 1871 and served proudly as the nation's instrument of
revenge ( revanche ) in the late 19th century. On the other
hand, the Army is viewed as the protector of the status quo
and the tool of the French bourgeoisie in the latter' s desire
to suppress any socialist attempts to rekindle the spirit of
revolution in France in order to obtain long-overdue improve-
ments in the condition of the French proletariat. This role
of the Army was abundantly demonstrated in I87O in the govern-
ment's military repression of the Commune.
In the following discussion of the Dreyfus affair of the
1890s, one must be careful to note that the singular polarity
which developed in French society over the Dreyfus issue was
not one of Left versus Right, but rather Republicanism versus
25Nationalism, justice versus patriotism. These terms will
be clarified during the course of the following discussion.
In 189^, Alfred Dreyfus, a young Jewish officer of the
French General Staff, was charged and convicted for giving
national defense secrets to the Germans. Initially everyone
was impressed with how swiftly and efficiently the Army had
dealt with the traitor. Even Jaures said at the time that
if Dreyfus had not been a bourgeois and an officer, he would
have been shot instead of merely imprisoned. D But as the
years passed and more facts became available, it became in-
creasingly apparent that a terrible error had been made:
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Dreyfus might be innocent. Prevailing anti-Semitic and
middle-class elements in French society, however, joined
with the Army in resisting public demands for a retrial.
If there had been a miscarriage of justice, the affair would
reflect scandalously on the integrity of the nation's mili-
tary, seen by the Nationalists as "the shield and protector
27
of the nation." ' Furthermore, they declared it was the
Republicans' aim to "break down the nation's faith in the
Army, reveal its military secrets and, when defenseless,
P R
open its gates to the enemy [Germany]." Barbara Tuchman
describes the. state of French society at this time in the
following way:
In political life the nation was at odds with itself,
galled from within by the unreconciled, unsubdued ad-
herents of the ancien regime and Second Empire, oppressed
from without by the superior strength of Germany and
the sense of unfinished war between them, hankering
for revanche . . . 29
In the light of the Dreyfus scandal, the Army, the Church,
the anti-Semites, the anti-Republican groups all joined in
a common Nationalistic, patriotic front to save the honor
of the Army and the integrity of all that symbolized the old
order. ^
The storm of Republican protest was not to be quieted.
Republicans were all those who "saw France as the fount of
on
liberty ,... the teacher of reason, the codifier of laws..." J
They believed that anyone who would knowingly allow France
to commit an act of injustice against one of its citizens
must be found, tried and condemned, in order to "cleanse
op
the honor of the Republic" J and restore the people's faith
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in the sacred principles of the French Revolution. The patri-
otism of the Republicans was questioned by the Nationalists,




other "Internationalists." Gordon Wright ma
many Socialists never came out openly in support of Dreyfus,
but the fact remains that Jean Jaures saw the polarization of
French society as an opportunity to associate the French Left
with the defense of Republican ideals of justice, honesty and
fairness for the individual citizen. Barbara Tuchman writes
that
Class hatred was so roote d in Socialist tradition that in
order to rally the Left in the fight for justice it was
necessary to de-class Dreyfus. "He is no longer an offi-
cer nor a bourgeois," Jaures wrote... "He is simply a liv-
ing witness to the crimes of Authority ... He is nothing
less than mankind itself. "35
Socialism henceforth became more than a class movement; it
became France's vanguard of democracy.
When Dreyfus was finally acquitted of all charges at the
end of the 1890s and the injustices of the Army and the Right
revealed, a wave of antimilitarism swept through the trium-
phant Left. The Army in its contemporary form was considered
an enemy of the Republic and the people, a machine of repres-
sion and selfishness. As a Republican government took office
in 1899, measures were undertaken to republicanize the officer
corps. A governmental spy network was set up to check on the
attitudes of all officers and the promotion system was placed
in the hands of the government's minister of war. Thus, by
191^, the Army high command was no longer a rightist-conserva-
37tive stronghold of reaction. (Note the example of the
39





In actuality, the French army of the 1890s was not a
powerful institution. Ever since the Franco-Prussian War
in 1870, inactivity, slow promotions and low pay had been
plaguing the morale of the nation's military. And after
the humiliation of the Dreyfus affair, applications to the
elite academy of St. Cyr dropped by fifty percent and many
39
officers either retired or resigned their commissions.
By the turn of the century, revanchist hopes of a war with
Germany had subsided and France had decided to seek security
in an alliance with Russia. French socialist leaders, how-
ever, denounced the Franco-Russian military alliance of 1899
as an alliance with the very heart of Reaction. They had
been watching the German socialist movement grow into the
largest Marxian party in Europe and they hoped for reconcil-
iation with Germany in order to realize the Utopian peaceful
coexistence of all the proletarian states of Europe. Thus,
it was in a spirit of antimilitarism, internationalism and
pacifism that the French socialists crossed into the 20th
century
.
F. SECTION FRANCAISE DE L • INTERNATIONALE OUVRIERE
By 1904, the five socialist parties in France had come
to agree with Jean Jaures that if the movement were to have
any effect in reforming society and the economy, then it
must be unified. Jules Guesde and Jean Jaures therefore
went before the 1904 Congress of the Second International
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in Amsterdam to plead their respective cases for leadership
in the new French party. Jules Guesde, advocating a party
of class struggle and revolution,, was made the founder of
the French Section of the Workers' International (SFIO). In
1905, however, as unification was actually taking place at
the Congress of Unity in Paris, it was the influence of
Jaures and his spirit of compromise and reform that truly
led the new party. (This Jauressian trend has been explained
in part by Ronald Tiersky. He maintains that the leading
theoreticians of the Second International were stunned by
the failure of the 1905 Russian revolution, and that they
consequently spent the next decade saying that proletarian
democracy would be reached by social and economic reform - a
41
process of making bourgeois democracy "honest.") Refusing
the Guesdist model of a strong, centralized party organiza-
tion, the SFIO adopted a federal organization in which each
federation wrote its own statutes, selected its own officers
and thus exercised a large degree of local autonomy. Jaures
(editor of the party's paper in Paris, L 'Humanite ) insisted
that this be "a party of free discussion and free criticism,"
42
with a press open to all opinions. During the pre-World
War I period, the SFIO never became a mass or worker-based
party. (Although this was an era of industrial expansion
in France, the proletariat comprised only 39% of the nation's
work force by 1914 and party membership reached only 93,000
as compared with one million members in the German Socialist
party.) ^ Party members came mainly from Paris, the
41

heavily-industrialized Franco-Belgian border area and the
agricultural south. But the electorate were primarily small
landowners, businessmen, government employees and profession-
44
al men. They were led by lawyers and professors, men from
bourgeois and intellectual backgrounds (as were the leaders
of the Second International at this time). There was no
particular cult of the working class. The SFIO merely em-
braced the ideals of the Republic and sought to improve
relations between bourgeoisie and the workers. Under the
influence of Jaures, French socialism became a constitution-
al party, trying to attract bourgeois support for the social-
ist cause. When the German Socialists (dogmatic adherents
to Marxism) tried to dissuade the French Socialists from
participating in government, Jaures argued that what was
good for the German Socialists was not necessarily good
for other national groups. In France the party could find
some really dependable allies among the progressive bour-
geoisie, and together they could get control of parliament
and of the state itself. In Germany it was very possible
46that a different strategy would be quite proper.
As one examines the significant events of the first
fourteen years of the 20th century, the year 1905 once again
comes to the fore. The French nation, already armed with an
assurance of aid from Russia, had just signed a secret entente
with the British; the fear of an aggressive Germany still ran
high in the hearts of Frenchmen. When Emperor Wilhelm II
visited Tangiers in 1905 and hailed the independence of
42

Morocco in spite of the Franco-British Entente which gave
Prance a free hand in that country, the French nation felt
itself on the brink of war. Although the ultimate test of
strength was averted by the dismissal of the warmongering
Foreign Minister Delcasse, tensions within France began to
rise geometrically, and continued to do so until the actual
outbreak of war in 191*1. There was a growing sense of urgency
for preparations to defend France against a German attack;
the standing army was strengthened by an extension of mili-
tary service from two to three years.
The Socialists, however, continued to pursue their inter-
nationalist hopes for a reconciliation between France and
Germany. The revolution seemed imminent, as French labor
was voicing its discontent as never before: a general strike
in 1909 had been ruthlessly subdued by army troops. ' SFIO
antimilitarist sentiments were evident during the voting of
the three-year military service law; Socialist opposition,
48however, was not able to prevent its ultimate passage.
Concerning the Socialist stand on patriotism and defense of
the homeland, Jaures spoke for the majority of the SFIO when
he said it was the "imperious duty" of workers to join the
nation's fight against, any aggressor to save her independence;
but he firmly added that this duty applied only in the case
of a defensive war. In other words, Socialists were supposed
to try to prevent war at all costs, even if it meant general
strikes and insurrections in order to force arbitration and
forestall an outbreak of hostilities. And if France were to
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wage an aggressive war? Jaures was unmistakably clear:
• 49Socialists must revolt. '
G. WORLD WAR I
On July 28, 191*1, Austria declared war on Serbia. French
Socialists had met in Paris just two weeks before to discuss
the possibility of calling a universal general strike of the
European working class. They soon agreed, however, that the
French movement was too weak to lead the strike and, since
the German Socialists were both unable and unwilling to
50participate in such an action, the idea must be abandoned.
Therefore it was in a spirit of hopelessness that the Social-
ists of France, Austria and Germany met in Brussels the day
after Austria's declaration of war. Too weak to combat the
mounting chauvinism in their respective countries, the leaders
of the three parties could only embrace and promise rallies
and demonstrations in an effort to avert the impending holo-
51
caust. Two days later Germany declared a state of "immi-
nent danger of war" and that night, as France was formulating
its response, Jean Jaures was assassinated. Thus, left with-
out a leader and faced with the almost certain advent of a
defensive war, the SFIO rallied to President Poincare's
call for a "sacred union" of all the sons of France "in a
common indignation against the aggressor, and in a common
52patriotic faith." Four days after the assassination of
Jaures, the SFIO was voting unanimously in favor of the war
credits requested by the President of the Republic. A
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government pre-war plan to preventively arrest 1000 trade
union and exteme-leftist leaders in the event of war was
cancelled as unnecessary. J Before the end of the month
two Socialists had entered the French cabinet, temporarily
abrogating the party principle that Socialists should not
participate in the cabinets of a bourgeois government.
In the opening days of the war, the nuances between re-
formist and revolutionary Socialists disappeared as nearly
everyone became a realist. By September, Socialists were
even among those on the front lines at the First Battle of
the Marne. In 1915, however, a handful of French revolu-
tionary Socialists went to an international socialist con-
ference in Zimmerwald, Switzerland, to register their opposi-
tion to the war. (The conference had been organized by the
Russian Bolshevik V. Lenin and it was in large part a result
of the contacts made and ideas obtained at Zimmerwald that
this small French delegation later played significant roles
55in the founding of a French Communist Party.) By 1916 many
Socialists in Parliament were ready for France to surrender.
Only Jules Guesde and his adherents were able to keep the
"white peace advocates" from moving into open opposition to
56
the government. (Jules Guesde was a cabinet minister at
the time.) By December of that year, however, the Party was
equally divided over the issue of continuing the war. The
Socialists made a unanimous call for the Allied governments
to accept President Wilson's offer of mediation and to adopt




annexations or reparations." But the harsh winter of
1916-1917 passed by and Socialist hopes for an early peace
dwindled.
1917 was to be a crucial year in the story - of the Sacred
Union. In "March the French government allowed three Social-
ists to go to Petrograd to talk with the Russian Socialists
and persuade them to join in the war effort and cooperate with
the new provisional government's plans for continuing the war
against the Central Powers. The Russians replied that the
only way to" revive the morale of the Russian Army and prevent
the Russians from making a separate peace was for the Allies
to attend the peace conference in Stockholm in May and be
willing to delineate their specific war aims. The French
Socialists were extremely concerned that the Russians might
sign a separate peace and leave France at the mercy of the
whole German military machine; therefore, they wanted France
to participate in the conference. Just as the government was
deliberating the matter, however, there was an explosion of
emotion and dissatisfaction that plunged the nation into a
severe crisis. Workers' strikes were becoming more frequent,
as they demanded higher pay and an end to the war. In May
1917 a near total strike occurred in the vital mines and
munitions factories of Paris and the St. Etienne basin.
Furthermore, General Nivelle's troops were refusing to go
into battle. A Colonel in the field at the time described
the army rebellion at its height as having "reached more than
half our divisions, including even the elite corps, and
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S8threatening . the army with total disintegration." Within
a few days General Petain had become Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces. His main task was to rebuild the army
into an effective fighting force. This he saw as impossible
if there were members of the government going to a peace con-
ference in Sweden to discuss a negotiated peace. He considered
this a clear display of defection and urged that the Socialists
not be issued passports for the conference, saying, "the
danger of an attack by 75 German divisions is distinctly less
59
serious than the demoralization of our army." This marked
the first serious crack in the Sacred Union, as the government
did withhold the passports. This act was important also in
that it revealed the association being made in the military
mind between Socialist pacifism and t.roop demoralization.
In September 1917 the Sacred Union was officially broken
as the Socialists refused to support the Painleve government.
Their withdrawal from the Union did not indicate, however,
any lessening of their concern for the national defense of
Prance. For example, when the Bolsheviks asked the French
Socialists a few months later to support the new Russian
peace policy, the Frenchmen replied that such a separate
peace would "serve... the designs of the enemies of democracy
and socialism throughout the world, by allowing them to in-
voke the Russian Revolution as an example of disorganization
and demoralization." (Trotsky reportedly retorted that of
all the socialist parties, the French were the least quali-
fied to preach sermons to the Russians. For, the French had
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voted for war credits and had been denied permission to go
to Stockholm and they were themselves responsible for this
f> 1humiliation because they had joined the Sacred Union.)
By the end of the year, Clemenceau had become Prime Minister
of France. He waged a ruthless campaign against pacifism
and defection, not bothering to distinguish between German
sympathizers and simple idealists. On December 28, the
Socialist deputies in parliament demanded a revision of the
war aims and the publication of secret treaties. A few days
later they asked Clemenceau for passports to make a last-
ditch attempt to reason with the Bolsheviks and talk them
out of a separate peace. -Clemenceau refused apparently be-
cause it was Christmas and morale was once again very low
among the troops at the front. The Socialists continued to
vote for war credits, but they also demanded in January 1918
that the government align its peace plans with Wilson's
Fourteen Points. The French intervention in Russia in
mid-1918 was greeted with general approval by the Socialists,
many of whom felt betrayed by the treaty of Brest Litovsk.
But, as intervention continued in Russia after the Armistice,
it became obvious that French troops were there to put down
the Bolsheviks and not German imperialism. French Social-
ists began opposing the operation, claiming that the Bolshe-
viks were merely exercising their right to self-determination
and therefore their right to revolution. The Socialists
claimed that such an infringement of human rights by the




intervention was not serving the interests of France;
rather, it was slowing demobilization and preventing the
conclusion of a Wilsonian peace.
Before concluding this section dealing with the SPIO
during World War I, it might be valuable to study the French
Socialists' basic attitude on national defense and to contrast
it with that of the Bolsheviks, who for their part refused to
contribute to the defense of their nation. One must recognize
that although there was a split in the French Socialists dur-
ing the war, the two major factions (discounting the Zimmer-
waldian minority) wholeheartedly supported the defense effort
and merely differed on the criterion for terminating the war.
One faction maintained the enemy had to surrender uncondi-
tionally; the other wanted a negotiated peace along Wilsonian
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lines as soon as the threat to France had been removed.
These Socialists of early 20th century France were Jauressian
in spirit: trying to balance patriotism with internationalism,
revolution with reform. In contrasting French Socialist
support for national defense and Russian refusal to do the
same, Robert Wohl explains:
If the Russians were the most revolutionary of all
socialists in their reaction to the war and the least
taken in by the appeal to Sacred Union, it was because
they of all European socialists were the most alienated
from. their own government and their, own society. The
French socialists, on the other hand, represented a
coalition- of workers, peasants and petty bourgeois
already deeply integrated into the social, political
and cultural life of the Third Republic. The Sacred
Union showed that reality of integration. .. it was
impossible to persuade the French worker or peasant.




This was true, at least, for the generation of Frenchmen
who entered the war in 191^; but they did not emerge unscathed
from the five years of conflict. The war had caused a second
French industrial revolution: by 1919 the primary industry
of France had shifted from textiles to metallurgy, requiring
greater numbers of less skilled laborers. Paris had become
a major industrial center and a "Red Belt" around the capital
began to take shape (i.e. large concentrations of factory
workers flocked to the industries springing up in the Pari-
sian suburbs). The ranks of the French Section of the Workers
International had swelled from 93,000 in 1914 to 133,000 in
1919- The psychological and economic privations of the war
had taken their toll on French society.
The Socialist leaders were jubliant in the Republic's
victory over imperialistic aggression. Furthermore, they
placed their faith in Wilson: the man, his abilitities and
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his principles. With heightened confidence in the effective-
ness and justice of the existing governmental system, they
believed that a revolution by parliamentary means was possible
and imminent, to be realized by the forthcoming elections of
1919. This ebullient optimism was short-lived however. A
wave of strikes had frightened the majority of French society
into believing that the Russian Revolution and Bolshevism
were spreading to France. As a result, the elections ended
with the SFIO receiving 23$ of the votes, more than in 191^




in Parliament. The Socialist faith in parliamentary revolu-
tion had been crushed. On the heels of this political dis-
appointment came the revelation of the Paris Peace terms and
the full realization that Wilsonian idealism was a sham,
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weak and empty. This only served to reinforce the Social-
ists' now resurgent belief that bourgeois idealism, no matter
how sincere, was simply incapable of solving the contemporary
72problems of the world. By the end of 1920, two-thirds of
the French Socialists had decided that the SPIO, as guided
by the principles of the Second International, was no longer
viable in postwar France. Led by L.O. Frossard, the Party's
left wing declared that a dramatic, substantive change was
needed, and it proposed French membership in the new Inter-
national being formed by the Bolsheviks.
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III. THE INTERWAR PERIOD (1920-1939)
A. DIVISION IN THE 1920 's
1. Section Francaise de 1
[
Internationale Communlste
At 2 a.m. on December 30, 1920, the French Section of
the Workers International was irrevocably cut in two. Two-
thirds of the delegates to the Party Congress in Tours de-
cided to form the French Section of the Communist Internation-
al (SFIC) . The remaining third departed the party congress
and, as the SFIO, soon fell under the leadership of the cen-
trist-socialist Leon Blum. How to explain this massive shift
towards Bolshevism? As mentioned earlier, there was by no
means spontaneous or unanimous SFIO support of the Russian
Revolution, considered at the time to be disruptive to the
war effort and dangerous to the defense of France. The
French Socialists had known the Bolsheviks from their earlier
meetings at congresses of the Second International. One of
the founders of the SFIC was to later remark:
But who among us paid attention before the War to
the representatives of Russian Socialism? We considered
them negligible. Indeed, we stayed away from them so
as not to get involved in their terrible sectarian
quarrels. Hadn't Jaurefs himself ordered the staff of
L T Humanite * not to accept their articles except in the
case of absolute necessity, aware as he was from long
experience that printing a line from any one of them
inevitably entailed printing half a dozen annoying
rectifications before the week was out .
1
These remarks emphasize how little the French Socialists
of 1920 had studied the Bolshevik movement. To be sure, no
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one of that era could really know or predict the future nature
of the Russian socialist movement for, from 1917 until 1920,
there had been strict prohibition by the French government on
travel to and publication of information from Russia due to
2possible adverse effects on the army. Thus, at the time the
SFIC was founded, Bolshevism in France was more of a mood
than a clear ideology. While Leon Blum and the SFIO centrists
regarded it as anarchistic, the new members of the SFIC saw
3it as a symbol of "the Revolution." In fact, the Russian
Revolution was considered an extension of the French Revolu-
tion. An article in a 1917 copy of L 'Humanite reads as
follows: "It is said that everything that has happened in
the streets in Petrograd has been carried out to the cry of
f Vive la France!'" Even Lenin himself told Frossard that
the Russians were being faithful' to French revolutionary
traditions "as the river is faithful to its source in flow-
5ing toward 'the sea." But aside from this nationalistic
attraction, Bolshevism was not so important for what it
represented as for what it opposed . In the words of one of
the new French communists of 1920:
I know nothing of Bolshevism. I have neither the
leisure nor the means to study it. But my landlord,
my boss, and my neighbor - each of whom is more greedy
and reactionary than the next - speak badly of it.
Therefore it must be doing something worthwhile."
Perhaps the French knew very little about the Bolsheviks
in 1920; but Lenin and Trotsky knew a considerable amount
about the French. Lenin had had contact with the handful of
dissenting French Socialists who had attended the Zimmerwald
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Conference during the war. Lenin saw the conference as the
first step toward the building of a new International, and
he saw the war as an opportunity for revolution and civil
7
war within each belligerent state. As mentioned earlier,
the French delegation to that conference was merely seek-
ing an immediate end to the war and objecting to all Social-
ist participation in the conflict. They considered Lenin
o
to be an extremist and refused to take him seriously.
Trotsky, on the other hand, had been in Paris since before
the war until his expulsion in 1916. He associated with the
small group of pacifists who were forming the Committee for
the Resumption of International Relations (between Socialists
and workers), and from this contact, he developed an impres-
sion of the kinds of ideas that would appeal and apply to the
9
specific case of France.
As soon as the war was over, the Bolsheviks invited
all European revolutionaries to come to Russia to organize a
new International. Lenin wanted to thwart the effort of
rightist Socialists to revive the old Second International;
he wanted instead a new one, led by the Bolsheviks and
avowedly hostile to reformist Socialism. The Third Commu-
nist International (the Comintern) was founded on March 4,
1919 and its "21 Conditions" for admission to the Comintern
were drawn up at the Second Congress, in July-August 1920.
As described above, the French vote for membership in the
new International took place later that same year. Reinforc-
ing the notion that Bolshevism and membership reflected a
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mood rather than a serious commitment to an ideology is the
fact that the delegations to the 1920 Tours Congress never
officially voted on the 21 Conditions. (These were the
conditions requiring a party to organize itself along Lenin's
model of "democratic centralism": a highly centralized and
disciplined party whose membership is periodically purged.)
As the Tours Congress of 1920 was voting for admission to the
Comintern, it received a telegram from the Bolshevik Zinoviev,
in the Comintern, prohibiting the membership of Jean Longuet,
son-in-law of Karl Marx. J Robert Wohl explains that Longuet
was considered too dangerous:
He was a man of principle, who would not knuckle
under... For men setting out to create a new kind of
political movement ,... the decision to bar the door to
Longuet and his friends made excellent sense. Senti-
mentalists ... could be remolded. . .Opportunists ... could
be used and if necessary discarded. Socialist leaders
of Longuet ' s type would simply be a hindrance. Too
reflective to overlook the implications of Bolshevik
methods, too honest to let themselves be used, too
committed to the old ways to be won over to totalitar-
ianism in the afternoon of their careers, they had no
place in a party whose objective was political power
rather than social justice. 1"
This early evidence of Bolshevik control over the French com-
munist movement is a birthmark which, some believe, is still
visible today.
2. Development of PCF
The SFIC proclaimed itself the French Communist Party
(PCF) in October of 1921, the the First PCF Party Congress
was held in Marseilles in December of that same year. Lenin
had realized the adverse side-effects of telegraphing his
orders to the various new parties, so to this first French
15
congress he sent two Comintern emissaries instead. J Thus,
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Moscow's representatives were present when the party dis-
cussed its national defense policy, a key item on the agenda.
This ended up being nothing more than the prewar Socialist
policy of opposition to all war credits, support for the
independence of all peoples and, in case of war, the calling
17
of a general strike. '
a. Resistance
The party accomplished little during its first
six months of existence, except general protest against the
government and expressions of vague solidarity with the Russian
18
Revolution. This failure of the French movement to apply
itself constructively to the cause of communism came to
Lenin's attention, and in March of 1922 he remarked:
The transformation of a party of the old parliamentary
type... into a party of a new type, a truly revolutionary
party, truly communist, is an extremely difficult thing.
The French case demonstrates this difficulty in perhaps
the most evident manner. 19
Furthermore, during this same period, a leading PCF member
complained that "our unkind adversaries accuse us of having
added a 22nd condition to the original 21, namely 'The 21
20
conditions don't count.'" By 1923, Lenin was saying "there
21
is at present no communist party in France..." This severe
admonishment was due to the PCF's refusal to obey Comintern
instructions to seek "a united labor front" with the centrist
Socialists. In 1922 Lenin had decided that the initial post-
war opportunity for revolution had subsided and that capital-
ism had become stabilized. This meant a change in tactics:
violent revolution must be temporarily replaced by an alliance
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of all communist and non-communist workers for the common
22
pursuit of short-term, immediate goals. French Party
Secretary-General Frossard, however, refused to attempt such
a reunification with the Socialists, stating that he could
not seek an alliance with the very people he had been malign-
ing as "traitors to the working class" for the past year or
more; for this refusal, Frossard was repeatedly criticized
2^by the leadership of the Comintern. In December of 1922,
on orders from the Comintern, Frossard was made to share the
24
secretary-generalship of the party with Albert Treint.
The Comintern already wielded a great deal of
power in the PCF, as evidenced by the following account.
Treint was arrested early in 1923 and, while in prison, he
offerred his resignation from the party (due to the party's
press having censored an article he had written). His res-
ignation was not accepted by the Comintern; for, as long as
Moscow wanted and trusted an individual in a particular
office, that individual stayed - regardless of his own or
25
his collegues' desire that he retire. By the same token,
when Moscow desired the expulsion of an undesirable, this
too was accomplished.
b. Submission
When Lenin died in 1924 and Stalin triumphed
over Trotsky for the position of leader of the international
communist movement, the PCF felt the repurcussions of the
change. Few PCF members had been aware of the Stalin-Trotsky
struggle, but if asked, their preference would probably have
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been for Trotsky to win. A Trotskyite cult had developed
within the French working classes, for he had impressed
them with his remedies for their troubles. With "a pheno-
menal theoretical and firsthand knowledge of French condi-
tions,'" he had captured their imagination. The PCF leader-
ship did not relish the idea of repudiating Trotsky, and yet
it dared not counter the majority of the Russian party and
the Comintern. A loyal French Trotskyite, Boris Souvarine,
learned of the Stalinist excesses during the power struggle
in Moscow but he suppressed the information from the rest
of the party. For,
What possible good could come from publishing articles
which the French could not understand and which would re-
quire whole volumes to explain. . .The role of the French
Communists is to study the Russian debates in order to
profit from them, and not to get involved in a dispute
when they have so much to do at home... If it is under-
standable that the Bolsheviks should be carried away by
a certain internal logic of conflict, and give themselves
over to unjust attacks, it would be intolerable for these
attacks to be renewed in the French party by comrades who
do not have the excuse of being inflamed by blows given
or received. 27
Thus, the PCF subjected itself to the change and Souvarine
and Frossard, among others, were expelled; the one for his
Trotskyite past, the other for his intransigence in the
united front policy. There was no longer any doubt that the
Soviet Union was the undisputed dictator of the Comintern
and of all its member parties. At the Third Comintern
Congress (1921), Trotsky had said:
We are defending this bulwark of the world revolution,
since at the given moment there is no other in the world.
When another stronghold is erected in France or in Germany,
then the one in Russia will lose nine-tenths of its signi-
ficance; and we shall then go to you in Europe to defend
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this other and more important stronghold. Finally, Com-
rades, it is sheer absurdity to believe that we deem this
Russian stronghold of the Revolution to be the center of
the world. °
But by the Fifth Comintern Congress (1924), Stalin was demand-
ing that the status of the USSR and its party be enhanced by
the bolshevization of all Comintern member parties. A bol-
shevized party was one that was more closely linked to the
masses, more able to exploit revolutionary situations. It
was one that embraced the principles and tactics of Leninism.
It was centralized, without factions, and mirrored the ideas
and practices of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)
This policy was credible at the time as the Soviet Union was
the only proletarian state in existence, and it manifested
29 •
every intent of enduring.
In France in 1924, the Communists had not been
able to attract much of a following. The 1921 tactic of a
Communist-Socialist united front on both the top (leadership)
and bottom (rank and file) levels had failed miserably.
With a great deal of Russian financial backing, the party
managed to get an initial 26 candidates elected to Parliament
in 1924. 31 (But this was only 7-9$ of the vote.) 3 ^ In 1924,
the PCF was not a mass party; due to political in-fighting
and general disillusionment, it had lost more than 60% of
its original members. Moreover the party was attempting to
recruit followers from the traditional Socialist elite,
rather than from the unskilled workers, discontented peasants
or rebellious immigrants; by 1924 it had attracted less than
2% of the nation's industrial workers. J Intellectually,
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the party described itself at this time as "20 percent
Jauresism, 10 percent Marxism, 20 percent Leninism, 20 per-
cent Trotskyism, and 30 percent confusionism. D
Thus, from 1924 to 1926, bolshevization began.
It was not to be fully completed until the early 1930s.
Leninist doctrine promised that the communist parties were
a new type of party, the vanguard of the rising revolution-
ary proletariat. Therefore the party must be thoroughly
working-class in membership and leadership. The Comintern
wanted national party leaders with working-class backgrounds,
with pragmatic (not intellectual) skills. The party leader
had to be able to carry out the policy lines emanating from
the Soviet leadership. It was in 1924 that Maurice Thorez,
future Secretary-General of the PCF, was promoted to the PCF
35Central Committee - he was only 24 years old.
Prom 1924 to 1928, the party was instructed to
practice the united front only at the bottom (i.e. try to
persuade Socialist rank and file to join the communist move-
ment.) But this tactic failed. No gains were made in the
1924 municipal elections or the 1925 cantonal elections, and
r 36
not one Communist senator was elected in 1926. The party
needed something new to capture the attention of the masses.
Something new came in 1928, but its merits were minimal.
For the past year, the Soviet Union had been watching revo-
lutionary developments in China with a very keen eye. The
Comintern Plenum of 1927 divided the world into two camps:
Soviet and Chinese versus Capitalist. The CPSU could finally
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claim a position of leadership in the world revolutionary
movement. The Soviet Union was no longer to be regarded
as a backward country; it was now the living proof of
37
successful revolution. With this renewed revolutionary
fervor, the CPSU instructed the PCF, through the Comintern,
to begin a united front from below, with absolutely no con-
cessions to the social democratic parties. Kermit McKenzie
explains that
On the whole, social democracy .. .was regarded as the
most serious enemy of the Communist Party within the labor
movement. For there could be no revolution without the
proletariat - and no support would come from the prole-
tariat without eradicating the Social Democrats first!
For the left wing of social democracy talked of revolution,
but did nothing about it. The Communist Party was to
strike, demonstrate and protest in other ways - teach the
proletariat class militancy. 3°
Regional ( Lander ) secretariats were set up among the Comintern
parties, with France and Italy belonging to the Romance Lander ,
Moreover, the CPSU decided that votes by various national
delegations at Comintern congresses would be accorded on the
basis of importance of the country. France and Italy were
ranked third most important in all of the Comintern.
Whereas the Italian communists were reprimanded
by Stalin for trying to interpret the instructions of the
1928 Comintern Congress, 9 the French seem to have embraced
the new mission of unity-at-the-bottom with rare radical
militancy. PCF personalities began provoking the authori-
ties with acts of civil disobedience, evading capture and
hiding from the police. When the PCF lost nearly 50$ of
its deputies in the 1928 elections, the party soon saw the
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detrimental effects of Bolshevik tactics applied to French
society. Ronald Tiersky has explained that
The PCF, born as a mass party in a liberal parlia-
mentary setting that offerred a legal existence and
regular, popularly legimated elections, seemed on the
point of being extinguished by the contradiction in-
herent in the importation of an organizational and
strategic doctrine that had proved itself only in a
context of extreme political repression, economic break-
down and defeat in war.^°
But with Stalin firmly at the helm of Comintern, the PCP con-
tinued this tactic for another seven years. Party membership
declined steadily, in spite of the fact that this was the
period of the great economic depression of the late 1920s and
early 1930s.
3. Growth of SFIO
A return to normalcy - this was the 1920s' gift to
France. Construction replaced devastation; industrial produc-
tion surpassed pre-war levels; and immigrant workers ensured
full production capability. It was a profitable decade for
the SFIO; for, although the loser at the Congress of Tours,
it quickly regained its preeminent position as leader of the
Socialist movement in France. In 1924, with a membership of
73,000, the SFIO formed a coalition with the Radical Party
(forming the Cartel of the Left) and proceeded to win a majority
in the 1924 parliamentary elections. SFIO leader, Leon Blum,
however, was an advocate of non-participation in bourgeois
government cabinets unless the SFIO could control the coali-
tion. Since it was only the junior party in the 1924 coali-





4. Defense Policy of 1920s
In spite of their apparent strength in parliament
during the 1920s, the Socialists do not seem to have exercised
any particular leadership in directing the nation's foreign or
defense affairs.
The PCF, on the other hand, did become significantly
involved in defense matters. Following the Comintern line
the party denounced the Versailles Treaty and demanded self-
determination for Alsace and Lorraine. From 1921 to 1922,
Hi
PCF deputies consistantly voted against military credits.
The Comintern of 1921 had called for French Communists to do
everything they could to make French soldiers in the occupied
zone of Germany feel ashamed of their police roles. But the
PCF knew there was little that could practically be done in
light of the continued hostility of most Frenchmen towards
the Germans. In 1922, at the Fourth Comintern Congress, the
Versailles Treaty became a key issue. The PCF was told to
demand the withdrawal of French troops from the occupied left
bank of the Rhine and to prevent the projected occupation of
the Ruhr valley. The Russians saw trouble between France and
Germany over reparations as a potential weakening of the German
bourgeoisie, a sharpening of class antagonisms and a provocation
ho
for revolution.
In January 1923, when French Prime Minister Poincare
ordered French troops into the Ruhr, the SFIO position was
43
"vague." The PCF, however, was ordered by the Comintern to
organize a vast campaign against French imperialism and
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occupation of the Ruhr. PCF Secretary-General Treint went to
Germany for an international communist conference which concluded
with a pronouncement that the PCP should undermine the morale
of the occupying French troops, distribute communist propaganda
and should prepare for a general strike throughout France in
case of war or prolonged occupation of the Ruhr. The French
Communist Youth movement became extremely active during the
Ruhr occupation, distributing over two million leaflets and
manifestos to the occupation forces, often right in their
barracks. The tracts, printed in German, French and Arabic
(for the Tunisian and Algerian troops), were generally
similar to this one:
In no circumstances will you accept the humiliating func-
tion of counter-revolutionary gendarmes. In no circum-
stances will your bayonets pierce the breasts of the
rebelling German workers .. .Set out for the Army in order
to be the soldiers of Communism... 5
In short, soldiers were encouraged to fraternize with the German
workers
.
In 1923, the Chamber of Deputies approved a motion to
suspend the parliamentary immunity of its PCF representatives
in order that they might be arrested and tried for their dis-
ii 7
ruptive opposition to the policies of the national government. '
In 1924 the PCF began a remarkable anti-colonialist
campaign. The PCF had had an opportunity to act in support of
the Algerian and Tunisian liberation movements in 1922. The
Comintern had sent a memorandum to the Algerian branch of the
PCF requesting it aid the local rebel efforts. The Algerian
Party replied that it could not accept the Comintern's colonial
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policy; for, it was premature and dangerous to make appeals to
the natives to revolt. A liberation of Algeria at that time
would probably be reactionary, not progressive, if it came
before a victorious revolution in France. The PCP in North
Africa had yet to establish in the minds of the natives a
favorable attitude toward communism. At the Fifth Comintern
Congress (1924) the French were castigated for their sluggish-
48
ness in supporting colonial liberation movements. Therefore,
when Moroccan rebels began fighting against Spanish imperialism
in July of 1924, the PCF took up the cause readily. The party
telegraphed its congratulations to the rebel leader, Abd-el-Krim,
for his victories, and the party expressed the hope that he
would continue "the struggle against all imperialists, includ-
49ing French, until Moroccan soil is set completley free."
In 1925, when the French government intervened with troops in
Morocco and also in Syria, the PCF protested the repressive
actions and called for fraternization of the troops with the
Moroccan rebels. They also demanded recognition of an inde-
50pendent Moroccan republic headed by Abd-el-Krim. One hundred
and sixty-five French communists were imprisoned in France
for their propagandizing activities between summer and fall
51
of 1925.
Once again, the SFIO took only a "vague" stand on the
52
intervention issues. But it permitted the Chamber of Deputies
to continue its prosecution of PCF members on into 1925, even
though the Socialists by then held a predominant position in





B. UNION IN THE 1930s
1. Leadership of Maurice Thorez
The decade opened with an important party election
for the PCF. Maurice Thorez, emerging from a year in jail
and criticizing the PCF leadership for its failure to follow
Comintern directives and to successfully implement a united
front policy, was elected Secretary-General of the Central
Committee. Three months later he had successfully created the
post of Secretary of the Politburo and had had himself elected
to fill it. As he stepped into this position, Thorez became
the first real chief of the PCF. More than a leader, Thorez
began consolidating the party power around his person. The
old leaders were removed between 1931 and 1932. At the end of
1931> the Comintern sent a team of advisors to school and
support the new chief.
National elections were held in 1932, during this
period of PCF leadership changeover. The PCF recorded a further
5^
loss of two parliamentary seats and 20,000 members. The
Cartel of the Left, meanwhile, was victorious once again:
the Radical Party received the highest number of seats in
parliament, but the SFIO emerged for the first time as the
55
single most popular party in France.
1933 was a landmark year in both France and the USSR,
for this was the year that Hitler came to power in Germany and
a Nazi party was formed in Austria. The Soviet Union began to
think it needed closer diplomatic ties with the democracies of
Europe. This goal could be enhanced if the respective
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communist parties were in a position to pressure their govern-
ments into a pro-Soviet stance. For these reasons, the USSR
began seeking a change in tactics for the national communist
parties. In France there still existed one rival to Thorez:
Jacques Doriot . He saw that the previous policy of "united
from below" and "class against class" was not working. He
favored a policy of"united from above"- a true union with the
Socialists. This, as it turns out, was precisely the tactic
the Soviets were hoping to see develop in countries like
France; but to openly direct such a dramatic shift in policy
was viewed as slightly humiliating by the Soviet leadership.
Therefore, in 193^, the Comintern summoned both Thorez and
Doriot to Moscow "to put an end to the party's internal
battle." According to the notes of a former PCF party member,
the Russians were hoping that Doriot would present his idea
of rapprochement with the Socialists, and in turn they could
agree that such a policy would be best for France. But Doriot
refused to go to Moscow and Thorez, smug and confident in his
blind allegiance to the official Comintern line, went alone.
Instead of helping the Russians, Thorez merely proceeded to
admonish Doriot for his deviant ideas. Reportedly one of the
secretaries of the Comintern (Manuilsky) became so exasperated
with Thorez 's "straight-arrow" behaviour that he declared,
"you are too subservient to be a real leader!"-3 And still
Thorez did not understand. Thorez' s return from Moscow has
been referred to in many sources as the return of the con-
firmed leader of the PCF; in reality it appears the Soviets
57had no one else with whom to deal.
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[Doriot, thinking he was to be reprimanded, left the
party and formed one of the major fascist parties in France
58
during the 1930s and 40s. In the hierarchy of French
fascism, his party, the Parti Populaire Francais (PPF) was
second only to Colonel de La Rocque's Croix de Feu, later
known as the Parti Social Francais. During the Second World
War, two major Vichy Ministers and several high ministerial
officials of the Petain regime were former members of the
PPF. 59 ]
2 . Jauressian Blum
The SFIO, meanwhile, had been suffering from internal
schisms of its own over Blum's insistence on non-participation
in cabinets. Party unity was put to the ultimate test in 1933
Fear of war was mounting in France, and the Socialists were
faced with the same dilemma as in 1914: should the party
temporarily abandon its principles and ideals in order to join
the bourgeois government for the defense of the nation? Leon
Blum was a Jauressian insofar as he lived in constant hope of
reuniting all French socialists into a strong, unified group
that could then appeal to all socialists for international
disarmament and the prevention of war. Therefore, Blum
adamantly refused to dilute party principles by joining a
bourgeois government. When the SFIO's coalition partners,
the Radicals, started formulating an active policy of national
defense (including increased defense expenditures), the SFIO
turned away and began seeking a rapprochement with the PCF.
Blum met with then-General Secretary Thorez in February 1933

to discuss the issue of socialist unification. Thorez
objected on the grounds that there existed within the SPIO a
rightist faction advocating collaboration with the bourgeois
60
Radicals. His intelligence was accurate: about 30 socialist
deputies and 20,000 members of the SFIO (roughly one-sixth of
the party) were in favor of active participation in the govern-
61
ment - particularly now in a time of national crisis. The
crack in the party widened ominously during a parliamentary
vote on the defense budget. The right-Socialist deputies
claimed they must support the policies of the Radical govern-
ment lest the latter lose the confidence of parliament and
fall, making way for a fascist, reactionary government of
62
the middle classes. It is important to remember here that
the Cartel of the Left had been ruling Prance ever since 1924
and that currently it was saddled with responsibility for
bringing the nation out of a massive economic depression.
Even though the depression was an international phenomenon,
it still served as excellent fuel for a fascist or reactionary
change of government incompetance . Therefore, it is quite
probable that the fears of the SFIO's rightist faction could
be readily substantiated. The vote in favor of the defense
budget passed, supported by the right-Socialists and opposed
by the Socialist majority. At this, the dissenters officially
broke away from the SFIO and founded the Socialist Party of
France (PSF), the most important split within the French
socialist mvoement since the break with the communists in 1920.
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By its rejection of the PSF and the Radical Party,
the SFIO majority of centrists-Socialists had thus cut itself
off from moderating, rightist influences. The only direction
it could go for support was left. It will be recalled that
Jaures had advocated a general strike before World War I in
order to halt the development of the nation's war machine,
the availability of which would only prompt a decision in
favor of war. In view of this fact, it is significant to note
that three months after the PSF defection, the SFIO and the
PCF participated in a "joint plan of counteraction": on
February 12, 193^, Socialist deputies and Party leaders led
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a massive anti-fascist demonstration march through Paris.
Demonstrators came from all leftist parties and groups. The
action was part of a nationwide general strike that completely
shut down all major cities including Paris.
3. Union
The success of the demonstration did not lead to auto-
matic Union between the SFIO and the PCF, however, for Thorez
insisted on pursuing the official Comintern direction to "beat
the bourgeoisie and. its main social support, the Socialist
party ... [and] win over the socialist worker from the traitor
SFIO." The Comintern leaders, however, were on daily air-
mail distribution for the SFIO party paper Le Populaire and
they had been following the Socialist overtures. On June 24,
193^, Moscow officials received the Populaire of the 23rd in
which Leon Blum was tendering the PCF yet another offer of
unity. The Comintern officer Manuilsky was in favor of sending
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an uncoded telegram immediately to the PCF, which was holding
a party conference in Ivry, France. "If we lose forty-eight
hours they will do something stupid, " he is reported to have
said. Nonetheless, he did wait - but only twenty-four hours:
the time required to secure Stalin's approval for the tele-
gram instructing Thorez to agree to a pact for "unity of
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action" with the Socialists.
Therefore, just as the Socialists had reluctantly
given up all hope of a unity pact with the PCF, Party Secre-
tary Thorez announced the party's willingness to negotiate
a united front with the SFIO
:
The [Communist] party must rise above all narrow sectar-
ianism or formalism. . .This is not a case of a change of
policy, but rather of changing something
-,-in some cases
a considerable something - in our tactics.
It is worth noting that, just six weeks before this momentous
decision was made, the USSR and France had signed a treaty of
alliance. There were suspicions at the time that this sudden
policy reversal was due directly to the new requirements of
Soviet foreign policy. A French Socialist of the day is
recorded as saying:
Yes, I believe in unity, but an honest unity, and not unity
directed from Moscow - Moscow which, under the mask of
bolshevism, pursues a tsarist policy. '
In any event, the Pact of United Action was signed one month
later. In view of its recent conflicts with the Radical
Party and dissident socialist parties, the SFIO was in no
hurry to enlarge the pact. The PCF, however, worked feverishly
to build the Front populaire . By July 1935, all the forces
of the French Left had been consolidated into a Popular Front;
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this included primarily the SPIO, the PCF, the Radical Party
and the Intergroupe Socialiste, a collection of dissident
socialist parties. France was now a strong ally for Russian
defense and a bulwark against fascism.
4 . Out-of-Government Foreign Policy
Between 1933 and 19 35 the SPIO formulated a remarkable
set of precise foreign policy attitudes. The French Socialists
had succumbed to a defense policy of "armed security" once
before - in 1914 - and France had still been invaded. There-
fore, absolutely refusing to repeat the mistake, the SFIO
insisted that "peace could be secured only through an inter-
national system of security based on controlled international
disarmament within the framework of the League [of Nations]." "
One must pause here a moment in order to fully appreciate the
significance of those words.
a. The French Socialists wanted peace, and France
was to do whatever was necessary to keep a war from ever be-
ginning. This even included signing the 1933 Four-Power Pact
with the fascist powers of Germany and Italy; if this served
to settle differences between the various powers, then such
an action was fully acceptable.' The French Socialists
wanted all the nations of the world to form one, global,
collective security system. This would be a union of all
acting to protect the national security of each. If any
nation should violate the sovereignty of another, the entire
community of states would be empowered to impose upon the
belligerent actor some kind of stringent sanction, a worldwide
economic embargo for example.
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7b. France must disarm. There did not need to be a
collective security system in place before disarmament could
begin: if all nations were to disarm except Hitler's Germany,
then it would stand out unequivocably as the aggressor in the
event of conflict. Furthermore, unilateral disarmament would
at least lessen the likelihood of war being answered by war.
(The Socialists recommended the use of economic reprisals
instead.) A delay in disarmament could only add fuel to
Hitler's massive rearmament effort; for he was defending his
actions by claiming that no one except Germany adhered to the
disarmament terms of the Versailles Treaty. Germany was
thereby justified in providing herself with means for her
defense against armed neighbors. Leon Blum reasoned that even
if absolute, universal disarmament were not really feasible
in light of contemporary conditions, France should at least
strive for the reduction and control of the world's most
destructive weapons, such as airplanes.
c. There should be a nationalization of the French
7?
arms industry.' Already in February 1932, SFIO leaders
were telling parliament that its real "internationalist"
enemies were the marchands de canons (arms manufacturers) -
the international cartel of munitions makers that would
supply even their countries' enemies with arms if it would
prove profitable. The stockpiling of arms creates such a
spirit of tension within a nation that "the smallest incident
will set off the powder kegs. And then people will kill each
7 3
other in the name of Right, Justice, their country ..."' J
Above all, the French Socialists wanted to avoid re-creating
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the feeling of 1913, when the final outbreak of war was greeted
with a near sigh of relief - at last the long-expected, dreaded
event had arrived; now one could go about getting rid of it
once and for all.
d. France must make use of the League of Nations and
make it work for international peace. The Socialists believed
the League could be endowed with some effective sanctions that
it could use to enforce international, multilateral decisions.
The sanctions were to be economic and not military in nature
(such as an embargo on raw materials to a belligerent nation).
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e. Prance should not build a large standing army.
The SPIO consistently voted against the military budget pro-
posals that began appearing in 1933- They opposed the extension
of national military service from one to two years, and this
issue became the focal point for an entire propaganda campaign
from 1933 to 1935 against the French army and the officer corps
in particular. The temper of the campaign can be gleaned from
a few exemplary phrases:
Did officers complain that reservists, called back for
short periods of active duty, were incompetent? Well...
this [is] not an unconscious incompetence but rather an
intentional and justified sabotage of military maneuvers,
reflecting the Frenchman's hostility to the useless military
exercises he [is] being compelled to execute. 7o
(A number of Socialists were arrested and tried for their de-
moralization and slander of the army.) Furthermore, French
Socialists demanded amnesty for all conscientious objectors.
f. In summary, Leon Blum and his party opposed any-
thing that could perpetrate a feeling of imminent war, and
77included in that category were the civil defense exercises.''
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Air raid drills and compulsory possession of a gas-mask were
objected to for reasons of economy, but primarily because of
the "war psychosis" they created.
After this review of the SFIO ' s pacifist policies, it
must be understood that the SFIO was not a movement advocating
7 Pi
revolutionary defeatism, a doctrine advocating surrender in
order to make more propitious the conditions for internal
revolution. The SFIO under the leadership of Blum was much
as it was under Jaures. That is, everything had to be done
to prevent the outbreak of war, but once France was attacked
by a foreign power, French Socialists would be on the front
lines of the national defense effort. They presented no threat
of disruptive, internal revolution (like that experienced in
Russia in 1917); nor would they refuse to enter the army.
On the contrary, this policy was "a conditional acceptance of
[the] national defense [of] a capitalist regime" - the condi-
tion being, of course, an attack on the homeland by a foreign
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aggressor. Moreover, the Socialists were among the first to
approve the idea of a modern mechanized force providing a
defense in depth, an improvement over the inflexible Maginot
line, and they also supported the tactical ideas of Colonel
On
de Gaulle. In short, the SFIO was prepared to support
France's defense , not Napoleon's aggression.
When the French government signed an agreement with
Mussolini in 1935 concerning the borders of Tunisia and




peace and the reduction of international tensions. (The
Socialists had been assured that no secret promises had been
made that would allow Mussolini to take over Ethiopia.) But
as tension mounted over the issue, and Great Britain went to
the League of Nations to plead her case, the French Socialists
were pleased; this was seen as a further step toward peace
and collective security since it was working to keep Italy
in check. No matter that this also constituted indirect
approval of British imperial and colonial goals.
A few months after the Ethiopian crisis came the sign-
ing of the Franco-Soviet military defense pact. Having so
painstakingly elaborated the above antimilitaristic program
for about three years, the French Socialists were horrified
by the sudden belligerence being advocated by the PCF. After
having refused in 1933 to unite with the SFIO because some
members of the latter were voting in favor of war credits, the
PCF suddenly began expounding wholehearted support for such
belligerent measures as the unconditional duty of national
defense (i.e. it would be reasonable to consider using French
ft?
forces even if the territory of France has not been invaded).
At the time the Franco-Soviet Pact was signed, Leon Blum had
endorsed it in the hope that it would help create some kind
O o
of collective security system. The major shock struck the
SFIO when the leader of the world's only "truly socialist"
nation declared himself in support of war preparations. On
May 15, 1935, Stalin declared:
The first duty [of France and the Soviet Union] is to
permit no weakening of the means of their national defense.
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In this respect, [I] understand and fully approve the
policy of national defense pursued by France in order
to maintain its armed forces at a level consistent with
its security.
°
To this announcement, Blum could only reply:
I am still in a daze. The more I think about it the
less I understand it. How is it possible that the repre-
sentatives of the Soviet government [have] signed this
communique? To be sure, the dispat ches . . . had prepared
us for an event, and even an important one. But the actual
fact overshadows all possible previsions ... [Stalin] dis-
approves of the campaign which we have fought endlessly
over the years and which sees true security only in the
collective organization of arbitration, of mutual assis-
tance, of disarmament. ->
With Stalin's surprising change in policy, the French Social-
ists' foreign policy was relegated overnight to the realm of
inconsequential, uninformed political rhetoric. And into their
place stepped the masters in the art of hairpin reversals: the
French Communists.
While the PCF appeared to some to be the vanguard of
the defense of France, it had become the source of serious
concern to others, namely the Rightist forces in France.
Significantly, these latter, usually so anti-German, were very
worried that Russia planned to take advantage of a war situa-
tion in order to set up a Bolshevik state in France with the
help of friends and adherents already in place within the
country: the PCF, SFIO and other leftist groups. Noticing
the loyalty with which the PCF aligned itself with Soviet
policy interests and remarking with concern the size and
strength of the newly-formed Front Populaire , Rightist France
began saying, "Better Hitler than Blum." An ominous mood
of appeasement fell over France: the chilling possibility of
another war like that of 1914 and an intense fear of falling
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prey to Bolshevik opportunism pervaded French society and
instilled in it a general spirit of non-resistance to Germany.
Many people thought that perhaps if nothing were done to pro-
voke German aggression, France would be left alone.
In March of 1936, one week after the French government's
ratifications of the Franco-Soviet pact, Hitler occupied the
Rhineland, justifying his action by saying France had just
violated both the Versailles and the Locarno treaties. Hitler
was left uncontested in the occupied area. As mentioned
above, public opinion in France was overwhelmingly against
any military action at that time. Moreover, the Socialists
were opposed to the government's decision to send troops to
the border; this seemed to them an unnecessary heightening of
o o
tension. When the British government also refused its
support, the French government finally retracted its plan.
Blum was to write, many years later, that France had suffered
incalculable damage by failing to repulse Hitler on the Rhine.
He mentioned especially the weakness this caused in France's
collective security system and the trust that was lost among
89France's small-power allies.
5 . The Front Populaire Government
Three months after the Rhineland crisis, national
parliamentary elections brought the Popular Front into power.
The SFIO received about two million votes and emerged as the
most popular party in the nation and the largest party in the
90Chamber of Deputies. The PCF gains were the most dramatic,




to 1,500,000 in 1936, and from 10 to 72 seats in Parliament.
This was 12.6% of the vote - never had the PCF scored so high.
Charles Micaud writes that the PCF began inviting internal
debate and no longer insisted on strict orthodoxy. Its member-
ship grew accordingly: from 40,000 in 19 34 to 327,000 in
931937. As the Front Populaire came to power in 1936, the
PCF agreed to support the Socialist-Radical coalition but
refused to participate in the government. This allowed it
the freedom to criticize - a freedom it used with disturbing
frequency
.
Leon Blum became Prime Minister of the 1936 Popular
Front government. He immediately instituted a large number
of social reforms in addition to a plan to nationalize the
armaments industry. According to Ronald Tiersky, this plan
was never efficiently implemented, but it was intended to
stimulate a policy of more active defense against a German
adversary - a policy similar to that being advocated by
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Colonel de Gaulle. Furthermore, faced with the actual
responsibility of leading and defending the country, Blum
and his Socialist Party repudiated some of the old Socialist
ideals: they not only endorsed military appropriations, but
also launched a major, long-range plan to modernize the
95
equipment of the French army and air force . Plans were
96
also made to liberalize French colonial policy. The pro-
jected measures would have broadened the rights of the native
peoples of Algeria and Syria, but they were still under dis-
cussion in parliament when the Popular Front fell in 1938.
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a. Spanish Civil War
Before Blum could effectively implement any of
these projects, however, he was confronted with the problem
of French aid or other intervention in the Spanish civil war.
In spite of stiff PCF demands to the contrary, Blum refused
the Spanish Popular Front's appeal for aid. Blum wanted to
localize the conflict and discourage the transfer of foreign
97
arms to the belligerents.
When Blum refused to send aid to the Spanish,
Thorez apparently was instrumental in convincing Stalin (who
wished to avoid a conflict with Hitler) to accept the idea
of International Brigades. Many PCF leaders and militants
participated in these brigades, and French Communists acted
as conduits for considerable amounts of money and material.
Thorez himself went to the war zone in February 1937- It
appears the PCF wanted to do as much as possible without
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compromising national defense or the Franco-Soviet alliance.
b. Failure of the Popular Front
The Popular Front in France had never been a
tightly cohesive union. Consequently, when the SFIO and
PCF persisted in their sharp disagreement over the policy
toward Spain, the Front began to crumble. The first Blum
government fell in June 1937 over a fiscal matter.
Blum returned to the post of Prime Minister nine
months later and, with his new Cabinet, he began discussing
the possibility of sending French forces into Spain if Italy
and Germany did not stop sending aid to Franco. In any
event, the Cabinet decided to organize extensive shipments
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of military supplies for the Spanish Republicans. Gordon
Wright argues that Blum had wanted to send aid all along,
but that pressure from the British forced him to keep hands
off the struggle of his comrades and neighbors. Blum accorded
Franco-British relations a place of great importance, realiz-
ing France's dependence on British friendship. Blum even
considered resigning from office when he was unable to help
the Spaniards; but the Spanish government told him that they
needed friends in Paris even more than they needed arms and
persuaded him to remain in office. French arms were
destined never to reach Spain; for, Blum's second government
fell after only one month and his successor, Daladier,
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sealed off the Pyrenees to all arms shipments.
The coup de grace for the disintegrating Popular
Front was the French signature of the Munich Agreement on
September 29, 1938. While the nation as a whole and the
Socialists in particular voiced their support for the contents
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of the agreement, the PCF declared it could not agree with
their partners 'willingness to sacrifice Russia simply in
103
order to avoid war with Germany. The French Communists
then moved into firm opposition against their former political
partners
.
6 . Nazi-Soviet Pact
The dramatic signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact on
August 22, 1939, apparently came as a surprise to the leaders
of the PCF, who were on vacation and found it necessary to
return home within three days in order to make a statement.
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Written by Thorez, the statement evidences a considerable
degree of disbelief and unusual divergence from the Comintern
line :
We find ourselves once again, one year after Munich,
in the presence of a situation in which the people might
be dragged into war at any moment. Hitler's fascism...
is a constant menace for the security of the 'European'
peoples. What can one do to prevent any new aggression?
The Soviet Union, loyal to its policy of peace, has under-
taken a policy of dislocation of the aggressor bloc...
The German-Soviet Pact... has checked the Munich Plan...
But if, despite all, Hitler begins war, let him under-
stand well that he will find before him the united people
of Prance, the communists in the front line, defending
the security of the country... It is because we are
desirous of peace and of French security that we seek
the conclusion of a French-Anglo-Soviet alliance, which
remains perfectly possible and necessary . 10^
The same day, the Communist parliamentary group vowed that "the
French Communists will collaborate without reticence toward
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national defense." Communist senator Marcel Cachin wrote
to Leon Blum:
At this grave hour, the Communist Party declares that
if Hitler declares war on France, he will find himself
confronted by... the Communists in the first rank. . .We
declare ..that we approve the measures taken by the govern-
ment. 106
But this was a losing battle: a PCF pledge to support the war
would 1) get the French Communists in trouble with the Comin-
tern and 2) not convince the French people anyway. In fact,
on the very day the above promises were being made by the
leaders of the PCF, their party papers L'Humanite and Ce Soir
were being seized as "undermining national defense." Iron-




Unity of the French Nation Against the Hitlerite
Aggressor: ...this is no time for those who want to
preserve the independence and the future of the nation
to argue with each other on the possible interpreta-
tion of events .. .France must be placed on the best
possible footing, able both to maintain a firm atti-
tude and to fulfill its obligations to the menaced
Polish ally... that is the unchallenged conviction of
all Frenchmen worthy of the name. It is our convic-
tion. The moment calls for the union of all Frenchmen.
If Hitler dares to carry out the action he is thinking
of, Communists will be in the front rank. . .they repre-
sent a considerable human, material and moral force,
which is ready to fulfill its obligations and carry
out what it has promised. -^3
The PCF leadership continued to support an anti-fascist policy
of national defense for about a month after the Pact had been
signed: the PCF delegates voted national defense credits the
day after Hitler invaded Poland, and they applauded Daladier's
speech to the Chamber of Deputies. Even Maurice Thorez joined
his military unit.
But on September 17, 1939, when the USSR dispatched
the Red Army across the Polish border, the Comintern finally
issued instructions to its member parties. In a stunningly
novel interpretation of the war, the Comintern declared it
to be "the second imperialist war" in which the proletariat
could have no interest. (This interpretation remained the
official party line until the Nazi invasion of Russia in
19^1. ) The Comintern admonished any communist party support-
ing its nation's defense movement - especially the parties
of France, Great Britain and the U.S. For these three
bourgeois states had conducted a policy of retreat and appease-
ment during the 1930s in order to let their rival (German)
turn all its efforts against the USSR. Meanwhile the bour-
geois, seemingly "non-aggressive" states would keep the war
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going so that in the end they could partition the postwar
world among themselves, having let others do the fighting.
Accordingly the Communist Parties were told to create
united and popular fronts from below only, to end the war, to
destroy the bourgeois capitalist system, and to set up
socialist society. In perfect line with these orders, Maurice
Thorez was to later make this condemnation:
In September 1939, the French bourgeoisie, having
earlier given Spain to Franco, having repeatedly be-
trayed its allies, declared war on Germany under pre-
text of rendering help to the reactionary lords of
Poland, that 'prison of peoples.'-^"
Within a few days of the receipt of the Comintern instruc-
tions, the party's Central Committee declared that the French
government had declared war on Germany without the agreement
of parliament. On September 26, the PCF was officially banned
and PCF mayors and local officials were suspended from their
109jobs. As for the party's parliamentary deputies, they
reorganized themselves into the Workers' and Peasants Group,
so as to avoid the dissolution order. But the revolutionary
defeatism (i.e. immediate peace on Hitler's terms) espoused
by the Group in October 1939 caused an investigation of the
Group and the subsequent arrest and trial of 44 Communist
deputies, among others, on charges of treason.
The PCF had been weakened by the Nazi-Soviet Pact and
the bout with French authorities. At the beginning of the
1930s, when its membership was small, the PCF had been able
to maintain a tightly-knit, well disciplined organization.
With this kind of support, the PCF leadership was able to
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cleverly maneuver around difficult situations requiring
drastic and sometimes illogical policy reversals. By the
end of the decade, however, nine-tenths of the Party's
members were new, post-193^ era recruits with roots too
shallow to bear up against a shock like the Nazi-Soviet Pact.
Estimates are that the PCF suffered considerable losses from
its middle-level leadership and rank and file cadres during
the crucial year of 1939.
7. Army Reaction
Before terminating this discussion of the PCF in the
1930s, it might be valuable to point out that there was one
group in French society which was not convinced by the PCF's
slalom maneuverings of 193^ and 1939: the French Army.
Concerned about the persistent Communist antimilitaristic
activities of the first half of the 1930s, the Army instituted
a system of underground networks that would alert civilian
and military decisionmakers as to the necessity of adapting
the Army to new strategic and tactical roles. Commandant
Loustaunau-Lacau stated during the 1930s:
The Army must be purged of the cells that the Communist
party is constantly developing, with the objective of
destroying discipline and wrecking morale... We are organ-
izing ourselves to have in every military district, every
military unit, every air base and every armaments factory
an officer who will gather information, and who will be
seconded by a reserve officer, chosen by him, in the wings.
Reportedly, the collected information was passed to staff
officers "sufficiently highly placed" to influence postings,
transfers and penalties.

The above efforts of French military leaders to de-
politicize the Army appear to be an attempt to maintain the
French military insitution as an apolitical tool of the
government. The care taken to keep the nation's decision-
makers informed on the condition of the Army indicates the
traditional French military concern for assuring a viable
defense of the French nation. In the above discussion,
however, the French Army leadership does not appear to be a
particularly ardent disciple of republicanism. The anti-
communist campaign seems to indicate a continuation of the
traditionally conservative or (to borrow the terminology
of Barbara Tuchman) "nationalist" French military mind-set.
8 . Conclusions
By the time France declared war on Germany (September 3,
1939), the SFIO had also moved into political opposition.
The Socialist party had had a chance to realize all its
dreams, but it had failed. And, unfortunately, the disastrous
consequences of that failure (particularly as reflected in
the course of international affairs) are still being felt
today.
Since it can be openly acknowledged that the PCF
during the 1920s and 1930s was according primary allegiance
to the Soviet Union and merely following the latter' s direc-
tives in matters of defense and foreign affairs, one does
not wonder at the PCF's failure to save France from the holo-
caust of World War II. One does wonder, however, at the
Socialists' impotence in the defense realm.
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There were many factors that affected Socialist
decisionmaking in the two decades preceding the Second World
War. One of those was political inexperience. During the
1920s the SFIO enjoyed great popularity among the French
people and yet, because of doctrinaire blindness, it opted
not to participate in the coalition government and learn the
problems inherent to policymaking. Instead of accepting
responsibility, the Party remained in comfortable opposition.
Thus when the SFIO came to power in the turbulent years of
1936 to 1938, its members and leaders had no experience in
organizing a nation, much less in leading it and defending
it from an impending world war.
Another factor was the public's mood of appeasement.
Fear of another war gripped the heart of the French populace;
another war like the last one was to be avoided at all cost.
Rightist elements of society were haunted by the spectre of
Bolshevism, and they found fuel for their fears in the grow-
ing French Leftist movement. No small wonder the public's
aversion to fascism waned in the face of the apparently more
immediate possibilities of war and revolution.
One factor which must not be overlooked was the
Socialists' blind idealism. Looking back on the brief years
of the Popular Front, one can see repeated instances in which
idealism obscured the Socialist policy-makers' appreciation
for the objective requirements and singular demands of a





a. The Socialist propensity to view the world
through a class-oriented grid. John Marcus has remarked
in his book French Socialism in the Crisis Years that the
Socialists failed to realize that fascism was not a class-
HP
oriented movement. He posits the idea that to effective-
ly combat or resist fascism, one should develop a strong
feeling of nationalism within one's country and not subdivide
the society into "united" fronts, pitted one group against
the other (Right versus Left).
b. Their unique notion of the concept of peace.
Leon Blum, while in prison during the Vichy era of the 1940s,
was to reflect back on the pre-war days of the Popular Front
and lament
:
The idea of peace in Socialist propaganda. . .was founded
on a conviction of the sacred character of the life of
each human being. This is a pure and noble ideal if it
leads to the rule: "Never willingly take another man's
life," rather than to the imperative command: "Above
all, save your skin. "...A noble propaganda would have
shown that in the face of a new dangerous situation in
Europe, peace could only be preserved by risking war... -*
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IV. WAR AND RESISTANCE (1939-19414)
A. CAPITULATION
Within three months of being outlawed, the PCP had its
underground press in operation, advocating outright neutrality
and conciliation with the Germans. The Germans' invasion of
France in May 19^0 did nothing to sway the French Communists
from their line. In fact, the first issue of L
\
Humanite
after the invasion read: "When two gangsters fight among
themselves, the honest people have no obligation to aid one
of them, on the pretext that the other had dealt an unfair
blow." Furthermore, it appears the PCF was planning a
French Brest-Litovsk as it proceeded, during the six weeks
between the Nazi crossing of the French border and the arm-
istice, to call for the formation of a new French government:
one which would include the Communists and seek an immediate
peace.
"Peace" was almost immediate. The pacifism and appease-
ment of the Front Populaire era had taken hold of the French
nation. An extension of the Maginot Line north to the
3
English Channel had been deemed too expensive. Military
leaders, like Marshal Petain and General Gamelin, had refused
the advice of young officers like Colonel de Gaulle who were
advocating greater air power and increased mechanization of
French forces. Gordon Wright explains, however, that
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Their fault was not lack of loyalty to the republic, but
lack of imagination and foresight; they clung to their
memories of the First World War and anticipated another
long defensive struggle of the same type.^
The conquest of Prance took barely one month. Marshal Petain,
as the new head of the French government, signed an armistice
with Germany on June 22, 19^0, and on July 10th the following
law was passed by parliament:
The National Assembly gives all powers to the Government
of the Republic under the authority and signature of
Marshal Petain to promulgate in one or more acts a new
Constitution of the French State.
5
A spirit of resignation descended over 85% of France's
senators and deputies as they accepted the cold inevitability
of German hegemony. Only 80 parliamentarians opposed the
creation of the Vichy government and only 36 of those were
Socialists. Many Socialists had decided to cooperate with,
and participate in the new government. (For example, Vichy's
first Minister of Labor was a Socialist.) But others, like
Leon Blum, were arrested and condemned to life imprisonment
by Marshal Petain or else they went into self-imposed retire-
ment. Gordon Wright explains that prominent Socialist leaders





Some Socialists, however, began organizing heroic clandes-
tine operations against the occupying German forces and join-
ing the many other small resistance groups that were springing
up throughout France during the summer of 19^0. A Socialist
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and non- Communist Leftist resistance group that became one
of the most important in France was the Liberation Nord (LN)
.
By the end of 19^0, it was publishing a newspaper with articles
written by Jean Texcier, a Socialist journalist who was to
become one of the most prominent figures in the Resistance
press. Texcier, through the LN press, would coldly denounce
the Petain regime in words such as these:
Compared with the military clash between Germany and
Britain, ...are not all these big and small measures g
taken at Vichy just a pastime of a gang of prisoners?
By 19^1 the LN had made contact with the Free French in Britain,
and it slowly began building a network of affiliated regional
sections
.
The French Communists did not enter the resistance move-
ment until Russia, not France, was in danger of German domina-
tion. When the USSR was invaded in June 19^1, the Soviets
and the Comintern directed an all-out effort be made to create
popular fronts "from above": i.e. communist parties were to
ally with everyone except fascists in the struggle against
Nazi Germany. None of the programs for popular fronts were
to contain any mention of revolution, socialism or communist
seizure of power, in order to reassure the new partners of
q
the communists' sincerety and patriotism. The French Commu-
nists succeeded in establishing the largest, most important
resistance organization in France: the Front Nationale (FN).
Its ideology was that of an all-encompassing Popular Front,
but its key positions were filled by supremely dedicated and
daring members of the PCF. It was the only resistance group
91

that operated in both the north and south zones and on both
a military and political level. Due to their fanatical
bravery, the Communists became the most hunted and persecuted
party of the Resistance. Whereas most of the other resistance
groups had been concentrating on keeping up public morale by
publishing clandestine newspapers, the Communists in the FN
believed they were making France ready for a great national
revolution. Few of the other resistants had any long-range
plans for political action. Few even cared about politics,
for their goal was, and continued to be, the defeat of
Germany.
The PCF made contact with de Gaulle in January 19^3 and
declared itself the only party of the Resistance. Refusing
to abide the PCF's claim to political exclusivity, the SFIO
officially reconstituted itself shortly after the PCF state-
ment and purged from membership all those who had voted for
Petain. 11
C. PEACE PLANS
Ever since the end of 1942, de Gaulle had wanted to create
a National Council of the Resistance (CNR) in order to show
the Allies the breadth of his support from within the French
nation. The leaders of the various resistance movements were
unknown internationally, however, so de Gaulle urged some
former prewar political personalities to join the CNR. (The
Council was to have no executive or governmental responsi-
bility, but was to help prepare for the government of France
after the defeat of Germany.) In Paris, May 19^3, the first
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meeting of the CNR was held with one representative attending
from each of the eight resistance movements and six prewar
non-fascist political parties, including the SFIO and the PCP.
These representatives passed a unanimous resolution cancelling
the acts of Vichy, entrusting de Gaulle with the management
of the nation's affairs and leaving military concerns to the
direction of General Giraud. Most important, however, was
the Programme of the CNR, completed in March 1944. Reflecting
a predominantly Socilaist influence, the Programme served as
the "ideological foundation-stone" for the Fourth Republic
(i.e. there were those who distrusted de Gaulle and who sub-
sequently insisted that, before authority could be surrendered
to de Gaulle, the postwar constitution must assure the applica-
"l Ption of the CNR Programme).
A month after the formation of the CNR, de Gaulle founded
the French Committee of National Liberation (CFLN) . This
committee, based in Algiers, was recognized by the Allies a
year later as the d_e facto civilian government of France.
One of the first acts of the CFLN was to declare null and
void the 1939 dissolution of the PCF. (It is interesting to
note that the Comintern had been dissolved just one month
prior to this declaration.) No Communists were invited to
sit on the CFLN. Twenty-seven Communists did participate,
however, in the long-range planning activities of the Consul-
13
tative Assembly, also set up by de Gaulle in Algiers.
Maurice Thorez had no part in any of the pre-Liberat ion
planning groups, for he had left his military unit in June
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of 19*11 as the Germans advanced on Konibychev, USSR. After
defecting to the Soviet Union,he asked to be allowed to return
clandestinely to France in order to direct the Resistance
effort, but Stalin refused, saying he did not want to compli-
cate his relations with the Allies. In Feburary 1944, Thorez
asked the CFLN delegate in Moscow for authorization to go to
Algiers, but the Committee refused. Thorez did not return to
France until after the French government's amnesty decree of
October 1944.
Finally, in April 1944, two PCF members were invited to
join the executive leadership of the CFLN and become the minis-
ters of Air and State. This action did not indicate, however,
any increase in trust between the Gaullists and the Communists.
This is evidenced in the Vercors incident of July 1944.
Several hundred resistance fighters (many of them Franc
Tireurs et Partisans [FTP] Communists) were killed in the
battle of Vercors because no reinforcements arrived from
either London or Algiers as promised. The Minister of Air
admonished the CFLN for its failure to help the resistants ;
15he was replaced two months later.
In June 1944 after the Normandy invasion, the PCF began
establishing Patriotic Militias within France that were
charged with executing reprisals against collaborators.
According to some reports, the Communists, as they took
control of many areas (especially in the south of France
where they dominated the military liberation effort),
would effectuate a massive "balancing of the books": taking
94

some 30-40,000 lives - undoubtedly including "armistice"
17
army officers. Author John Ambler states that noncommunist
members of the French Forces of the Interior (FFI) often
feared their FTP counterparts. Illustrative of this is a
report made during the war by two regular army colonels who
were in charge of some FFI units. They relate how these
units rushed to be the first to occupy the city of Bordeaux
as it was evacuated by the Germans in August 19^4; the reason
for their haste? They wanted to prevent nearby FTP units
from arriving first, for there were suspicions that the
Communists were under orders to establish a "Soviet Republic
1 P>
of Southern France." (The PCF does not appear to have re-
ceived any such orders, however.) Simon Serfaty estimates
that during the Second World War, one half of the French
military and one third of the civilian resistants were PCF
19
members or affiliated adherents.
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V. PARTNERS IN GOVERNMENT (1944-1947)
A. PARTNERS
As World War II drew to a close, Stalin above all wanted
stability. Therefore he endorsed de Gaulle's leadership in
postwar Prance and told the PCF to restrain its militants'
revolutionary ambitions. On September 10, 19^4, just after
the Liberation, the Secretary General of the reconstituted
SFIO, Daniel Mayer, proposed the SFIO and the PCF join in a
comite d' entente . The Socialists knew that the Communists
had emerged from the war as the most popular political party
and that the only way to obtain a share of power was to ally
with the PCF. Delegations from the two parties met in
December 1944 at PCF headquarters in Paris. A permanent
comite d'entente was created. But as soon as the SFIO saw
the PCF plans calling for a United Labor Party, which would
essentially fuse the SFIO into the PCF, the Socialists grew
uneasy, and the demise of the entente was already apparent
by January 1945. The split between the two parties widened
with the 19^5 events in Poland (i.e. the absorption of the
Socialist party by the Communists) and the return to Paris
of Leon Blum, who still had great influence with the SFIO.
Daniel Mayer declared there could be no unity as long as the
2
PCF remained "absolutely faithful to the USSR" ; and Blum
wanted the Socialists to build a third political force, one




Without socialism, deomocracy is imperfect. Without
democracy, socialism is helpless.^
Moreover, Leon Blum advocated a strictly pro-Western, pro-
American foreign policy for France.
The October 19^5 referendum concerning the formation of
a Constituent Assembly resolved many questions. Ninety-six
percent of the population voted to abandon the old Third
Republic (which had led the nation into such disaster) and,
to draw up a new constitution. Three parties were given
three-quarters of all the votes: the SPIO, the PCP and the
Christian Democratic Popular Republican Movement. This was
a great victory for the French Communists: French society
apparently agreed with the main PCF thesis that the bourgeosie
(most of which had rallied to the Vichy government) was not
qualified to reassume leadership of the country it had be-
ll
trayed. The tripartite coalition soon unanimously selected
de Gaulle to be President of the new Provisional Government.
He was recognized by all as the only possible candidate if
political crisis were to be avoided. The PCF demanded repre-
sentation in one of the three key ministries: National
5
Defense, Foreign Affairs or the Interior. De Gaulle refused,
but he did agree to make Thorez Minister of State and name
another Communist, Charles Tillon, Minister of Air. In this
capacity, Tillon had complete control of all civil and mili-
tary aviation activities. He was entrusted with the rebuild-
ing of not only the French aircraft industry, but also the
French Air Force. Since all of the Air Force's aircraft had
been destroyed at the beginning of the war, Tillon did not
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dispose of a great arsenal of weapons, but he was in charge
of all French Air Force personnel, equipment and facilities.
Although there was unlimited opportunity and requirement for
innovative, constructive action, Tillon apparently wished to
do nothing. It was apparently his deliberate intent to delay
as long as possible the rebuilding of French air power. The
Ministry of Air, like the other Communist ministries (i.e.
National Economy, Industrial Production and Labor) were pur-
posely paralyzed by the mass influx of Communists to posi-
tions at every level of responsibility. During this period,
those aircraft that were available were usually so poorly
maintained that they were chronically non-operational. Due
to Tillon's ministry (1944-1947), the rebuilding of the
French Air Force was retarded by at least four years.
Tillon's efforts to thwart the postwar recovery of French
A A 6air power succeeded.
Ronald Tiersky describes another facet of French aerospace
activity during this period:
In the aircraft undustry, the large Gnome-et-Rhone Company
had been nationalized, falling under the jurisdiction of
the Air Force Minister, Charles Tillon. Tillon appointed
Marcel Weil, a Communist, as Director General of the com-
pany, and from this position Weil was able to pack the
entire administration of the enterprise with Party mili-
tants. Moreover, Communists were also given preference
in employment. Often, job openings in the aircraft in-
dustry were advertised only in L 'Humanite , Franc-Tireur ,
Paris-Liberte
, and Ce Soir - all Communist sympathizer
papers. This led to a situation in which a large major-
ity of the working force in the aircraft factories was
either Communist or dependent on the Party for job secur-
ity. And even after Weil was replaced, Communist labor
inspectors in the plants often refused to sanction




The first draft constitution for postwar France appeared
to be the product of Socialist and Communist collaboration,
and it envisaged an extremely weak and purely ceremonial
role for the President of the Republic. In disgust, de Gaulle
resigned from office in January 19^6 and left the three
parties to manage the government by themselves. The PCP at
first supported Maurice Thorez as candidate for the vacant
Presidency. The MRP adamantly refused the idea, so an innoc-
uous statesman, Felix Gouin, assumed the title of President
of the Constituent Assembly. His caretaker government con-
sisted of, among others, six PCF and seven SFIO ministers.
The PCF had obtained such positions as Minister of War
Veterans and War Victims, Minister of Reconstruction and
8
Urbanism. Thorez became Vice-President of the Council.
The first draft constitution was rejected by the French
people on May 5, 19^6, and a Second Constituent Assembly was
voted into office: once again a tripartite situation. The
PCF received seven ministries in exchange for its congenial
cooperation with the system. The second draft constitution
was an SFIO-MRP collaborative effort, giving more power to
the President. It was passed by a slim majority of the
voters on October 13, 1946. The elections for the first
National Assembly of the Fourth Republic registered the contin-
uing postwar decline of the SFIO and the rising popularity
of the PCF. (See Appendix I) Riding on this wave of good
feeling, Maurice Thorez became a candidate for President of
the Provisional Government in the November 19^6 elections.
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The position would have only been a one-month caretaker posi-
tion, until January presidential elections could be held to
determine the leader of the new Republic. But the Communists
coveted the transitory post because of the amazing precedent
that could be set: a Communist holding Prance's highest
office. Thorez strove primarily to prove that long-term
cooperation between Communists and other progressive forces,
such as the SFIO, was possible. He wanted to convey an
image of the PCP as a peace party, one that was against the
division of Europe into two power blocs. In trying to re-
assure the nation about the PCF's plans for France, Thorez
became the first French Communist to ever speak seriously
of a French "national" road to socialism:
We have expressly repeated, in the course of our electoral
campaign, that we do not ask of the people a mandate to
implement a strictly communist program. . .We have proposed
a program of democracy and national reconstruction, accept-
able to all republicans ... It is evident that the Communist
Party in its governmental activity and within the cadre of
the parliamentary system which it helped to reestablish,
will constrain itself strictly to the democractic program
which has won it the confidence of the popular masses.
The progress of democracy across the world. .. enables
one to consider other roads to socialism than that followed
by the Russian communists. In any case, the road is
necessarily different for each country. We have always
believed and declared that the French people, rich in a
glorious tradition, would find its own way toward greater
democracy, progress and social justice.^
Thorez lost the bid for the Presidency, and Leon Blum be-
came President of the Provisional Government in December 19^6.
He dutifully resigned in January 19^7 to make way for the
Socialist Vincent Auriol, the first President of the Fourth
Republic. Paul Ramadier (SFIO) was named Prime Minister and
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nine ministries were given to SFIO members, five to the MRP
and five to the PCP. Thorez was once again Minister of State
and Vice-President of the Cabinet, Tillon was Minister of Re-
construction, and other Communists were given charge of
Labor and Social Security, and Public Health. Most signifi-
cant, however, was the nomination of a Communist to the
Ministry of National Defense. The PCF had finally obtained
one of the three key governmental seats, but in this govern-
ment the organizational framework allowed ministers very
little policy-making power. Furthermore, the PCF ministers
remained in office for only six months. International crises
and domestic turmoil put tremendous pressure on the multi-
party governmental arrangement. When, in May 19^7* the PCF
ministers dissented against the government's economic policy,
the Socialist prime minister decided to insist on the princi-
ple of cabinet solidarity and therefore used the opportunity
to dismiss the Communist ministers from government. (The PCF
has remained in opposition ever since.) The SFIO, after
experiencing some heated internal party debate, opted to
remain in government instead of forming a Leftist opposition.
The SFIO remained in government until 1951.
B. FOREIGN POLICY
1944 to 1947 was more than a period of transition from
provisional to permanent government, however. More signifi-
cantly, it was one of transition from postwar to cold war
politics. The way in which the temporary governmental offi-
cials during this period responded to the international
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crises facing them was to influence the whole future of the
Fourth Republic. History does not wait for the right man
to be in the right office at the right time.
1. Algeria
Immediately after World War II had ended, the French
government sent troops into the colonies to quiet the rest-
lessness of indigenous nationalists. The Program of the CNR
had stipulated that after the war, political, social and
economic rights were to be extended to native and colonial
populations. But this meant only that these populations
should be accorded a certain degree of autonomy of rule, not
independence from France. In Algeria, on VE Day 19^5, there
was a nationalist uprising in Setif; it was brutally put
down by the European-French colons (colonists). In 19^7,
Socialist prime minister Ramadier was able to persuade par-
liament to pass the Algerian Statute, a rather liberal docu-
ment which made some concessions to Moslem demands but un-
12
equivocally reaffirmed the existence of French Algeria.
The SFIO supported the passage of the Statute, but the PCF
abstained, believing it did not go far enough toward grant-
ing independence. For the French colons , however, it went
too far, and they refused to implement the document. From
14
19^7 until 1958, it was Algiers that gave orders to Paris.
Charles Micaud describes the mood of the French nation in the
immediate postwar period as follows:
An atmosphere of unreality bathed the whole issue. Algeria
was French. Pacification was not war. Only a handful of
fanatics were responsible for all the difficulties. Normalcy
was expected to continue. Few had the bad taste to point




In Indochina, the Viet Minh were watching the French
election returns with great expectation. When a predominantly
leftist Constituent Assembly was voted into power in October
19^5* the Viet Minh had great hopes that such a political
group would grant Vietnamese demands for independence, mili-
tary and diplomatic autonomy and representation in the United
Nations
.
Interestingly, the Viet Minh had decided to place
their faith in support from the SFIO rather than the PCF.
This might be explained by the PCF's unusual behavior with
regard to the Algerian situation. The PCF was supporting the
theoretical cause of nationalist movements, but adamantly re-
fusing to become associated with any violence-prone organiza-
tion. Power was to be acquired, but by peaceful law-abiding
means; and this was to be true for Communists both at home
A K A l6and abroad.
Former French Communist Annie Kriegel explains that
the PCF's original goal had been to take full control of
France after the war. The Communists were thwarted in their
plans, however, by de Gaulle's successful tactic of disband-
ing the Popular Militias and merging them together with all
the other military organizations within France. To use the
words of Charles Tillon, "That was how the party lost all
its heavy armament and therefore all possibility of serious
action." 1 ''' Kriegel further explains that the party recognized
the undisputed national appeal of de Gaulle and, having
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received Stalin's order for stability, it decided to support
the man and participate in the government. These were seen
as the best guarantees of preventing American incursion into
France (another primary concern voiced by Stalin). The PCF
therefore became an active and vocal opposition within the
government, but not a challenge ("an alternative") to the
18
system itself. Correspondingly, Thorez declared in July
19^5, "I say it frankly... it is impossible to approve the
19
smallest strike." Stability was to be maintained for the
security of international socialism; the Americans were not
to be given the opportunity to expand their influence by
profiting from any internal insurrections in France. Thus,
after the Algerian Setif uprising in 19^5, the North African
branch of the PCF declared that
those responsible for organizing this unrest must be
immediately punished - quickly and without pity; the
instigators of the revolt must be shot, along with
ontheir henchmen who led the uprising. u
The conflict in Indochina began in 19^6 during the short
one-month government of Leon Blum. Shortly before the out-
break of war, a Vietnamese delegation arrived in France to
negotiate with the SFIO and the PCF at Fontainebleau. The
French Left was very amenable to talks with the Viet Minh,
and when the French military leaders in Indochina heard of
the latest Leftist victory at the polls (November 1946), they
became worried. The Left, and the SFIO in particular, was no
friend of the military. The Socialists saw no reason for
France to have a large military: there was not to be another




should be reduced as quickly as possible. According to
evidence provided by George Kelly, the French High Commis-
sariat in Saigon feared that the new Leftist French govern-
ment would turn a deaf ear to military interpretations of
the Indochinese situation; and so it prepared itself to take
advantage of the first provocation in order to present the
Parisian politicians with a fait accompli : a war already
in progress. The French military got their chance on November
20th, and official reports of the incident (describing the
excessive belligerency of the commanding officer involved
and the full-scale indescriminate assault on the civilian
population) were intentionally delayed in transit to Paris
in order that the High Commissariat's representative would
have sufficient time to favorably condition French public and
political opinion. Even Ho Chi Minh ' s telegram containing
peace proposals was intentionally delayed en route and did
22
not reach Blum until after the war was well under way.
During the first six months of 19^7 the Minister of
Defense was the Communist Francois Billoux. Even so, the PCF
was frustrated in its inability to stop the war, since the
only actual power that could be wielded by the Minister was
to encourage the PCF deputies to recommend negotiations with
2^
the Vietnamese and to withhold their vote of confidence
24
from the government's colonial policy.
Once again, the PCF had adhered faithfully to Stalin's
order for stability at all cost. A further illustration of
the French Communists' dogged loyalty to Kremlin desires during
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the postwar period is seen in an incident that took place in
October 19^7. At the founding meeting of Stalin's Cominform
(the replacement of the Comintern), the Yugoslavian Communist
Party denounced the French Communists as opportunists. There-
fore, in 19^8, when Yugoslavia's Tito was expelled by Stalin
from the international communist community, the PCF was among
the first to second the expulsion and one of the firmest pro-
25Stalinist parties in the Cominform. Thorez was still head-
ing the French party, and the Moscow line was therefore still
the guide for PCF action (Thorez 's remarkable "French road to
socialism" notwithstanding). America's Dean Acheson recognized
this pro-Soviet character of the postwar PCF. He warned,
With four Communists in the Cabinet, one of them Minister
of Defense, with Communists ... infiltrating government
offices, factories and the armed services, with nearly
a third of the electorate voting Communist, and with
economic conditions worsening, the Russians could pull




The SFIO spent the next twelve years either participating
in or giving out-of-government support to most of the Fourth
Republic cabinets and their prime ministers. As for the PCF,
it remained in official opposition, obediently adhering to
the requisites of Soviet foreign policy. This period will
be described in the light of SFIO and PCF policy positions
on major international relations issues. In addition, the
foreign policy of Francois Mitterrand will be discussed since
he is the current leader of the French Socialist Party (PS)
and a potential prime minister of France. During the 1950s
he led a small Radical-affiliated party: the Democratic and
Socialist Union of the Resistance or UDSR. His affiliation




On July 7, 1948, the SFIO approved the adoption of
the Marshall Plan for France. The PCF, although in opposi-
tion, also approved of the Plan, believing France could accept
2
U.S. aid without risking any political involvements.
The SFIO also approved the London Agreements (creating
the Federal Republic of Germany) and agreed to allow the
industrial Ruhr valley to be associated with the West German
state. The PCF, on the other hand, opposed the creation of
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a West German republic and thought the Ruhr should be under
international, not German, control. (This was also the
Gaullist position.
)
Both the SFIO and the PCF opposed the July 1948
military appropriations bill; they demanded instead that cuts
5
be made in the military budget. (The SFIO would not ask for
another cut in military spending, however, until 1954.)
2. 19^9
On 27 July 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was rati-
fied by the French parliament. The Socialists by this time
had become "enthusiastic Americanophiles" ; Annie Kriegel
explains that with the threat of the Cold War and the influ-
ence of Leon Blum, the SFIO had developed a political culture
closely akin to that of the United States: antifascism, anti-
6
communism and optimistic idealism. The PCF, as could be
expected, objected violently to French membership in the
7
"warmongering" NATO pact. The vehemence of their response
is evidenced in these two official PCF declarations:
The French people do not accept the disappearance of
their right to reparations from Germany. They do not
accept being made an ally of West Germany in order to
make war on socialist countries. That which Hitler,
with Petain and Laval, failed to obtain will not now
be obtained by the American capitalists, with de Gaulle
and Blum: the people of France will not, will never
make war on the Soviet Union...
The second of these declarations was made by Maurice Thorez
on February 22, 19^9:
The enemies of the people believe they can embarrass us
by asking the following question: "What would you do if
the Red Army occupied Paris?" Here is our response:
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1. The Soviet Union has never,, and could never find
itself in the position of being an aggressor against
any country whatsoever. A socialist country by
definition cannot practice a policy of aggression
or war; those are the policies of imperialist powers.
The Soviet Army, the heroic army of the defense of
Stalingrad, has never attached any nation. By
fighting Hitler's Germany, she accomplished her
glorious mission as Liberator of the People...
2. Our position is based on facts .. .These facts are:
the active collaboration of the French government
with Anglo-Saxon aggressive policies of imperial-
ism, the presence of a foreign military headquarters
in Fontainebleau, the transformation of our country
and French Overseas Territories into bases for aggres-
sion against the USSR and Popular Democratic nations.
3. Since the question has been asked, let us clearly
answer with this: if the common efforts of all
Frenchmen, robbed of their freedom and peace, were
not able to bring our country back into the camp
of democracy and peace, if our people were then to
be dragged against its will into an anti-Soviet
war, and if under these conditions the Soviet Army,
defending itself having to pursue the aggressors
even into our territory, the workers, the people
of France, could they behave any differently towards
the Soviet Army than the workers and peoples of
Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, etc?9




By 1950 the Stalinist era of "stability at all cost"
was over; Stalin himself had recently challenged the status
quo in the Far East by encouraging the North Korean communists
in their struggle against the Western-backed South Koreans.
The Korean War caused Cold War tensions to reach new heights.
The French Socialists supported a bill instituting the draft
for 18 months of compulsory military service. They also
voted in favor of a military budget proposal for the rearma-
ment of France. Furthermore, they approved of Rene Pleven's
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plan to build a European army. When, at the end of 1951,
however, Pleven called for a tax increase to support French
rearmament and the Pleven Plan, the SPIO abstained. Need-
less to say, the Communists opposed the 18-month service
12
bill, the rearmament of France and the building of a
13European army. The PCF chastized the Socialists with state-
ments like
Hitler and Goebbels are dead, but thanks to... Guy Mollet,
their spirit will live again in a new Nazi headquarters
and a rebuilt Wehrmacht . -^
4. 1952-1953
During 1952 the Socialists continued to support the
idea of a European Defense Community (the EDC being a further
elaboration of Pleven's plan), and they decided to vote for
increased taxes to support French foreign policy goals.
Simultaneously, however, the Communists and Gaullists were
voicing unconditional opposition to the EDC-L -) and to the
installation of U.S. bases in France.
B. RESOLUTIONS
Ever since the end of World War II and the beginning of
the bi-polar, Cold War world, nationalistic movements in the
colonies had come to be regarded by French colonialists and
soldiers as fronts for communist aggression. The French
military, so disgraced during the Second World War, was glad
to have a mission once again, a reason for being and a high
moral purpose. Therefore, throughout the 1950s and early
1960s, a sense of anticommunist mission was propagated by the




activities. The soldier's fervent belief in the worth of
his mission in the colonies can be seen in these words:
The French Army is the first army in the world which
has agreed to fight on the ground of the human mind,
on the ground chosen by the communist Revolution to
destroy Western Civilization.
1. Indochina
The war in Indochina raged from 19^5 until 1954.
Twenty thousand Frenchmen were killed in the nine-year
19battle. At home, the French public felt guilty, indiffer-
ent, hesitant about the proper policy to follow in pacifying
the Far Eastern colonies; all they knew was that they wanted
them to remain French. °
In 19^7, after the failure of the Fontainebleau
negotiations with the Viet Minh, the SFIO declared it wanted
no part of any war that supported the corrupt, although pro-
21
French, Bao Dai regime. As the international atmosphere
grew chillier, however, the Socialists relented and actually
began voting in favor of bills increasing the strength of
French military forces. At first, the war did not cost very
much, and no French conscripts were sent to fight in Indo-
china. In 1951 however, a leading spokesman for the SFIO,
Gaston Defferre, asked the government to reach a settlement
with Ho Chi Minh before Red China should decide to intervene
to "internationalize" the war; for, if that were to happen,
"it is certain that all Southeast Asia would be open to the
forces of invasion." 22 The SFIO finally became openly
hostile to the government's Indochina policy in October 1953
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Socialists had become concerned for the defense of France,
for her army was so far away.
...soldiers know that there will be no French Army as
long as the war lasts in Indochina, for it absorbs a
third of our officers and half our NCOs.^3
In answer to the Socialist call for a negotiated settlement,
Minister of Defense Pleven merely replied that military sta-
ph
bility had to be established first. This would have re-
quired sending French conscripts to the war - an act which
the SFIO could not abide. Therefore the Socialists refused
to support the March 195^ military budget. The French de-
feat at Dien Bien Phu occurred less than two months later
and, in July 195^, the SFIO approved the Geneva partition
of Indochina. J
In 1953, Francois Mitterrand had been in favor of
direct negotiations with Ho Chi Minh. He even published a
book advocating an end to the Indochinese war. (His reasons
were perhaps not entirely humanitarian, since he argued that
if so much had not been wasted in Indochina, scarce resources
could have been used towards developing the North African
Maghreb into "France's California.")
As for the PCF, it was constant in its opposition to
the Indochinese conflict. In 1950 Thorez addressed the PCF
party congress with these words:
For three and a half years, an unjust war, a criminal war
has been carried on against the people of Vietnam. This
war of colonial plunder is sowing devastation and death
on a people who ask only to live in peace and fraternal
union with the people of France. '
In 1952, Communist parliamentary leader Jacques Duclos sent
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a telegram to Ho Chi Minh, leader of the Viet Minh, congratu-
lating him on his successes over the French and assuring him
p o
of PCP support in "this criminal war." More specifically,
it said:
The people of Prance, which fought yesterday and fights
today against foreign occupation, understands and supports
the struggle of the Vietnamese people for their freedom
and independence. [The people of France] rise up against
the continuation of the criminal war being waged on the
Vietnamese people and being fought for goals contrary to
the true interests of France. "
Also in 1952, PCF deputy Billoux urged all French
workers to interfere in the manufacture and transport of war
materials. (One general officer at Dien Bien Phu blamed
communist sabotage for the defective condition of motors,




The Communists further advocated immediate negotia-
tions with the enemy. This at first ran headlong into govern-
ment arguments that to speak of negotiations was "the surest
means of raising the morale of the adversary and of demoraliz-
ing our own troops." (It will be remembered that the French
government used this same argument against the Socialists
during World War I.)
It is important to note that, whereas PCF deputies
were arrested and tried for treason in 1939, PCF parliamentary
members in the 1950s were not even censured for their out-
spoken antiwar propagandizing and sabotage activities, even
though Prime Minister Pinay in 1952 did attempt to outlaw the
party and failed. 32 Public opinion and public leaders were
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so divided on the subject of war goals in Indochina that a
clear definition of treason was impossible. J
2 . Tunisia and Morocco
a. Tunisia
Nationalist uprisings began in Tunisia in January
1952. Francois Mitterrand was Prance's Minister of State in
charge of Tunisian Affairs. The Tunisian reform question had
been debated in parliament in June 1952, but all proposals
were rejected by the Left as being insuf ficient . 3^ it was
incumbant upon Mitterrand, therefore, to draw up a set of
French proposals likely to be accepted by the Tunisians as
the basis for a settlement. It was the Mitterrand Plan that
was ultimately accepted by the Tunisian nationalists in July
of the same year. The plan granted the native population-
a
considerable degree of autonomy while, at the same time, it
safeguarded French rights in the country. J By July however,
France had a new government and the new prime minister took
no interest in Tunisian affairs, thus allowing the European-
French community to resume its repressive tactics against
the native populace.
b. Morocco
In September 1953, Mitterrand (now Minister-
delegate to the Council of Europe) resigned from the govern-
ment in protest over French policy in Northern Africa. Two
weeks before Mitterrand's resignation, the Laniel government
had allowed the Sultan of Morocco to be overthrown. Prime
Minister Laniel reportedly had business ties with the Sultan's
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opponents and therefore did not wish to antagonize them or
impede their political activities.
c. Settlement
Mendes-France came to power in June 1954. During
the campaign, he had promised a quick settlement of the
Tunisian and Moroccan situations. The promise was kept. By
August, programs for negotiating the internal sovereignty of
Tunisia and Morocco had been approved by both the SFIO and
the PCF. (Tunisia and Morocco were finally granted total
national independence in March 1956.)
3. EDC
The French National Assembly refused to ratify the
European Defense Community Treaty on August 30, 195*1. Some
attribute the defeat to a preponderance of Gaullist influence
in the Assembly. (The Gaullist party, the RPF, had received
20.4% of the national vote in the June 1951 legislative elec-
o o on
tions.)-5 The PCF, of course, was delighted with the defeat.
As for the SFIO, when the time came to actually ratify the
treaty, the party split in half. The left wing of the SFIO,
which had voted against the EDC, was expelled from the party,
40
but was later invited to return.
However, the question of German rearmament was not
settled by the defeat of the EDC. Alternatives were discussed
among the NATO allies, and Great Britain and the U.S. warned
Prime Minister Mendes-France that unless France cooperated,
it could expect to be left isolated from the West. Mendes-
France pleaded with parliament for French approval of the
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London and Paris Agreements, which dealt with German rearma-
41
ment and German integration into NATO, respectively. The
Socialist vote was responsible for the passage of the London
Agreements in October 195*1. The subsequent Paris Agreements
passed by a hair * s breadth in December that same year: 287 to
260 - once again thanks primarily to Socialist support. (The







The legislative elections of January 1956 were a victory
ho
for the Left. The Gaullist vote had declined to a mere 4.4%.
The PCF offered to form a Popular Front government with the
SFIO, but the latter refused, preferring to ally with the
moderate Radical and UDSR parties. Together the three parties
formed the Front Republicain with a Socialist prime minister:
Guy Mollet. This became the longest-lived cabinet of the
Fourth Republic (January 1956 to June 1957). By the time
Mollet and his government came to power, the left wing of
the SFIO had succeeded in attracting a great number of Social-
ists to its Free Algeria stance. Initially, even the PCF
ill!
declared its support for the Mollet government.
1 . United Europe
The Socialists wanted a united Europe because it would
mean quick economic expansion and a higher standard of living:
45
a boon to democratic socialism and a hindrance to communism.
In 1951, they therefore voted for the Schuman Plan which led
to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community.
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•In 1956, they gave their approval to EURATOM and, in 1957,
they supported the creation of the European Economic Community.
The French Communists, on the other hand, opposed all
46
these measures. They had no desire to build an anticommu-
nist, capitalist Europe. They preferred to develop an alli-
ance of Communists, anti-Germans, pacifists, internationalists,
Jacobin patriots and technocrats who could all work together
47
to make France strong in the face of competition.
From 1954 to 1956, Mitterrand was not a proponent of
United Europe policies. George Kelly explains that during
this period France was divided into two schools of national
strategic thought: the neo-Carolingian and the neo-Roman.
The neo-Carolingians , like de Gaulle, attempted to recover
French grandeur and leadership in Europe. Mitterrand, however,
had had a great deal of experience working with the problems
of French Union (i.e. keeping France and her colonial empire
together). This experience led him into the neo-Roman school,
which strove for a close entente between France and North
Africa, whether it be by possession or association. (Since
the neo-Roman school focused on the importance of the Mediter-
,48
ranean, it also advocated closer ties with Spain and Italy.)
2. Suez
In 1955, official French government propaganda began
suggesting that the Egyptian government was aiding the rebels
in Algeria. When Guy Mollet became prime minister, he
attempted a rapprochement with Egypt, which claimed to be a
neutral country; Mollet' s attempts failed. In July 1956,
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Nassar announced his intention to nationalize the Suez Canal.
With the link between Arab nationalism and communism already
well established in the minds of European Frenchmen, pan-
Arabism was now widely seen as a new threat to the liberty
of the world: theocratic and totalitarian regimes were try-
49
ing to take control of the Mediterranean. Mollet declared
"one French division in Egypt is worth four divisions in
50
North Africa."
The PCF refused to back Mollet 's verbal and armed
attack on Egypt. Socialists, however, were in the front line
of the anti-Arab nationalist movement. Socialist Minister
of Foreign Affairs Christian Pineau invoked the memory of the
consequences which befell France after she had failed to stop
the German remilitarization of the Rhineland and had yielded
to Hitler's deception at Munich. Socialist Minister of
France Overseas (Gaston Deferre) stressed the impact Nassar'
s
actions could have on Black Africa, and Francois Mitterrand
(then Keeper of the Seals) compared the nationalization of
51
the canal to Hitler's aggression against Czechoslovakia.
Although the Franco-British-Israeli attempt to re-
capture the Suez Canal failed (due in part to Soviet threats
and American pressure), the French military was convinced
more than ever before that
The Suez affair [was] the supreme example of internation-
al communism's new strategy. It was by the intermediary
of nationalist movements, and in particular of Arab
nationalism, that the western positions would be breached,
undermined and finally destroyed. In the field vacated
by the retreat of the western powers communism would one
day stretch far and wide, whenever the weakness of its




3 . Partisan Developments
a. SPIO
As demonstrated in the above discussion, the
SFIO was one of the major governmental parties in the Fourth
French Republic. Although Leon Blum continued to exercise
a great deal of influence in the party until his death in
1950, the secretary general of the SFIO throughout the imme-
diate postwar and Cold War period was Guy Mollet. Although
the party possessed some of the nation's most astute politi-
cians, as evidenced by the frequent presence of Socialists
in the Fourth Republic cabinets, public support for the SFIO
steadily declined between 19^5 and 1956 (from 23.8% to 14.9$
of the votes, respectively). The party itself suffered a
serious split when its left wing refused to support German
rearmament. The left wing did not seek a coalition with
another party, however, and the schism remained a purely
54internal party dispute. The Algerian problem had become
the preoccupying political concern by 1957 when the Mollet
government was ousted from power due to its inability to find
a satisfactory solution. In 1958, as the Algerian crisis
reached its zenith, Guy Mollet announced SFIO support for
Charles de Gaulle's return to power. At this, the party's
left wing seceded from the SFIO to form its own splinter
group, the Autonomous Socialist Party (PSA, later becoming
the United Socialist Party or PSU). Neither the SFIO nor the
PSA gave in to the PCF requests for an alliance against
55




After its expulsion from the 19^7 Ramadier govern-
ment, the PCF remained firmly in opposition for the duration
of the Fourth Republic. The only government it even marginal-
ly supported was the Socialist one of Mollet, from 1956 to
1957- Due perhaps to its non-participation policy, the PCF
was able to maintain a steady average of 26% of the popular
56
vote throughout the 19^5 to 1956 period.
An opportunity for fundamental change in PCF
policy occurred in 1956. When Khrushchev read his February
1956 secret report on Stalin to the 20th Party Congress of
the CPSU, a revolution was forced upon all the parties of
the international communist community. The content of
Khrushchev's report and new policy program were not known
until the U.S. State Department published the document in
June of the same year. The PCF was shocked both by the dis-
crediting of Stalin and by the new program calling for (1)
peaceful coexistence between East and West, communist and
capitalist, and (2) many roads to socialism.
Maurice Thorez had always faithfully adhered to
Stalin's principle of democratic centralism and proletarian
internationalism. Khrushchev's new directives presented the
PCF Secretary-General with a major, personal challenge to
his own credibility as leader of the French communist move-
ment. Now, for once, the party, which had become such a
master of effectuating stunning policy changes in a minimum
amount of time, was momentarily stymied. The Italian
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Communist Party (PCT) provided an interesting contrast.
Togliatti, the PCI's Secretary General, immediately gave
voice to a novel idea: polycentrism, that is, no leading
party at all, with all parties being independent and equal. '
Thorez preferred to refer to the heretical secret
speech as "the report attributed to Comrade Khrushchev" as
he sought a way to implement the new directives as slowly and
gradually as possible. Palling back on his comfortable Soviet
cushion for support in his time of trial, Thorez interpreted
the new instructions as: the cause of the Soviet Union is
still the cause of all the international workers' movements;
it is just that one must recognize the fallibility of indivi-
58
dual leaders and refrain from idolizing any one of them.
The CPSU liked this interpretation of its new party policy
59
and it encouraged other parties to follow suit. But Thorez
was not to have it so easy. The Italian ideas had captured
the imagination of PCF intellectuals such as Jean-Paul Sartre,





rism nd planning for the PCF to become a truly French
party.
The CPSU had told all parties to seek peaceful
62
means to power. This was interpreted to mean that alliances
could and should be made with social democratic parties like
63
the SFIO, in order to gain parliamentary strength. Togliatti
embellished these ideas with the notion that "there is neither
64
a guiding state nor a guiding party." But the Soviet inter-
vention of Hungary in 1956 served as strong warning to other
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parties to refrain from taking the notion of party independ-
ence too far. Thorez was in the forefront encouraging the
USSR to repress Nagy's "revisionism" and also Gomulka's
"national communism," for such repression would demonstrate
to the nascent revisionists within the PCF the error of their
ways. At first, the PCF suffered only minimal effects from
the Hungarian invasion; only one party intellectual was ex-
66
pelled and only one prominent member resigned. Among the
rank and file, the argument was circulated that if the bour-
geois were feeling sorry for the Hungarians, then these must
67
have been enemies of Communism.
When the Algerian crisis peaked in May of 1958,
the PCF at first tried to form an alliance with the SFIO
against de Gaulle's return to power. When the SFIO refused,
the PCF proceeded to call de Gaulle a fascist and staunchly
oppose his reorganization of the French governmental system.
(Great was the PCF's bewilderment when the Soviet Union
suddenly voiced its support for the General, and his foreign
policy proposals in particular. ) At the polls later that
year (1958), the PCF suffered a 30$ decline in voter support






For fourteen years beginning in 1958, the two major
leftist parties in Prance disappeared into political opposi-
tion. The charisma, arrogance and power of de Gaulle had
returned to the French political stage. Once again he alone
appeared capable of rescuing France in a time of crisis.
Almost immediately upon being made Premier of the 1958 emer-
gency government, de Gaulle began consolidating his position
by initiating a reorganization of the French government. A
new constitution was written, permitting the populace to
permanently rally around le_ grand Charles . Guy Mollet, the
Secretary General of the SFIO, initially supported de Gaulle;
but that was when he thought they had a common interest: a
French Algeria, or perhaps more accurately said, an Algeria
for France. Once he realized the nature of de Gaulle's
policy toward Algeria, he withdrew his support of the govern-
ment and joined the ranks of the opposition. But it should
be noted that this was not a move toward union -with the PCF.
A. RAPPROCHEMENT
In I960, just as Thorez was coming under increasing
attack from his party for his autocratic ways and for the
party's weakness, Khrushchev and the CPSU made a dramatic
shift back to a hardline, Cold War stance. Thorez could not
have asked for more. The conflict with Red China and the
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U-2 incident had sparked an order from Khrushchev for a return
to anti-revisionist, neo-Stalinist politics. Thorez, who had
continued to condemn Togliatti, and Tito, was given a warm welcome
2
to the Soviet camp. An old-fashioned Stalinist, democratic-
centralist party like the PCF was a rare sight indeed as
Khrushchev looked around at the communist world split by-
revisionism and Maoism.
By May 1961, the PCF had expelled its dissidents; Thorez-
protege' Georges Marchais became a member of the Politburo and
Thorez heir apparent Waldeck Rochet was made Deputy Secretary-
General to assist the Secretary General who was ailing.-^
Thorez opposed de Gaulle's personal power as President and
encouraged the PCF in 1962 to form "the most diverse forms
of the united front" in order to increase its electoral
power. Therefore in November of that year, the PCF per-
suaded Mollet to cooperate in a united electoral tactic
against the Gaullist party. France operates its elections
on a two-ballot system. The two parties agreed that, if
after the first ballot, the candidate from the other party
were running stronger than one's own party candidate, the
weaker party's candidate would withdraw from the race in the
second ballot, and all the members of his party would be
urged to vote for the stronger party's candidate. (The
PCF-SFIO tactic succeeded, with the PCF quadrupling its
number of seats in parliament and the SFIO increasing its
5
representation by one-half). This was the first cooperative
electoral action taken by the two leftist groups since the
end of World War II.
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From 1963 to 1965, Socialist Gaston Deferre attempted to
unite all non-communist Left parties into a common Federation,,
and then unite this group with the French political Center
parties. His plan was for the PCF to be forced into an alli-
ance with the Gaullists for the 1965 presidential elections,
6
which was supposed to work to the detriment of both. The
union of the non-communist Left was accomplished on 10 September,
1965 with the creation of the Federation of the Democratic and
Socialist Left (FGDS). But Defferre's plan ended there, for
SFIO Secretary General Mo 1 let refused to let his party become
affiliated with the political Center. Mollet found support
for his position from the leader of another party recently
absorbed into the FDGS: Francois Mitterrand of the Conven-
tion of Republican Institutions (CIR). Since March of 1965,
the CIR had been trying to form an alliance with the PCF.
Mollet and Mitterrand, however, intended for such an alliance
7
to be purely temporary and for electoral purposes only.
Waldeck-Rochet was Secretary General of the PCF by this time
and, at first, the PCF tried to insist on the agreement of
a common program before the elections. In the face of
stubborn Socialist opposition, however, the Communists reluc-
8
tantly agreed to the FGDS terms.
The PCF had not wanted to put up a presidential candidate
of its own because of fears that it would indicate de facto
Communist approval of de Gaulle's system of direct presi-
9
dential elections. With the PCF's support, therefore,
Mitterrand (who was now leader of the FGDS) could present
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himself as the candidate of the united Left against de Gaulle
in the December 1965 elections. The PCP proved to be "a
loyal and active ally" and Mitterrand garnered a final 45.5%
10
of the popular vote.
The significance of the 1965 presidential elections is
twofold. On the one hand, Mitterrand's near success indi-
cated to the French government that a Left-extreme Left
coalition could become a majority force in France. And on
the other hand, the PCF's loyal support of a presidential
candidate of its own choosing marked the first departure of
French Communists from an officially declared Soviet line:
the Soviets had openly stated its support for the candidacy
11
of de Gaulle.
Annie Kriegel explains that with the advent of Waldeck-
Rochet as the head of the PCF, the dual nature of the French
party became apparent. The party is at once a member of the
international communist movement and the self-proclaimed
12
leader of the French working class. In matters concerning
international relations and the creation of the proper inter-
national atmosphere for the growth of the communist movement,
the French Communists abdicated all original authority to
the wiser judgment of the Soviet Union. After all, the USSR
was one of the two great superpowers; it was a leader whose
superior knowledge and interpretation of the international
situation as it pertained to the greater communist fraternity
was not to be contested by a mere national branch of the
universal Communist movement. In domestic affairs, however,
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the PCP (under the influence of Waldeck Rochet) had begun
claiming its right to determine policy pertaining to the
French working class. After all, they were a party of French-
men and they could discern much more accurately than a
Russian the desires and needs of the French proletariat.
I believe it was in this spirit, therefore, that the Waldeck-
Rochet leadership of the PCF decided to support the French
Leftist candidate in 1965 rather than the Soviet-designated
de Gaulle: it was deemed to be a domestic affair.
On April 22, 1967, Leonid Brezhnev reportedly made the
following statement during a private conversation with East
European leaders Ulbricht and Gomulka. Arguing in favor of
the contemporary Soviet policy towards non-Communist regimes,
Brezhnev is quoted as saying:
...take de Gaulle. Have we not succeeded, at no risk to
ourselves, in driving a breach through the imperialist
camp? De Gaulle is our enemy and we are well aware of
it. The French Communist Party was narrowminded enough
to try to stir us up against de Gaulle for their own
particular interests. But look at our achievements!
We have weakened the American position in the heart of
Europe and this weakening will continue. De Gaulle is
a sly old fox. He is aiming for mastery in Europe for
himself and in opposition to us. But here we must be
flexible. De Gaulle has virtually no chance of realiz-
ing his concept o'f Europe because the other West Euro-
pean countries are too powerful and they would never
allow it. But look at the balance-sheet from our point -^
of view, Comrades. Isn't this a success for our policy?
Brezhnev is said to have become so excited during these remarks
that he slapped his thigh several times, saying "to the Devil
with those parties that set themselves up as our mentors!"
In January 1966, immediately following the December
elections, Waldeck-Rochet renewed contact with Mollet, asking
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once again for the formulation of a joint governmental pro-
gram. Two months later, in an effort to increase its credi-
bility with the SFIO, the Central Committee of the PCF issued
a statement affirming the right of other political parties
15
to exist after the establishment of socialism. Later the
same week, Waldeck Rochet said that
With the passage to socialism, the aim is to reinforce
and democratize ... the exercise of freedom of thought,
freedom of assembly and association, of the right to
strike and the whole of the political rights for the
democratic parties in power, and for those who are in
the opposition and accept and respect the laws of the
new Socialist regime.
Throughout the remainder of the year, debates appeared in the
two parties' dailes (Le Populaire and L'Humanite ) concerning
such subjects as how to best guarantee the liberties won by
the French in 1789 and 1848, and how to best achieve a trans-
17
formation to socialism from a modern democratic state.
During the long and serious discussions, the Socialists
stressed they had no intention of being submerged by the
Communists into the kind of "socialist unity" that exists in
Eastern Europe. Mitterrand describes the December 1966
decision of the PGDS to unite with the French Communist Party
for the legislative elections of 1967:
Beginning of December 1966, the decision had at last been
made by the executive committee of the Federation. It
obviously had not been easy. The SFIO and the Convention
of Republican Inst itutions .. .were ready to make the step.
The Radical party had some difficulty in being convinced.
But once agreement was reached, things went quickly. The
first meeting between the two delegations (that of the
Communist Party was headed by Waldick Rochet) took place
at the Federation's headquarters on rue de Lille . The
meeting proceeded to be conducted in an atmosphere of
gravest seriousness. We had the feeling that we were
living an important moment in the history of our times...
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That day - 11 December - Began the irreversible march
toward unity. There will certainly be stops and set-
backs... but they will not be able to destroy it...
"
The Left scored another victory at the polls in 1967. The
union of the Left worked well. The FGDS obtained almost 20$
of the vote and the PCF obtained a healthy 22.5$ (which
translated into 75$ and 35$ increases in parliamentary repre-
sentation, respectively). Ronald Tiersky maintains, how-
ever, that the PCF refused to withdraw in favor of the FGDS
candidate in ten separate cases for fear the FGDS would win
21
a majority and elect to ally with someone other than the PCF.
However, it seems likely that the PCF did not feel ready to
form a government with the FGDS since a fully elaborated pro-
gram had not been agreed upon beforehand; the PCF did not
wish to risk participation in and association with a leftist
government whose programs were not necessarily going to be
those preferred by the Communists.
Further progress was made on a common program in February
1968, when the FGDS and the PCF issued a document entitled
The Common Declaration of the FGDS and PCF . Reportedly, the
greatest disagreements encountered during the negotiations
concerned the area of foreign policy: the FGDS advocated an
economic and political unfication of Europe and the PCF was
against any "supranational authority dominated by huge
22
capitalist forces." The Common Declaration ended with a
statement expressing the hope that the two sides would try
to resolve their differing points of view, "notably in
2 3
questions of foreign policy." J (Prime Minister Georges
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Pompidou denounced the Declaration as "a program of anarchy
24
leading to dictatorship.")
The events of May 1968 temporarily disrupted the growing
unity of the Left. Because the riots of the students and
workers had been spontaneously generated (i.e. without any
communist encouragement or direction), the PCF attempted to
play the role of peace-keeper for the Fifth Republic by act-
ing as a mediator between the government and the rioters.
Their attempts failed, however, since the rioting crowds
25
were not communists. Mitterrand opted to take advantage
of the situation. On May 28th, anticipating the defeat of
de Gaulle's announced referendum on the crisis, Mitterrand
announced that in view of the imminent resignation of de Gaulle,
the Left was prepared to "assume its responsibilities."
This proved to be a tactical disaster for the Left. President
de Gaulle decided to hold national elections instead. The
population, convinced by government propaganda and Mitterrand's
pronouncement that the rioting crowds were Communist-inspired,
voted overwhelming support to the Gaullist party, which, just
for the occasion, had been renamed Union for the Defense of
the Republic (UDR). The FGDS received only 16.6% of the vote,
27
while the PCF received a bare 20%.
The repercussions of the August 1968 Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia were also felt throughout the French Left.
As a result of the June French elections and the August inva-
sion, the entire Leftist movement in France broke apart and
crumbled away into small individual parties, each vying for
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the title of the "pure" socialist party. When de Gaulle un-
expectedly resigned in April 1969 3 the Left was therefore
totally unprepared.
By 1969, the PCF had a de facto new leader: Georges
Marchais (Waldick-Rochet having taken ill in late 1968.)
When Socialist Gaston Defferre presented himself as the
"Leftist" candidate for President in the 1969 elections with-
out having had any prior consultations with the PCF, Marchais
is reported to have been furious. Seventy-year old Jacques
Duclos became the Communist candidate and, although Pompidou
eventually won the election, Duclos did receive 21.5$ of the
first ballot votes versus Defferre' s meager 5%
•
Noting this
tremendous support for the PCF, the SFIO decided to resume
negotiations for unity with the Communists. At the SFIO
Party Congress in July 1969, Guy Mollet was replaced as
Secretary General by an even more enthusiastic advocate of
Leftist union: Alain Savary. The Socialist delegates to
the Congress voted to change the name of the party from the
anachronistic French Section of the Socialist International
to the more modern Socialist Party (PS). Furthermore, they
set up an Executive Committee to work on a Socialist Plan of
29
Action based on the FGDS-PCF declaration of 1966.
Throughout 1970, Marchais and Savary worked together on
the joint program. In June 1971, after inviting Mitterrand's
party to join the PS, the Socialist Party congress voted
Mitterrand its new Secretary General. On June 27, 1972,
Mitterrand and Marchais announced their final agreement on
a Common Program of Government.
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B. DIPLOMACY AND DEFENSE
International relations had been the subject of consider-
able disagreement between the two parties during the negotia-
30tions for the Common Program of 1972. In view of the PCP T s
traditional willingness to follow the Soviet lead in this
domain, it should come as no surprise that throughout the
1960s the PCP meticulously adhered to the Soviets' line in
international and defense matters.
1. Algeria
The problem of Algerian independence was the immediate
cause for the death of the harried Fourth Republic and the
birth of the Gaullist Fifth Republic. As discussed earlier,
the conflict between Algerian nationalists and European-French
colons originated in the immediate postwar period. After the
colons refused to execute the 19 ^ 7 Algerian Statute, the
Paris government In 19^8 sent Socialist Marcel Naegelen to be
Governor-General in Algiers. His duty was to follow the pro-
visions of the Statute and organize elections for the Algerian
Assembly. Naegelen accomplished this, however, in such a way
that, from then on, the extremely popular nationalist groups
31
were allowed only minimal representation. By 1951,
Socialists in Paris had heard reports of Naegelen's systematic
falsification of election returns and were deploring his
32
actions; he resigned later that year.
In December 1955 the French government decided that
33
Algeria would no longer vote in French national elections.
Therefore, when the SFIO was elected to power in the legislative
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elections of January 1956, the National Assembly contained
no Algerian representatives. This was ironic and unfortunate
since the SFIO had campaigned on the slogan "Peace in Algeria";
but how could it conclude a peace if there were no adequate
means of communication with the enemy? War had been raging
in Algeria ever since October 31, 195*1. Nationalist forces
were being led by the National Liberation Front (FLN) and
after ten years of colon repression, there was little desire
for talk. The newly-installed Socialist government in Paris,
however, was hopeful that it could reach an agreement with
the FLN. The French Socialists' proposal called for the elec-
tion of a single Algerian assembly composed of equal numbers
of French Moslems and French Europeans. In the new arrange-
ment, the Paris government was to serve only as a mediator
between the two equal sides of the Algerian Assembly. Prime
Minister Mollet wanted first a cease fire, then elections
and negotiations with the new, elected officials. Mollet f s
plan appealed to neither side, however. The colons were
frightened by the term "one single and unique assembly,"
fearing that they would be irrevocally separated from France.
34
The FLN wanted nothing short of independence.
In 1956, Mollet' s representative in Algeria (Socialist
Resident-General Robert Lacoste) began urging increased mili-
tary operations. The French cabinet debated whether large
reinforcements could be sent to Algeria while at the same time
leaving room for negotiations. General Andre' Zeller resigned
as Chief of Staff, stating the fluctuations of the military
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policy of successive cabinets did not permit him to fulfill
35his functions effectively. ' Throughout 1956, Mollet arranged
secret meetings between representatives from his government
and the FLN in hopes of reaching some basis for a preliminary
36
understanding. The meetings were fruitless, however. The
FLN reported to the United Nations that the Mollet government
never offered anything more than administrative autonomy:
instead of Algeria being governed like a collection of small
37departements, it would be one big French province. This
was far from a promise of independence.
After a year and a half in office, the Mollet govern-
ment had nothing to show for the tremendous amounts of money
and resources that had been spent on the war in Algeria.
The French economy was dangerously weakened by the prolonged
conflict. The Socialist government was finally voted out of
office in May 1957. Debate continued on the Algerian problem
and, in November 1957, the French National Assembly was asked
to vote on the principle of a unique Algerian Assembly and
the decentralization of Algeria into autonomous territories.
q O
The Socialists supported the idea, but both the Right and
39
the PCF opposed it.
Why did the French Communists refuse this 1957 plan
for an end to the war? Why, if they opposed the plan, did
they not make any stirring declarations in support of the
FLN? The evolution of the PCF position vis-a-vis the Algerian
independence movement is worthy of some special attention.
There are a number of reasons why the PCF's Algerian and
13^

Indochinese policies were markedly different. First, as
mentioned in Chapter VI, the PCF initially was not able to
support the Algerian nationalists because of Stalin's ban on
Communist Party association with violent acts of any kind.
Second, although by 195^ the party was able ideologically to
support the armed revolt of the FLN, it was preoccupied with
cultivating French domestic opposition to the German rearma-
ment issue. The PCF wanted, above all, strong backing from
the traditional, anti-German sector of the French populace;
this latter group, however, also happened to support a French
Algeria. Not wishing, therefore, to allienate new-found
allies, the PCF and its affiliated Algerian Communist Party
confined their remarks dealing with the FLN to such non-
committal pronouncements as:
We are in favor of the existence of permanent, special,
political, economic, and cultural ties between France and
Algeria. .. [We] express our firm resolution to neglect
nothing in our advance along the road that must end with
a cease-fire in Algeria and lead to negotiations that
will transform the Algerian people into friends and allies
of the French people. ^0
As Stalin had peripheral parties sacrifice themselves for the
good of Russia, so Thorez felt the Algerians should realize
the insignificance of their cause as compared to the greater
one of defending France's strategic position in Europe and
41
the world. Furthermore, he objected to their violent and
terroristic tactics, for reasons all of his own:
If the FLN thinks that it's winning public opinion, it's
mistaken; it turns opinion against itself ... Such methods
open the door to all sorts of provocations against us. 42
Third, the French Communists had begun to realize by 1957-1958
that, in spite of any fraternal desire the party might have to
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help the FLN, a sizeable segment of the French proletariat
was refusing to give up the idea that Algeria was French.
Therefore, it must either openly oppose the government's con-
cessions to the FLN (as it did in November 1957) or venture
no further than a call for negotiations between the two sides
(as it did in 1958); this latter was, of course, a pale sub-
stitute for a demand for unqualified military victory of the
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rebels over the French.
In 1959, the PCF Politburo condemned de Gaulle's
declaration of the principle of self-determination for Algeria
as a simple, ineffectual maneuver. A few days later,
Khrushchev voiced approval of the Gaullist proposal. Thorez,
who had been out of town at the time of the Politburo state-
ment, is reported to have reprimanded his colleagues for
their hasty declaration. The official party newspaper
L'Humanite began stressing the importance of de Gaulle's
proposal. As might be expected, by I960, both the SFIO and
the PCF were supporting de Gaulle's efforts to negotiate
peace with the FLN. J
Before concluding this discussion of Algeria, there
is one special aspect of the problem which must not be over-
looked. In spite of the massive support which was eventually
accorded de Gaulle's plans for Algerian independence, a cer-
tain segment of French society persisted in demanding the
retention of Algeria for France. One of the spokesmen for
this group was Francois Mitterand, who even went so far as
to condemn the NATO allies for not helping France in her
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struggle against this armed, communist attack on an integral
part of French territory. Many of the French military fight-
ing in Algeria agreed with him when he spoke of the need to
make the Allies understand that
[today] the Mediterranean, and not the Rhine, comprises
the very axis of our security, and therefore of our
foreign policy. °
French military personnel who belonged to this school of
thought tended to come from among the specially trained and
indoctrinated colonial units of the French armed forces.
It was on April 22, 196l, that a group of military men such
as these attempted to save French Algeria by executing an
eleventh-hour coup d' etat in Paris. The attempt failed, how-
ever, due to a lack of generalized support from the rest of
the French military which was based mainly in France and
Germany and thus not as ideologically motivated.
The coup attempt had a tremendous impact on the
public. The immediate reaction of the PCF was to take ad-
vantage of the fascist threat: the French Communists
clamored for the creation of popular militias. The
Socialists met on April 26th and unanimously approved the
following statement:
The Steering Committee of the SFIO has examined the politi-
cal situation in the aftermath of the failure of the
subversive action taken by a group of officers betraying
their duty.
The inflexible firmness of the President of the
Republic throughout the entire crisis, and especially
that which he showed in his address to the nation and
in his instructions to the army, was a decisive element
in the quick liquidation of the insurrection...
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In spite of the reserve and rancor which they can
legitimately feel towards a system that favors the well-
to-do, the Workers ... demonstrated that they are the
Nation and that they will not tolerate the installation
in Prance of fascist military authority...
The army must be reorganized, most especially the
specialized units that made up the shock troops in the
insurrection. The Republic, in order to be defended, ^o
must be served by men who are incorruptably attached.
This was precisely what President de Gaulle had in mind.
2. Force de Frappe
As France's colonial empire came to an end with the
granting of independence to the various possessions, so too
did end the French military's idealistic, ideologically-
motivated struggle against communism in the colonies. Impor-
tant segments of the French armed forces were suddenly faced,
once again, with lack of a mission. But more importantly,
the government was faced with a body of armed men who had no
clear purpose or reason for being. De Gaulle had taken this
into consideration when he decided to reorganize the French
armed forces in such a way that the center of attention would
be the defense of la P atrie - the defense of France. In
order to accomplish this fundamental reorientation of purpose,
he injected into the system one vital new ingredient: French
nuclear power. y
France had been secretly developing her own nuclear
capability since July 1952 by authorization of a governmental
program. According to Alfred Grosser, every successive
government reaffirmed the importance of the program and
actively (albeit secretly) supported preparations for tech-
50
nically applying the new nuclear source of power. President
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de Gaulle and General Charles Ailleret transformed France's
nuclear potential into a powerful, national Strike Force
( Force de frappe ) comprising nuclear-armed manned bomber
aircraft, intermediate-range land-based ballistic missiles
and nuclear-powered ballistic missile carrying submarines.
Leftist opposition to an indigenous, French nuclear
force began as early as 196l. The SFIO had already announced
51its opposition to the idea by April of that year. By 1964
both the SFIO and the PCF were organizing demonstrations
against the nuclear force. (The SFIO even formed a special
National Committee against the Force de frappe
.
)
The Leftist argument became formalized during
Mitterrand's 1965 presidential campaign. (As already men-
tioned, Mitterrand's candidacy was supported not only by the
non-communist FGDS but also by the PCF.) Mitterrand's cam-
paign proposals were published the next year as the Program
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of the FGDS
, and a section of the program was devoted to
the disposition of the nation's armed forces and, most
especially, its force de frappe :
To preserve its freedom Its culture and its prosperity,
a nation has the duty to defend itself against eventual
foreign pressures or interventions ... It is true... that
the threat could be .. .military . Hence the necessity to
organize for the defense of the nation... An armed nation
requires universal and compulsory military service, the
length of which will be reduced. . .The army can and must
contribute to the civil and professional formation of
young citizens .. .The army reserve will regain the place
it never should have lost in the military organization:
that of being region and mission specific.
Every government must maintain an active arsenal.
If it is normal for the State to place orders ... with
certain private specialized industries like those deal-
ing with electronics, it is nonetheless necessary [for
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it] to NATIONALIZE those industries which produce the
weapons necessary for the nation's defense.
The danger of today's policy is that Prance might
find herself one day without any conventional forces
while at the same time not disposing of a real force
de frappe . . .France must put an end at the very soonest
possibility to the vain attempt to create an autonomous
nuclear capability .. .The undertaking is reprehensible:
to pretend that Prance is capable of having all the
elements of an autonomous thermo-nuclear military force,
that is to say not only the bomb, but also the launch
vehicles and the warning system to detect hostile
attacks, is to feign ignorance of economic, financial
and even geographic realities...
A government run by democratic socialists would
therefore decide, the very next day after its assumption
of power, to renounce the creation of a national atomic
force... The cancellation of the force de frappe would
entail a reconversion of some factories and jobs...
Atomic research represents a great deal on an energy
level [and on] the level of research for peaceful pur-
poses ... 5^
Three years later, however, immediately following the 1969
election of Gaullist candidate Georges Pompidou to the presi-
dency (for a term of seven years), Mitterrand wrote the
following:
I said during my 1965 presidential campaign that I would
outlaw the Force de Frappe . I would not be able to say
that tomorrow. The military policy of General de Gaulle
was approved of by the French people. .. Seven years from
now our atomic arsenal will be an irreversible reality.
You won't be able to drown it like you do puppies. Some
suggest transferring it to a European level, when Europe
exists. That would resolve a part of the immense problem.
But that would also be hypothesizing Soviet consent to
this indirect form of rearming Germany -and in what a way!-3 -3
Was this an historic turning point; had the Socialists accepted
a nuclear fait accompli ?
3. United Europe
a. SFIO/PS
In 1958, Charles de Gaulle arrived on the political
scene with a plan for Europe entirely different from that
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suppored earlier by the Socialists. De Gaulle had a unique
perception of the role France should play in Europe and the
world.
All my life I have nurtured a precise image of France,
inspired by both feeling and reason. What I have in me
of sentiment naturally pictures France, like the fairy-
tale princess of the madonna in the fresco paintings,
as vowed to some superior, exceptional destiny... If on
occasion her gestures and actions indicate mediocrity,
I have the feeling of an absurd anomaly, stemming from
the mistakes of the French and not from the genius of
the nation... The positive side of my mind convinces me
that France is only truly herself when she is among the
first, that only great tasks are liable to compensate
for the leaven of dispersion that her people secretes
within itself... In one word, as I see it, France cannot
be France without grandeur. .. DU
Therefore, France was to be more than a mere member of a
United Europe; it was to be Europe's leader. Possessing an
indigenously-produced nuclear defense system, France could
call itself the most independent of all the European nations.
De Gaulle wanted to safeguard the sovereign authority of the
French nation against any attempt to submerge it into a
nebulous, collective decision-making body. Towards this end,
he opposed the creation of all supranational institutions; he
instituted the principle of individual veto in the organs
of the European Communities, assuring thereby that no nation's
interests would be sacrificed to the dictates of majority rule.
De Gaulle's Europe of Nations was bitterly attacked
by the French Socialist Party as the product of a chauvinistic
57
love of the fatherland. This does not mean, however, that
the Socialists refused to support the various European insti-
tutions, such as they were. On the contrary, the French
Socialist Party continued to participate in the building of
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a United Europe and in the creation of as much de_ facto
socialist internationalism as they could. In 1961 the 53rd
SFIO Party Congress expressed its pleasure over the positive
58
changes occurring in the British attitude toward the EEC
and in 1964, the SFIO tasked its parliamentary group to re-
search the best way of maintaining French Socialist repre-
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sentation in the European Assembly. ' In 1965 the Bulletin
Interieur de Parti Socialiste SFIO bitterly condemned Gaullist
behavior in the European community. The Bulletin referred
specifically to the French government's 1 July 1965 statement
that France would no longer participate in the meetings of
the EEC due to a delay being caused by the other nations in
reaching an agricultural agreement. The SFIO asserted that
the French government had a number of other options, includ-
ing presenting its case to the European Court of Justice.
But the Socialists knew the Gaullists would never accord such
importance to a European institution:
The Steering Committee denounces most vigorously the
recent measures decided by the government of General
de Gaulle. These will end in the reestablishment of
State-to-State methods of diplomacy which have in the
past cost Europe a series of bloody conflicts and de-
stroyed the alliances that were permitting our country
to recover its freedom.
M. Couve de Murville has declared that the Treaty
of Rome accords only a strictly consultative role to
the Strasbourg Assembly ... Article 138 'of the Treaty
of Rome' provides that there shall be elections for
the Assembly on the basis of universal suffrage, which
the Gaullist powers refuse to do and thus show how
they ignore democracy as much outside as inside France.
By choosing Europe of Governments ... instead of the
union of European peoples, General de Gaulle encourages
the renaissance. . .notably in Germany, of the worst kind
of nationalism. This policy of false grandeur is con-
trary to the interests of France, Europe and peace. 60
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The 1966 Program of the FGDS (comprising primarily Mitterrand's
campaign proposals) promised the following actions, should
the French Left be voted into power:
Election of a European Assembly by universal suffrage...
expansion of the European Community by the addition of
Great Britain... an opening of European institutions to
countries of the East in an effort to promote peaceful
coexistence ... the progressive denuclearization of the
center of Europe... the reunification of Germany ... the
nonmanufacture of nuclear weapons by Germany and the
recognition of the Oder-Neisse line."-'-
b. PCF
As early as 1959, the PCF was condemning the
European Common Market on the basis that it would
increase the dependence on the part of the countries of
Europe on the United States and the dependence of France
on a revanchist and reactionary West Germany.
At the Party's l6th Congress in 1961, Waldeck Rochet (not yet
Secretary General) referred to the EEC as a simple instrument
"for the reinforcement of American monopolies in Europe."
By the spring of 1962, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) was
revising its position on the EEC issue, saying it had "not
properly understood" how to evaluate the effects of European
integration on the Italian economy. It declared the EEC
should not be dissolved, for it had considerable vitality
64
and was based on the real needs of economic development.
At a conference in Moscow later that year, the PCF representa-
tives were criticized by Soviet and Italian colleagues for
their "subjective errors" in having ignored economic facts
and seeing the EEC only as the work of U.S. and West German
6Sforeign policy. The PCF was not to be swayed, however,
for in February 1963 it refused to join the PCI in setting up
a liaison office with the EEC in Brussels.
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The first softening in the PCF position came in
December 1964. After a meeting in Paris, the trade unions
affiliated with the PCF and the PCI agreed to take the ini-
tiatives necessary to demand their admission to the organisms
of the Common Market; and by May 1965, the Congress of the
PCF-affiliated CGT labor union was calling for a single labor
front for the six EEC nations. Also in May, now Secretary-
General Waldeck Rochet met with the leader of the PCI and
subsequently announced that,
Without modifying our basic interpretations, we recognize
that the Common Market exists ... [and] we think that it is
possible that a positive collaboration can be established
. . .which takes account of the interests of the workers in
each country and also of our national interests. °7
Two months later, the Politburo of the PCF demanded Communist
representation in Brussels and Strasbourg (the 'EEC and the
European Parliament, respectively). What could have
sparked this dramatic reversal? Annie Kriegel offers the
explanation that in 1965, the PCF was seeking an alliance
with the Socialists and this recognition of the EEC was re-
garded by the French Communists as a concession. In reality,
however, the PCF had determined that by recognizing the EEC,
it could get inside the organization and eventually paralyze
and annihilate it under the guise of "democratization."
There appears to be some proof to substantiate
the suspicion that, despite its pronouncements to the con-
trary, the PCF persisted in its basic opposition to the EEC.
During the PCF-PS negotiations for the 1972 Common Program,
one of the areas of greatest disagreement was the economic
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and political unification of the EEC. The PS insisted upon
70
it; the PCP firmly rejected it.
4. Atlantic Alliance
The other point upon which the two parties could not




The PCF had been among the first to protest
against French military involvement in NATO. In 1957-1958,
the entire PCF was mobilized to campaign against the United
72
States' request to install missile launch sites in France.
(An important point of contention was that the sites were to
remain strictly under U.S. control.) But the French Communists'
anti-NATO crusade came to an abrupt end when President de Gaulle
made his historic March 11, 1966, speech demanding the with-
drawal of all French troops from the integrated NATO command
structure and the removal of all NATO bases and troops from
7 "3French soil by April 1967. This was an indisputably favor-
able move from a PCF or CPSU standpoint. Annie Kriegel has
stated that nothing saved France from Communism better than
74
the pro-Soviet policy practiced by General de Gaulle. The
old general had cunningly maneuvered the French Communists
into a position of non-criticism, and therefore de facto
support of his NATO/Force de frappe policies. The Gaullist




On January 6, 1972, the new acting leader of the
PCF, Georges Marchais, denounced the "accelerated sliding of
the present [Pompidou] regime toward Atlanticism" and the
"closer integration of French foreign policy with the general
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strategy of American imperialism." One week later he
claimed that the French government was relaxing its opposi-
tion to military integration within NATO. (An article con-
cerning the current orientation of French foreign policy
appeared in the Soviet newspaper Izvestia a few weeks later
7 f)
and it used terms similar to those employed by Marchais.)
b. SFIO
France's allies were dismayed and angered by
de Gaulle's March 11th declaration. But then, so was the
French Socialist party. The SFIO was enfuriated:
The Chief of State, in deciding the withdrawal of NATO,
violates the word we gave to the allies, endangers our
future and upsets our general policy without any prior
debate in Parliament or even before the Council of
Ministers
.
His decision has the direct consequences of: forcing
the withdrawal of American troops from France, which
weakens the collective security that guarantees peace
while we wait for disarmament; depriving our force de
frappe
,
already costly and useless, of allied radar
coverage so necessary to our aircraft; aiding the dis-
semination of nuclear weapons; and encouraging the re-
armament of Germany which now becomes the principal
ally of America, due to our own fault...
The Socialist Party... has always affirmed the neces-
sity of reorganizing NATO, but it believes it essential
that NATO armed forces be integrated to the maximum ex-
tent possible, not separated. Besides, it is mindless
to pursue the destruction of NATO while at the same
time impeding the construction of Europe.
The Socialist Party does not believe that it is pos-
sible to permanently base the organization of peace on
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In the FDGS Program, published four months after this state-
ment, the French Socialists had these plans for the disposi-
tion of France in the Atlantic Alliance:
Autonomous defense is not possible for a country like
France, above all in the case of a nuclear conflict.
Security does not exist for France except within the
framework of an alliance that includes one of the
great nuclear powers and within an organization of
peaceful coexistence.
Our military Instrument will henceforth be con-
sidered only within the context of what it is contri-
buting to the alliance system to which France belongs...
In Europe, France intends to remain faithful to her
friends and to the obligations she currently holds in
the Atlantic Alliance. France does not believe that it
is by destroying NATO from the inside that one can make
a better system. That kind of action is a serious mis-
take, a fortuitous gesture which only changes the bal-
ance without bringing any compensating benefits.
The changes which have occurred since 1949 in the
position of the Atlantic Alliance members demand a pro-
found reorganization of the Pact. A French Leftist
government would undertake negotiations with its 14
partners with the purpose of rebalancing the responsi-
bilities of each... Even though France has left NATO,
it is still able to explore ways to build an organiza-
tion of peaceful coexistence that could be effective
in determining the kind of military accords that should
henceforth link the Atlantic allies.
The French Leftist government will orient all its
efforts towards international detente and a plan for
progressive and simultaneous general disarmament in
order that the Atlantic Pact and the Warsaw Pact will
eventually have no reason for being.
As explained earlier, the ideas of the Program
were also those of Mitterrand. It might be interesting,
therefore, to see if Mitterrand's NATO position became modi-
fied at all by the passage of time. In 1969, in his book
entitled Ma Part de Verlte, Mitterrand wrote:
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For every Socialist the building of peace is inseparable
from the trilogy: international arbitration, simultane-
ous and controlled disarmament and collective security.
But let's leave the Seventh Heaven of Great Principles
right there. I will only say that I do not accept
principles that have drawers, drawers that you open
and close according to the opportunity of the moment...
I will not sacrifice to a union of the French Left
the convictions that I have regarding the security of
France and the balance of world power. .
.
The Atlantic Alliance and the construction of Europe
are not to be considered equals. I support the Atlantic
Alliance; I wish for the new Europe. The problem of
alliances is simple. What guarantee can Russia give us
if we leave the Pact that binds us? And what will be the
guarantee of that guarantee? At the point where we are
today in international relations, no one is able to give
me an answer. But as in all things, that which is not
immediately possible becomes so if one is sufficiently
determined. This is why I have taken a position in
favor of the progressive and simultaneous dissolution
of military blocs and the creation of a demilitarized
zone in the center of Europe. I hope that France will
take advantage of every opportunity to negotiate an
inter-European collective security system. .
.
This being said, I will now say that I am absolutely
against any return of France to NATO. A lot of my close
friends urge me to denounce the Alliance altogether.
Their arguments have meaning for me when they speak of
the Americans invading with their Secret Service, money
and technology. But neutralism is not a policy for a
country like ours. Therefore I am waiting for the chess
players to make their move, and I meanwhile keep myself
from upsetting their game. 79
5 . World View
Apart from the long-term issues of United Europe and
the Atlantic Alliance, there were a number of occasions during
the 1960s when the French Socialist and Communist Parties had
to formulate opinions of crisis situations.
With the sole exception of the 1968 invasion of
Czechoslovakia, the PCF aligned itself closely with the Soviet
foreign policy dictates throughout the 1960s. In i960, the
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PCP Central Committee proved its loyalty to "the position of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)" by adopting
a resolution which "disapproved the positions expressed by
the comrades of the Chinese Communist Party." In 1962, the
PCP adopted the Soviet interpretation of the Sino-Indian con-
O-i
flict, andy a year later, Waldeck Rochet condemned the PRC
for its "adventurist and nationlist policy," its aggravation
and, a year later, Waldeck Rochet condemned the Peoples'
Republic of China (PRC) for its "adventurist and nationalist
policy," its aggravation of international tensions and its
promotion of the nuclear arms race by its hostility to the
nuclear test ban treaty - a hostility described by Waldeck
Rochet as being "shared with the imperialist 'madmen' and
„82
partners of the Cold War such as de Gaulle. During the
Cuban Missile Crisis, L 'Humanite saw only U.S culpability:
The pretexts invoked by Kennedy to hide his actions of
piracy are pure lies. Everybody knows that the only go
military base in Cuba is an American base - Guantanamo.
Even after Khrushchev had officially recognized the presence
of Soviet missiles in Cuba, the PCF's loyalty was undiminished:
they praised the Soviet leader's actions as having "saved the
peace." Similar praise was voiced the following year on the
occasion of the Soviet signing of the 1963 nuclear test ban
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treaty in Moscow.
Thus, from the beginning of the Fifth French Republic,
the official French Communist Party line was firmly pro-Soviet,
but also anti-Gaullist. By 1964, however, de Gaulle was begin-




d'Estaing to Moscow and welcoming Podgorny to Paris. In
March of that year, Thorez made an important announcement at
a meeting of the Party's Central Committee: the PCF was to
end its a priori opposition of all Gaullist foreign policy
decisions. Thorez stated that the Party should not withhold
its support from "positive" measures merely because "de Gaulle
o 7
allegedly has ulterior motives." (One such "positive"
measure was the 1966 French recognition of the PRC; for, like
the eviction of NATO forces, this was seen by the Kremlin as
enhancing French isolation and independence from the Western
s88bloc.) Annie Kriegel has explained that, in the eyes of
Communists, de Gaulle's was a "realistic" policy:
a policy which, although conducted by a "class adversary,"
is going "in the right direct ion. " °9
But the primary determinants of PCF foreign policy remained
to be the directives of the CPSU.
In 1964, the 17th PCF Party Congress issued a resolu-
tion, a section of which dealt with the orientation of foreign
policy towards detente, peaceful coexistence and general,
controlled disarmament. The terms and arguments used in that
resolution were identical to those found in contemporary CPSU
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documents. The pro-Soviet, pro-deGaulle foreign policy
stance of the PCF greatly displeased the French Socialist
party. For example, instead of parroting alien terms and
arguments, the FGDS worked to develop promises specific to
the French experience. In its 1966 program, the FGDS asserted
that a French Leftist government would immediately reoccupy
France's rightful place at the Geneva disarmament talks; it
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would secure France's signature to the Moscow test ban
treaty; it would initiate a general agreement on the non-
proliferation and non-dissemination of nuclear weapons; and
it would limit military expenditures to the 1965 level.
While the PCF was conducting its anti-Chinese cam-
paign of the early 1960s, the SFIO Party Congress of 1961
was stating:
The Congress believes that it would be dangerous to keep
China in its current state of isolation. The Congress
hopes that the Peking Government will be recognized and
that Chinese representation in the United Nations will
be normalized."
And in 1966, with regard to the tensions in the Middle East,
the FGDS called for all nations, "using the eventual control
of the UN, to end all interventions 'in the Middle East' that
tend toward reinforcing the military potential of the various




problems." The PCF preferred t side with the Soviets and
voice support for the Arab cause.
C. COMMUNISM WITH A NATIONAL FACE
The PCF probably understood the reasons why Nasser was to
be supported in the Middle East. But one wonders if the French
Communists were ever told of the lightheadedness with which
the Soviet leadership contemplated the fate of the non-ruling
Communist parties in countries being governed by "positive"
forces such as Nasser and de Gaulle. Brezhnev was quite
specific on this subject in his private conversation with
Ulbricht and Gomulka in 1967:
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Nasser is muddle-headed in ideological matters. But he
is a good man and has shown that he can be relied on. As
politicians responsible for the future of humanity, we
must naturally make sacrifices in order to achieve pro-
gress. One of the sacrifices we have had to accept is
that Nasser persecutes the Egyptian Communists. But
Nasser has the stature to assume the leadership of the
Arab liberation movement which makes him invaluable to
us at the present stage. This is a creative application
of the Leninist principle of alliances with various dif-
ferent political groupings at any given point in time
when this can serve the cause of revolution. Once the
Arab masses realize what their true interests are we shall
not need a Nasser any more.-^
Was the French Communist Party willing to support Soviet
policies even to the point of its own self-destruction? I
believe not.
In 1968, when the Soviet Union decided to launch a mili-
tary invasion of Czechoslovakia, the PCF was still reeling
from the disastrous effects of the May riots and the devastat-
ing defeat of the French Left at the polls. As explained
earlier, the French Communists had been somewhat the victims
of vicious anti-Left propaganda, in spite of their attempt
to maintain a law-abiding, non-violent image throughout the
crisis. What the PCF did not need, two months after the
riots, was a blatent public display of armed Communist aggres-
sion anywhere in the world. Waldeck Rochet was Secretary
General of the Party at this time and a delicate agreement
had been reached, just a few months earlier, with the FGDS
resulting in a Common Declaration, the fruit of many years'
work and the promise for a future Leftist program of govern-
ment. Waldeck Rochet knew all these painstaking negotiations
would be for nought unless the Left could quickly recover its
momentum. The Czech invasion, however, delivered the coup de
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grace to whatever hopes remained for the creation of a United
French Left by the end of the 1960s.
What was Waldeck Rochet's reaction to the Soviet invasion
of Czechoslovakia? Seeing his own Party's domestic situation
in danger of being ruined by a Soviet display of armed aggres-
sion, Waldeck Rochet sharply condemned the invasion. The morn-
ing after the invasion, the PCF Politburo released a communique
95
expressing "surprise and reprobation" at the "military inter-
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vention in Czechoslovakia" by the "Communist Party of the
97Soviet Union" and its allies. Kevin Devlin describes the
feeling that had prevailed prior to the crisis:
In Czechoslovakia. .. here, at last, was the promise of a
socialist society to which Western Communists could point
as a relevant example, without endlessly insisting that
their own pluralistic, democratic paths would not be
patterned after existing Communist regimes. 9o
As early as April 1968, Waldeck Rochet expressed firm approval
of the political and economic reforms being instituted by the
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Czech Communist Party leaders and wished them "great successes
in the application of their program aiming at the expansion
of socialism." 100 On July l4th (three weeks after the PCF's
defeat at the polls), Waldeck Rochet travelled to Moscow with
two Italian Communists to defend the proper socialist nature
of the Czechoslovak regime and to warn the Soviets "that for
us only a political solution [is] admissable, and that any
101
kind of armed intervention [would be] unacceptable." A
few days later, the Central Committee of the PCF sent its
Soviet counterpart a letter emphasizing the PCF's total opposi-
tion to military intervention and its inability to approve
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such a measure. Once again it is Kevin Devlin who offers
an insightful explanation of the PCF's repeated opposition
to a military solution:
The West European parties ... [took] their stand on the
military intervention as a matter of principle .. .As
Communists ... they had to condemn the violation of norms
accepted by the entire world movement - the sovereignty
of each socialist state, the equality and autonomy of
all parties, the right of each national Communist leader-
ship to determine its own policies.
In October 1968, the new, more independent nature of the PCF
became even more pronounced with the departure of one of the
Politburo's most pro-Soviet and pro-Stalinist members:
Jeannette Vermeersch, widow of Maurice Thorez. After being
censured by Waldeck Rochet and the Central Committee for her
"divergent and contradictory position" on the Czechoslovakian
103
invasion, Thorez 's widow resigned from the Party.
These actions of 1968, however, must not be interpreted
as symptoms of a PCF desire to wrench total independence from
the Soviet Union. As explained in an earlier chapter, the
French Communists seek only "respect for both the sovereignty
of each country and the free determination of each party" as
regards Party jurisdiction over purely national, domestic
affairs, all the while preserving and respecting "the spirit
of proletarian internationalism" 10 ^ as the chief goal of all
foreign policy decisions. Indicative of the French Communists'
continued desire for good relations with the USSR is the fact
that the PCF announced its acceptance of the "normalized"
105
situation in Czechslovakia five days after the invasion;
and, three months later, the PCF became the first non-ruling
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Communist Party to send a delegation to Moscow to renew ties
with the Soviets. While it is true that on July 28, 1972,
the PCF issued a statement in defense of some dissidents on
trial in Czechoslovakia, Annie Kriegel minimizes the impor-
tance of this PCF stand. She points out that, unlike the
strongly emotional Party condemnation of the invasion itself,
this statement in 1972 contained no explicit criticism of
the CPSU or any mention of the Soviet methods and directives
107
that were certainly governing the conduct of the trials.
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VIII. FROM ALLIANCE TO ANTITHESIS (1972-1977)
A. UNION
In the spring of 1972, at the time of the signing of the
Common Program of the Left, there was no doubt that the French
Communist Party was the dominant partner in the Union of the
French Left. The Communists' position was somewhat attenuated
by the surprising increase in public support for the PS during
the March 1973 legislative elections, but the PCF still pre-
dominated, albeit by only two-and-a-half percentage points
(PCF: 21.3$, PS: 18.9$). Later that same year, the PCF
watched with horror as the Leftist Allende regime in Chile
was deposed and obliterated. The leadership of the PCF took
this to be a lesson that, in order to successfully retain
power in a politically pluralistic society, the Left must be
2
supported by a substantial majority of the population. When
the French presidential elections were held six months later,
in May 1974, Leftist candidate Francois Mitterrand obtained
43.4% of the first ballot vote, as compared with only 32.8%
3
for the Centrist candidate Valery Giscard d'Estaing. After
the final second-round ballots were cast, Mitterrand had
lost to Giscard d'Estaing by less than one-and-one-half per-
il
centage points (a mere 350,000 votes). Seeing that the
Left did not yet command a strong enough majority in French
society, the Communist Party immediately embarked on a
5
campaign to create a National Front. It appears they wanted
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to repeat the historical example of the Front Populaire ; for,
just like Thorez in 1935, the PCF leadership in 1974 maneuvered
into position to attract support from every corner of the
French political spectrum calling Gaullists and "other patriots"
to membership in the Union. As in 1935, members of the French
Socialist party were not very keen on the idea, objecting that
this new "Union of the People of France" would dilute the pro-
gram and purpose of the smaller, but more purely Leftist con-
6
federation. Undaunted, the PCF proceeded to open its Party
meetings to scrutiny by all, and Party leaders and members
7
responded to questions from the public. All this came to an
abrupt halt, however, just a few months later.
B. TENSION
1. Interparty
Parliamentary by-elections were held in September and
October of 197*1, and the PCF lost to the PS in five of the
o
six races. For, while the Communists had been catering to
the political Right, many former Communist suporters no longer
considered the PCF a true anti-establishment party. As a
result, they gave their vote to the French Socialist Party
9
which had remained aloof from all the PCF shinanigans.
Following the September-October humiliation, the PCF began
a bitter anti-PS campaign. The Communists felt they had to
reestablish their identity and, more importantly, their
supremacy in the Union of the Left. Campaigning now strictly
for itself, the PCF launched a membership drive, focusing on




engineers, small businessmen and the military. An extra-
ordinary Party Congress of the PCF was held in October and
new conditions for membership were announced:
We must realize that after the presidental election hun-
dreds of thousands of people want to participate in 'our'
activity .. .Obviously they do not all have a clear vision
of our strategy and of the final objectives of our party.
But this cannot be an insurmountable obstacle to their
membership. The desire to work for democratic changes...
is sufficient. -1-
The PCF ended its anti-PS campaign in the spring of 1975, as
it became apparent that to continue any longer would threaten
12
the very existence of the Union.
2 . International
In 197^ s the French Communists received a political
slap in the face. As in 1965, the PCF was determined to sup-
port Francois Mitterrand as candidate for the French presi-
dency. The Soviets, however, were once again displeased with
the narrowmindedness of the French Communists; to the eye of
the CPSU, Valery Giscard d'Estaing appeared to be a suffi-
ciently independent and chauvinistic statesman who would
follow the general lines of Gaullist foreign policy. There-
fore, in the midst of the presidential campaign, the Soviet
13
Ambassador to Paris paid a well-publicized visit to Giscard.
There are many possible reasons why the CPSU continu-
ally refuses to support the PCF's bids for power and leader-
ship in France. Believing the position of the PCF to be too
weak within the Union of the Left, the Soviets could be fear-
ful of French Communists being forced into a secondary, sub-
ordinate role under the French Socialists, especially since
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the prime minister in such a Leftist Union victory would be
the leader of the Socialist Party. Without sufficient control
over the government's actions, the PCP would become associated
with all governmental decisions, whether Communist-endorsed
or not . The pure and unique quality of Communism would be
drowned in the sea of Social Democracy. Vadim Zagladin (CPSU
First Deputy in charge of West European Communist Parties)
expressed fear that certain Communist parties that had devel-
oped close associations with Social Democrats were in risk of
14
losing their revolutionary nature. Boris Ponomarev (CPSU
Secretary in charge of the International Department) warned,
furthermore, that should the Union of the Left come to power
in France and fail, the political climate would be ripe for
15
a rightist, even fascist, takeover. In April 1975, shortly
after cancelling Mitterrand's planned visit to Moscow,
Brezhnev made a speech in Warsaw warning that, during such a
time of capitalist economic crisis, Communist parties should
refrain from making any tactical alliances with non-Communist
"l ft
parties; Communists were to remain politically independent.
From October 197^ to October 1975, French Communists
loyally supported Soviet-inspired proposals for the draft
document of an upcoming pan-European Communist Party Con-
17
ference, a pet project of the CPSU. French support was
constant in spite of Italian, Spanish, Yugoslav and Romanian
opposition to the Soviet line. The USSR answered this fidel-
ity, however, by publishing an article in Pravda scorning the
PCF's hardline approach to detente (a position Brezhnev himself
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supported just a few days. later). The reason for this insult?
Giscard d'Estaing was visiting Moscow for the purpose of
18
signing some new Franco-Soviet agreements.
It appears that the PCF finally wearied of being the
constant recipient of fraternal criticism and the victim of
selfish Soviet maneuverings , for the French Communist Party
leadership began to rebel. In August 1975, in answer to
continuing criticism from Moscow, Georges Marchais publicly
proclaimed that PCF policy was being made in Paris, not
19
Moscow. In November, at the preparatory meeting for the
pan-European Communist Conference, the PCF suddenly joined
sides with the troublesome Italian and Spanish Communist
Parties. This sudden defection to the ranks of the opposi-
tion succeeded in forcing a delay of the conference, much to
20
the chagrin of the CPSU. And so the polemic continued into
1976 and 1977.
One must be careful, however, not to overestimate the
significance of these periodic barbs in PCF/CPSU relations.
In her latest book, Un Autre Communisme? , Annie Kriegel ex-
plains that the current Franco-Soviet Communist antagonism
should be interpreted as a tension in the bilateral relations
21
^f two Communist parties. (In other words, it is not to be
interpreted as Leader-Subordinate dissension.) Kriegel goes
on to say that the PCF is seeking neither to withdraw itself
from the international Communist movement nor to dispute
Soviet leadership of the movement. What the PCF wants to
revise is "the number of obligations which... a Communist
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party incurs by belonging to the world Communist movement." 22
The French Party seeks to establish a certain distance between
its proposed French road to socialism and the often embarras-
sing example of socialism as it is practices inside the Soviet
Union. In short, the PCF seeks sovereignty in all matters
2k
that concern the French national interest. The hypothesis
that this PCF movement towards greater freedom of action does
not entail a divorce from Soviet leadership in the attainment
of international goals finds a certain degree of confirmation
in various statements made by Georges Marchais:
Socialist countries are implementing a foreign policy of
peace and international cooperation which accords so well
with... the peace program proposed to the world by the 24th
CPSU Congress. [20th PCF Party Congress, 13 December 1972] 25
The existence of differences with the CPSU... does not lead,
any more than it has in the past, to a lessening of our
desire to cooperate with it in the common struggle against
imperialism and for our great common goals. [22nd PCF
Party Congress, February 1976] 2 °
I believe it would be dangerous to place the struggle for
freedom opposite the struggle for detente and peaceful
coexistence .. .The two must be fought simultaneously. I
must say that, insofar as a matter involves peaceful co-
existence and international detente, we have no criticism
to make of the policy of the Soviet Union. [22 February
197 7 ]27
C. ESTRANGEMENT
In August 1976, as the PS and PCF began preparing for the
March 1977 municipal elections, PS Secretary Mitterrand sent
a telegram to all PS-affiliated trade unions enjoining them to
refrain from making any concessions to the PCF during the up-
coming interparty negotiations. By September, Mitterrand's
position and that of the PS majority had become so strong
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that he was able to order the exclusion of the PS-left wing
29faction (C.E.R.E.S.) from membership in the PS Secretariat
and to declare, with regard to the PCF, "Yes to union, No to
30
unanimity." An opinion poll conducted in December 1976 by
one of the major French polling agencies, IFOP, revealed that
if parliamentary elections were held immediately: the Union
of the Left would garner 53$ to $6% of the popular vote (or
31
53$ to 63% of the seats in the National Assembly). Of
greater significance, however, is the partisan breakdown of
the vote in which one can see a dramatic increase in public
support for the non-Communist Leftist parties: the PS and
the Radical Left Movement (MRG) together would win 31$ to
33$ of the vote (or 35$ to 45$ of the seats), whereas the PCF
would receive no more than 19$ of the vote (or 17$ of the
32
seats). These statistics were not lost on the PCF leadership
By the end of 1976, Marchais was visibly losing patience
with the evolution of the political situation. In response
to a PS pro-Europe vote in the National Assembly in December,
Marchais reportedly growled, "The wheels are beginning to
grind." But the Union was not to be broken before the
March 1977 municipal elections. With both the PS and the
PCF adhering faithfully to the electoral tactic described
earlier, the French Left obtained the support of approximate-




The CPSU Central Committee acknowledged this victory with
a message to the PCF:
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[The Central Committee of the CP.SU] warmly congratulates
the Communists and all the forces of the French Left on
the occasion of the great success won during the municipal
elect ions ... Soviet Communists wish you and all the forces
of the French Left continued progress in your noble strug-
gle for the interests of the workers of your country, for
peace, democracy and social progress. 35
The editors of L'Humanite published the message, but accorded
it no special attention. For, in the midst of its campaign
to portray itself as a national party, the PCF did not want
to become linked to the Soviet Union. (It is just possible
that this was precisely the intention of the CPSU: to plant
a seed of doubt in the French public's mind regarding the
true allegiance of the PCF. But if it was a tactic to pre-
vent the PCF from taking office in a social democratic govern-
ment, it failed] for, the PCF refused to give it the proper
public exposure.) The victory had not been especially sweet
for the French Communists. Once again, the public had shown
its distinct preference for the non-Communist Left. In 1971,
the PCF had controlled 51 of the cities with populations
greater than 30,000, and the PS controlled only 45. After
the March 1977 elections, however, the PS ' s support in this
category had increased 82$ compared with a meager 39$ for
the PCF. Refusing to remain in this position, always two
steps behind the Socialist Party, the PCF began making a
series of dramatic announcements in an apparent attempt to
reorient votes toward the Communist side of the Leftist Union.
Two of the most controversial announcements occurred during
the second week in May. The first was a sensational article




Program's nationalization plans. (This article was probably
aimed at embarrassing the Socialist Party, for it came less
than 48 hours before Mitterrand was due to meet Prime Minister
Barre in a televised debate on the French economy.) The
second came just 24 hours after the first: a shocking declara-
tion that the PCF intended to keep the French force de frappe
as the mainstay of an independent, national defense force
oriented in all directions. (The significance of this action
will be discussed in detail in Chapter IX.
)
Undaunted, the Socialist Party continued to consolidate
its political position. In early 1977, the PS sent envoy
Jean-Pierre Cot to Washington, D.C., to make contact with
U.S. State Department officials. He returned to Paris with
Cyrus Vance's assurance that the accession of the Union of
the Left to power in France would not create a "major problem"
39
for the Carter government. Then, in June 1977, Mitterrand
welcomed two official CPSU Central Committee observers to the
PS Party Congress at Nantes; the three men reportedly had a
40
chance to confer privately for about thirty minutes. On
the 26th of September, a PS delegation travelled to West
Germany to confer with Social Democratic Party (SDP) repre-
sentatives in Bonn; the purpose of their meeting was to pre-
pare the Mitterrand-Schmidt talks which were held on the 29th
41
of September in the German capital.
The French Socialist Party's euphoria was in some respects
a facade, for the Union of the Left was slowly crumbling.
Since May 1977, the three parties of the Union had been meet-
ing intermittently to revise and update the Common Program.
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From the outset, however, a distinct feeling of tension and
mistrust prevailed. Georges Marchais denounced "the personal
42
power" of Francois Mitterrand. Members of the PS leadership
complained, "We know nothing, absolutely nothing about what's
really going on inside the PCF. .. Something has certainly
43happened, but what?"
It is possible, however, that the PCF finally decided
that all further efforts to weaken the position of the
Socialists before the elections in March 1978 would be in
vain - all efforts, that is, except one: to dissolve the
Union of the Left. From the standpoint of the French Commu-
nists, the Union had been their brain child. It had been
created during a period when the PCF was the strongest single
Leftist party in France. At that time, de Gaulle had gone,
the temporary electoral alliances with the non-Communist Left
during the 1960s had proven profitable, and there was every
reason to hope that a Communist-led Union of the Left might
be popularly elected in the very near future to a majority
position in the French government. But in creating the
Leftist Union, the PCF had unwittingly provided the French
public with an alternate, less drastic way of expressing its
anti-establishment feelings: to vote for the Socialist Party.
Once the two parties had publically agreed to always combine
their power, a vote for the small, minority Socialist Party
was no longer wasted. By 1977, the Socialist Party was no
longer the junior partner in the arrangement. The PCF had
tried to reverse the strong pro-PS current of popular opinion
by offering repeated evidence of the enlightened and patriotic
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ideals allegedly locked in the hearts of PCF leaders. But
the PS success of five years could not be undone in just a
few months; on September 22, 1977, the Union of the French
Left broke apart.
On that day, the small leftwing MRG seceded from the
Union, blaming Communist intransigence for the failure of the
three parties to reach an agreement on a common interpreta-
44
tion of the 1972 program. During the night 22-23 September,
Mitterrand is reported as having declared, "If everyone will
be ready to make an agreement, then let's meet tomorrow morn-
45ing. If not, then why waste our time...?" The morning
meeting was not held and the problem of the program's revi-
sion remains unresolved. There have been sporadic PS attempts
to reunite the three parties, but following an attempt on
November 9th, the pro-Socialist Party newspaper Le Martin de
Paris stated that
The brief meeting [between the leading negotiators of
the three parties ]... has swept away the last hopes of
a reopening of negotiations in the near future.^"
The Italian Communist Party leadership believes the PCF is
deliberately trying to undermine the chances of a Leftist
election victory in March 1978, and that it is purposely
"removing itself from all possibility of entering a French
47government after the next elections." In November, PCI
party representatives went to Paris to find out what had
really happened. Reportedly, they were told only that
Mitterrand had politically turned to the right. The pres-
tigious French daily Le Monde reports that the PCI are
believed to be furious with the PCF for causing the split;
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for the Italian Communists had counted on a leftist victory
in France in 1978 to facilitate the credibility of their own
coming to power before 1979- The PCI had also reportedly
thought a victorious French Left would lend added support
48to the PCI's anti-Soviet stance.
Almost prophetically , Annie Kriegel wrote in 1974 that:
In the event an alliance with the Socialists should lead
to... a type of Front Populaire, [the Communists] would
work to enclose their allies, in advance, in a network
of well chosen obligations which would ensure, all by
themselves, the kind of system and society that will be
built by the allies together, like it or not ... [They
want to be] concretely guaranteed against any treacher-
ous dreams that the other allies might feed each other
once the charm of unity has worn off. ^9
French public opinion polls taken before September 22nd
gave the Leftist Union 53 to 54% of the vote; a survey taken
soon after the split found only 52% would vote for the Left.
And by October 10th, less than a month later, only 50%
50favored the Left. Will the French public continue to re-
gard the three Leftist parties as an ad hoc Union for elec-
tion purposes? Will the three parties still be able to
command an electoral majority after an additional four months
of discord? Will Francois Mitterrand be able to finally take
a place of leadership in the Fifth French Republic in spite
of the Union rifts? In answer to this last question,
Mitterrand replies simply:
Right now I am working on a long-term basis. The victory
of the Union of the Left has perhaps been retarded, but
it is historically inevitable. At least I have built an




IX. THE QUESTION OF DEFENSE
Now that the union of the Left has broken apart, it
appears doubtful that the PS and the PCF will be able, or
even willing to reach any general agreement on defense policy
before the elections of March 1978. The possibility of one
or both parties participating in the next government of
France cannot be Included. But, in any event, the defense
strategies and interests of the French Left occupy a signi-
ficant place in the current school of French strategic and
military thought. What is the defense orientation of the
current government? How realistic are the proposals being
made by the PS and PCF? These are the questions to be
addressed in this chapter.
Two years before the advent of the Giscard government,
the French Left laid down its defense plans in six chapters
of a Common Program. Since then, there has been major changes
made in the official defense policy of France. A study of the
proposals made by the Left in 1972 provides an interesting
basis for comparison as one studies the evolution and the
present orientation of French Socialist and Communist stra-
tegic thought.
A. YESTERDAY: THE POLICY OF THE LEFT
As mentioned above, The Common Program of 1972 includes
six chapters dealing with international and national defense
issues. The most important statements regarding defense and





The principal objective of the new Leftist government
would be general, universal and controlled disarmament. The
national defense policy would be founded on the following
principles
:
a. Renunciation of the strategic force de frappe in any
form whatever; immediate halt to the construction of the
French force de frappe ; reconversion. .. of the military
nuclear industry into a peaceful atomic industry taking
care to safeguard the interests of the workers involved.
In no case will the problems caused by this reconversion
serve as pretext for the maintenance of the military nu-
clear industry.
b. Immediate halt to nuclear testing and adherence to
treaties banning nuclear explosions and limiting the
dissemination of nuclear weapons.
c. Become a signatory to international treaties limit-
ing and banning specific kinds of weapons. Initiate the
extension of these treaties. Participate actively in
the Geneva Conference and in all other disarmament con-
ferences .
d. Propose a world negotiation on universal nuclear
disarmament, on simultaneous and controlled reduction
of weapons, armed forces and military budgets.
e. Halt to all sales of arms and war materials to colo-
nial, racist or fascist governments (South Africa,
Portugal, Spain, Greece).
f. Strict regulation of sales of arms abroad.
2. NATO and European Security
Taking into account the actual state of European
affairs, the Leftist government would seek to assure the
security of France by basing its national defense policy on
a simultaneous search for collective security and disarma-




a. While continuing to refuse to reintegrate into NATO,
France will not forbid itself from concluding, if
necessary, defensive alliances and non-aggression
treaties. If a system of European collective security
were to require them, French armed forces could
participate . .
.
b. The government will define a military strategy that
will be applicable to any eventual aggressor, whoever
it might be.
c. The government will pronounce itself in favor of the
simultaneous dissolution of the North Atlantic Treaty
and the Warsaw Treaty. It will be in favor of all
measures that will lead to the progressive weakening
of existing politico-military alliances to the point
where they completely disappear.
d. The government will multiply all possible initiatives
for the effective and controlled reduction of weapons
and their manufacture, taking into account the neces-
sity of preserving, at every step, the security of
the country.
e. The government will actively participate in the prepara-
tions for the Conference of States for European Security
and Cooperation. The government will propose that the
Conference reach a general accord on measures for
European disarmament. It will take all the necessary
initiatives to create a European treaty establishing
a new security organization for all States participating
in the Conference.
f. The government will favor the creation of nuclear-free
zones, a freeze on armaments in central Europe, the
controlled and balanced reduction of forces and arms
in Europe, and the creation of a true European collec-
tive security system.
g. The government wishes to practice in all situations
a policy independent of all military blocs, but the
government will respect the current alliance arrange-
ments of France... It will demand an immediate end to
NATO assistance to the dictatorships of Spain, Greece
and Portugal. . .The military accord with Franco will
end. 3
3 . French Armed Forces
4




a. The army will be exempt from all missions involving
the internal maintenance of order... it will not be
used for any external interventions of a colonial or
imperialistic nature.
b. All orientation of the army towards a career force
will be abandoned. Conditions to assure the profes-
sional cadre their material and moral dignity will
be created. The army will be organized on the basis
of regional reserves.
c. Military service will be equal for all and last six
months. The recruitment, training and promotion of
reserve and active duty officers and NCOs will exclude
all selection based on social, political or philoso-
phical discrimination.
d. The government will rely on the unfailing loyablty of
its officers and NCOs.
e. Conscientious objectors will be neither rewarded nor
punished. They will accomplish their legal duty by
performing services in the general interest. They
will be exempted^from military training and from duty
in combat units.
B. TODAY: THE POLICY OP GISCARD
The French defense scene has undergone some major revisions
under the guidance of the 197^-elected President of the Republic,
Valery Giscard d'Estaing. It is important to study the foreign
and defense policy orientations of the President, for, by
virtue of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, Giscard
should remain in office until 1981, regardless of which politi-
cal party is voted into power in the National Assembly. The
compatibility or incompatibility of Giscard's policies with
those of the Left, or even one part of the Left, could be
crucial in the successful avoidance of a constitutional crisis
(i.e. the necessity of the President to resign before the end
of his term) . Georges Marchais has attempted to dispell fears
in this regard by stating, "following the elections, there
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would be better things to do than to involve the country in
a dispute over a change of constitution which would take us
from the Fifth to a Sixth Republic."
1. Giscard's Foreign Policy
Economist by education and French Minister of Finance
for 12 years , Valery Giscard d'Estaing has replaced the ideal-
ism of the Gaullist era with a keen, calculating eye trained
on the realistic place of France in today's world. He recog-
nizes that "France used to be a superpower, .. .but our size,
population and natural resources prevent us from being so
7today." "There are superpowers, the United States and the
Soviet Union... then there is the special case of China...
then there is the group of Japan, Germany, Great Britain and
France. Our ambition ... should be that France be at the head
o
of this group [of medium-sized powers]." Giscard's govern-
ment has consequently acquired a strong "European" flavor as
the French Chief of State strives for an increased, closer,
pragmatic interface between the nations of Europe. In short,
he seeks to increase the viability and real power of the Euro-
pean collectivity to which France belongs. Recognized
"European-oriented" officials have been selected by Giscard
9to occupy important positions in his government.
Giscard d'Estaing is an advocate of detente - "the
gradual establishment of more trusting relations between all
the countries of the world." In particular he is trying
to focus world attention on "North-South" relations and in-
crease developed nations' awareness of the economic and poli-
tical importance of the developing world. The word economic
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is of key importance: a central concern of the President
throughout his administration has been the strengthening of
his nation's sagging economy. As J.O. Goldsborough said,
"diplomacy ... reflects the needs of industry" 11 and nothing
could be more true with regard to the Giscard government.
The Mediterranean as a lifeline to the oil-producing Middle
East and Europe as a market for arms sales has been the
spoiled child of France's attentions. Mitigating this
basic pragmatism, Giscard often evokes the theme of a United
Europe: a powerful confederation of sovereign states work-
ing for the benefit of all, but robbing none of its individual
members of prestige or power.
Here is Europe, that will one day be united, and
where France must not be dominated. And here is France,
which has come so far, France of the battlefields, of
the successive revolutions, France with the cries in the
street and France with the quiet country mornings,
France which can be one of the first to cross the thresh-
old of a new organization of society. 12
2. French Defense Policy: The Gaullist Legacy
The question arises: how to reconcile this foreign
policy with the all or nothing, nuclear deterrent defense
policy inherited from the Gaullist era? General Pierre
Gallois (retired) was one of the chief supporters of de Gaulle's
creation of a force de frappe (the nuclear "strike force").
Today he is a spokesman for those elements in France which
continue to maintain that the country must refrain from
embroiling itself in any collective security arrangements
and rely solely on its supreme deterrent: the French second-
strike nuclear capability. 13 According to Gallois, there are
only a few vital areas in France that need to be protected by
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the armed forces (e.g. the strategic missile silos on the
Plateau d'Albion) and there is correspondingly no need for
large numbers of conventional troops or weapons to be
deployed to the borders. A line of resistance could be con-
structed along the country's frontiers. Crossing it would
signal an enemy's decision to invade Prance and cause French
nuclear weapons to be launched quasi-automatically . In
Gallois ' view, the Introduction of tactical nuclear weapons,
such as the short-range Pluton missile, has only served to
dilute the credibility of French determination to use her
strategic nuclear forces. In today's world, a country with
France's geographic location and limited manpower resources
cannot afford to play tactical games with any encroaching
enemy. Thus, Gallois continues to agree with de Gaulle's
words
:
[The] basic role of the air and land forces does not
consist of joining a battle that they have no chance of
winning in view of the balance of forces, but of obliging
the adversary to face the risks of our strategic nuclear
response. . .Deterrence [is] the only effective way of en-
suring our territorial integrity and our political inde-
pendence . 1^
In its purest, most extreme form, this school of strategy
holds that to enhance her independence, and thereby the credi-
bility of her deterrent, France must impartially aim her
nuclear forces "a tous azimuts - in all directions," to use
the words of General Ailleret, former Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces . In this way France would be neither ally nor
enemy of any nation. In this conception, when a nation
participates in NATO, it becomes an enemy of the Soviet Union
This makes it a player in the highly risky game of Western
174

Defense in which the allies hope the aggressor will follow a
particular pattern of action for which NATO forces are
trained and prepared. Gallois maintains that if Prance
commits itself to the defense of areas outside her terri-
torial borders (e.g. West Germany) and then suffers tactical
defeats on those battlegrounds, the French government would
be faced with "a dilemma involving a choice between humilia-
tion - acceptance of the terrible fait accompli - or of
escalation ... the supreme risk for a stake which would not
15
be directly related to her own interests."
3- French Defense Policy: The Present
This Gaullist conception has been increasingly chal-
lenged in Giscard's France. For example, Jacques Vernant
,
Secretary General of the Center for the study of Foreign
Affairs, has written of "the need to put our defense policy
in harmony with our diplomatic policy." He concludes that,
"since our diplomatic policy is to assemble Western Europe
into one cohesive body, it would appear reasonable to give a
European role to Defense so that our partners would be re-
-1 c
assured about our motives." In his 197^ book, La France
Desarmee, former Chief of Staff of the French Air Force,
General Paul Stehlin, noted after participating in a Parlia-
mentary tour of the French Strategic Nuclear Forces, that
It could not escape the attention of any visiting
parliamentarian that the 'plausible' enemy .. .was ... very
well defined geographically: the Soviet Union. . .There
is a dramatic contradiction between our diplomacy and
our defense... We have been estranged from our necessary
allies and natural friends . . . In the international cir-
cumstances of today, France can only be defended col-
lectively .. .Neither our nuclear forces nor our conven-
tional forces can alone assure the security of France. 1 '
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General Stehlin pointed out that the very existence of the
French nuclear force only makes sense when it is considered
within the context of a collective European defense scheme.
A strong argument supporting this theory has been formulated
by Raymond Aron:
The French nuclear force is not one that can discrimi-
nate between towns and pinpoint targets; therefore, by
using her nuclear force, she would destroy Soviet cities
and thereby incur her own self-destruction. .. she will be
therefore most reluctant to use this force. The U.S.
nuclear force is so refined that it would be capable of
striking targets without destroying cities, and thus would
not provoke her own self-destruction as we would. . .The
whole question of dissuasion is not how sure the USSR is
of U.S. intervention, rather how uncertain she may feel...
if she knows that France is reluctant to use her nuclear
force, so much for our policy of dissuasion.-'-"
President Giscard d'Estaing, apparently sharing the views of
these " Atlantistes , " ordered an in-depth review of France's
defense policy in July 1975- Under de Gaulle and Pompidou,
France had let it be known that any threat to her homeland
would be met with nuclear retaliation, because this was the
only major force she had, and therefore, the only one she
could use. This all or nothing stand, however, robbed the
policy of dissuasion of its very foundation: uncertainty
and unpredictability of French response. The enemy could
feel quite confident that, unless it were so careless as to
directly violate the French borders, it had a wide freedom
for action; the French Strategic Nuclear Forces would lie
quiet. Giscard wanted to restore the element of doubt to
France's defense position, to expand the credible options
for French response to aggression, so the enemy could no
longer be sure exactly when France might opt to use her
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nuclear forces. (This doubt, of course, also serves to de-
crease France's feeling of security since it increases the
likelihood of a pre-emptive enemy attack.) Although Giscard
wants to increase his options by having a full complement of
conventional, tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, this
19does not indicate a policy of "gradual escalation." General
Mery, Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces, recently
stated that "military effectiveness is second to the mani-
festation of our political will to warn the enemy that the
use of tactical nuclear weapons indicates that the battle
has changed and that the next stage may be the use of strate-
gic fire." The General refuses to contemplate protracted war
involving nuclear weapons; France will not fight such a war,
and for that reason it will have no "mininukes" : small,
limited destruction, precision-guided tactical weapons.
General Mery disapproves of the manufacture of any weapons
20
with a yield of less than a kiloton.
Concurrent with this maintenance of a sufficiently destruc-
tive nuclear force, Prime Minister Barre declared the necessity
of keeping to a "counter-city strategy ... for it is the only
really deterrent solution, given the modest size of our nuclear
force." He also introduced the interesting notion that the
French nuclear forces might possibly be used from foreign
territories
:
All our forces, strategic nuclear forces, tactical
nuclear forces and conventional forces participate equally
in deterrence and must always be prepared so as to prevent
war from breaking out. This concept of deterrence applies
to the defense of our vital interests, that is, essentially
to our national territory .. .and also to its approaches,
that is, neighboring and allied territories. 22
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The French President noted that too many resources had
been expended on building up the strategic nuclear forces,
while all the other elements of French defense had lain idle,
neglected, and had been allowed to deteriorate. He asserted
that the conventional forces must be rebuilt and reincorporated
into French defense options. Giscard sees the principal enemy
as clearly lying to "the East" and this must be the main orien-
tation of French strategic defense policy. 23 But would this
be enough? For, as Raymond Aron has pointed out, it is hard
to believe that Soviet forces would stop at the French border
once the USSR had committed itself to the immense risk of a
massive attack on the Central Front. The current defense
policy officially states, "It would be illusory to hope that
France could retain anything more than diminished sovereignty
if its neighbors were occupied by a hostile power or even
came under its control. The security of the whole of Western
25Europe is, therefore, essential for France." Giscard has
been significantly more explicit:
Certain people reason as if the conflict, taking place
outside the national territory of France, would let us
remain totally uninvolved. This viewpoint is not realis-
tic. Due to the rapidity of the means of transportation
and communication, there will be only one territory, and
French territory will be from the beginning included in
that territory of generalized war. This does not mean
that the enemy will actually set foot on French land, be-
cause dissuasion is there for that... Since there will be
only one territory, it is essential that there be only
one military body on that territory. 26
As optimistic as this might sound for the cause of European
military integration, such is not to be the case. Giscard'
s
armed forces remain very definitely "national" forces. Jacques
Vernant writes that "It is no longer a question of French
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reintegration with NATO, because this is politically impossible;
rather, it is a question of knowing if the consequences of
the 1966 decision can be annuled in practice . . . " [emphasis
27
added]. Independence for the French is not to be sacrificed
for any cause. De Gaulle felt that by integrating French
forces into NATO, France became like a dependent child, de-
pendent on the U.S. He argued that once submerged in a col-
lective defense arrangement, a nation soon loses its self-
confidence and its sense of responsibility for its own national
P 8
defense. One finds much the same feeling in the writings of
the current President: "Must the domination of the superpowers
be accepted as a fatalistic fact of history? Our own history
teaches us how much strength and reserved force can come from
29
one's desire to be one's self." Thus it becomes evident
that, by selfishly guarding her independence, France is ex-
pressing a fundamental desire for internal strength and inte-
grity rather than a basic hostility towards the rest of the
world; and the idea of joining a collective European defense
effort becomes consistent with French thinking, so long as
her right to independent decision is assured. Regarding the
role of the U.S. military in Europe, Giscard d'Estaing con-
siders the presence of American forces in Europe to be a proof
of the United States' commitment to the defense of that
Continent; he is opposed to any efforts to diminish that pres-
ence - hence one of the reasons for French refusal to partici-
30
pate in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks.
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4. French Defense Policy: The Decisionmakers
Before addressing the current defense policy of
France in detail, it might be helpful at this point to brief-
ly describe the organization of the French defense structure
31
and identify the key participants in the making of policy.
The President of the Republic is Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces and is invested with the supreme power to declare
war and to determine the use of the French tactical and
strategic nuclear forces. The Defense Committee, assembled
and presided over by the President of the Republic, makes
all major decisions pertaining to national defense matters.
This Committee comprises the President, the Prime Minister,
the Minister of Defense, Minister of Finance and Economic
Affairs, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of the
Interior. (It is to be remembered here that, in practice,
all these officials are individually accountable to the Presi-
dent and subject to dismissal by him.) The Prime Minister
assures the execution of the Committee's decisions. The
Minister of the Interior is responsible for executing all
policies concerning the defense of the civilian population of
France. (So far there have been no provisions made to protect
the public against the effects of a nuclear attack - there is
no civil defense program. There are only two anti-nuclear
shelters in existence in France: those which will protect
the governmental and military high-command officials located
at the underground command centers of Taverny and Mount
Verdun.) 3 The Minister of Defense is in charge of preparing

















0) cd M E
-P 50 O cd









h cd Sh -p
<D -p o co

















































































































































Subordinate to the Minister is the Ministerial Delegate for
Armaments and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. The
Ministerial Delegate for Armaments is in charge of all acti-
vities concerning the study, research and development of
armaments. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces draws up
the plans for utilizing the armed forces. He is also res-
ponsible for all military operations in wartime (except for
33those involving tactical or strategic nuclear weapons).
And, finally, subordinate to the Minister, are the Chiefs of
3 1*Staff of the three individual services.
5 . Disposition of the Armed Forces
Passed by a vote in Parliament of 303 to 101, "The
Program for Military Expenditures and Equipment for the Armed
Forces for the 1977-82 Period" became law on 19 June 1976.
With this act, the Giscard government began a fundamental re-
organization of the French armed forces. Assessing the nu-
clear program to be essentially complete, Giscard has placed
the restructuring, reequipping and reorganization of the con-
ventional defense forces at the top of his list of national
defense priorities. The conventional forces are being devel-
oped as an integral link in the defense scheme and are to be
considered as complementary to the tactical and strategic
35
nuclear forces. Left idle for so many years, the conven-
tional forces were not deemed capable, organizationally or
operationally, of effectively performing in a modern military
threat environment. With one eye on Europe and the other on
North-South relations, the new defense policy law states that
"France must have the means to confront the widespread
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insecurity of a much more complex world which is far from
having found its equilibrium, a world where direct or in-
direct threats can appear at any moment on unexpected hori-
zons."-5 Therefore, Giscard argues, the armed forces must
be highly mobile, organized and adaptible to the realities
of the 1970 ' s and 80's. The Army has been fundamentally re-
structured; the Navy is taking a new look at the Mediterra-
nean; and the Air Force's Strategic Nuclear Forces have been
reorganized. The policy of universal conscription has been
maintained in spite of cries for ah all-volunteer army.
Giscard told a French television audience that "the security
of a nation must involve its entire population. .. the only
people who guarantee their security are the ones who are
determined to provide their own defense." (He also invoked
the argument that a French all-volunteer army would have to
be small, for economic reasons, and this would leave only
one large, effective army in Europe: West Germany's. He
believes it is important for the military balance of Europe
37
for the French force to be comparable to that of Germany.)
While current priority is being given to funding con-
ventional weaponry, research continues on "new generation"
weapons, such as developing new missiles with increased
38
speed, multiple warhead and countermeasures capabilities.
In fact, French Chief of Staff Mery revealed in March of this
year that under its second nuclear arms program, "Coelacanthe
Two", France will develop military observation and guidance
. .-,
39
satellites, as well as a nuclear-tipped cruise missile.




cruise missile research. The decision to opt for the develop-
ment of military observation and guidance satellites instead
of navigation and telecommunications satellites was due to the
fact that, as Jacques Isnard put it, "the possession of such
a spy satellite is indispensible , especially if France wants
to be able to participate in international disarmament nego-
tiations without having to depend on information which its
41
allies might or might not provide it with." Such a satel-
lite may also be needed to produce more precise geodetic and
42
terrain elevation data for cruise missile guidance.
The passage of the Military Program Law assures that
by 1982 the defense budget will constitute 20% of the state
budget. In 1977, the defense budget was the only one to re-
ceive any substantial increase: it comprises 17-5% of the
national budget, with 58.8% being spent on personnel and the
remaining 41.2% being devoted to equipment and investment.
(This proportion will only change slightly by 1982 - the
43
figures being 55-7% and 44.3%, respectively.)
a. The Army
The brunt of the President's reorganization pro-
gram has been felt by the Army. It is currently undergoing
an unprecedented restructuring. To increase its mobility-
and combat-readiness, the Army is no longer divided into
separate maneuver and territorial forces; these are being
consolidated into 16 new general-purpose divisions. Unlike
before, the regional commander is now in control of all the
ground forces in his region regardless of their operational
mission.
4
The emphasis of the Army's program for this year
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is unit training, with a projected goal of 90 days in the
field for each unit. Some commentators estimate that this
increased operational activity will require sacrifices in
new equipment acquisitions. Despite this, some notable
developments during the 1977-82 period will include the
issue of the first Roland low-altitude SAM systems to a
divisional anti-air regiment, the formation of an experi-
mental battery of 155mm rapid-fire cannons, and the begin-
ning of field-testing of the VAB forward-fighting vehicle
(the first 121 are scheduled for delivery this fiscal year)
.
Although the Pluton tactical nuclear missile program seems
to have stagnated (it represents only one percent of this
year's Army budget), the Army will finish equipping its
46
fourth Pluton regiment and begin equipping a fifth.
General Mery has announced that the tactical nuclear arsenal
will be modernized by the development of a Super-Pluton mis-
sile (180km instead of approximately 100km range).
b. The Navy
There has been no major restructuring of the French
Navy; rather, there has been a shift in its orientation.
With the President emphasizing the importance of North-South
relations, it is understandable that he should take a special
interest in the Mediterranean region. For, as Jacques
Vernant explains:
The Mediterranean area is of strategic importance
for all countries that import their oil - and therefore
their energy - as well as for those that export in
order to finance their national development. As these
countries become more and more important in the commer-
cial world, whatever affects the [Mediterranean] cangot
fail to cause repercussions on the worldwide level.
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Accordingly, Giscard has quantitatively doubled French naval
presence in the area (in terms of tonnage) since 1974, and
he has qualitatively improved her representation by basing
49
both of her aircraft carriers at Toulon. Considering the
President's prejudice against further expenditures on nuclear
weapon systems, it is perhaps signficant to note that the
French Navy appears to be the only arm of the French Nuclear
Strategic Forces to be programmed for any substantial techno-
logical upgrading. This is perhaps because the nuclear SLBM-
equipped submarines are considered the ultimate guarantor of
the French second-strike nuclear capability; should all the
land and air-based nuclear forces be destroyed, there will
50
always remain the submarines. France currently has four
operational missile-launching nuclear submarines, two of
which will be equipped by this summer with the new M20 SLBM
(3000km range and a 1MT thermonuclear warhead). This permits
two of the submarines to be on deterrent patrol in the Atlantic
Ocean almost permanently. A fifth submarine in the series is
currently under construction and will be on operational patrol
by January 1980. Plans for yet another in the series were
cancelled so that funds could be devoted to the study and
research of a new-generation submarine, one that will navi-
gate at greater depths, present a less identifiable signature
and carry improved detection and weapon capabilities. In
addition, the Ocean Strategic Forces are expected to be
equipped as early as 1985 with the M4 SLBM, which is already
under development and expected to be MRV-configured and have
51
a 25% increased range. Other noteworthy projects underway
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for the Navy include the developmental flight-testing of the
Super-Etendard naval strike fighter, 80 of which are scheduled
52
for delivery beginning in late 1977 and ending in 1982, and
the development of a new nuclear-powered carrier for heli-
copters and V/STOL aircraft. In addition, the ship-based
Super-Etendard is to be equipped with tactical nuclear
weapons within a few years, for the French general staff is
currently giving some thought to the use of these weapons at
53
sea, "where [they] lose much of their apocalyptic nature."
Such weapons could be used on seas bordering the European
Continent, but they would then be tied to the overall European
strategic nuclear scenario. The general staff is considering
their use in a more "distant maritime theater, the Indian
Ocean, for example"; this would allow for tactical nuclear
weapons to be employed without necessarily involving any
54
folow-on strategic nuclear action. One French critic
argues that by 1987 the French Navy will be at its lowest
55
level since World War II (in terms of tonnage), but this
projection fails to acknowledge the possibility of qualita-
tive improvements offsetting, at least in part, quantitative
shortcomings
.
c. The Air Force
The new Program Law appears to have benefited the French
Air Force the least. There has already been a consolidation
of the manned bomber fleet of the Strategic Air Forces (FAS).
Effective 1 July 1976, the 36 Mirage-IV aircraft were regrouped
from nine to six squadrons, and the Boeing KC-135F tankers
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were grouped into a single squadron at Istres air base. The
role of the manned bomber has apparently been extended until
1985, but it seems to have lost some of its prestige due to
the perceived "dissuasive power" of the land and submarine-
56
based ballistic missiles. Of notable significance, however,
is the fact that about a dozen Mirage-IV aircraft (based at
Bordeaux-Merignac) have been converted into long-range strate-
gic reconnaissance aircraft. Each aircraft is configured with
eight high-precision cameras capable of day and night-time
operations. There is also "the supercyclops" : a version of
the Mirage-IV that is configured with an infrared reconnais-
sance capability sufficient to "see through" usual camouflage.
The Mirage-TV can operate at ranges of several thousand kilo-
57
meters when refueled inflight by the KC-135s. The Air Force
is responsible for the land-based strategic S-2 IRBM deployed
in two squadrons of nine missiles each, in hardened silos on
the Plateau d'Albion. These two-stage, solid-propellent
missiles are currently configured with a 150KT warhead and have
58
a maximum range of 3000km. Each missile is programmed for
a single primary target; but it only takes two-and-one half
59
minutes to reprogram it for any one of 20 or more alternates.
The Program Law allows the Air Force to have (outside of
its strategic forces) only 450 combat aircraft. These are
divided into 30 squadrons, 22 for Tactical Air Force and 8 for
Air Defense. The emphasis in the Tactical Air Forces is to
improve electronic countermeasure and air-to-surface attack
capabilities. The Air Defense Forces need to improve their

capability to intercept high-speed/low-altitude targets. The
French Air Defense Forces have complete radar coverage of the
French territory and its approaches but only at high and medi-
60
um altitudes. A joint Air Defense/FAS underground head-
quarters is located at Taverny, northwest of Paris. The com-
mand post at Taverny relies on a sector communications network
with multiple channels, that links it with all Air Force
bases and governmental authorities. A similar center has been
established in a granite formation at Mont Verdun, near Lyon.




assure the same functions. Sixty percent of the French ir
Forces can be operational within three hours of an alert
The IRBMs on the Plateau d'Albion are to be launched one
minute after receipt of the red alert signal from the supreme
63
commander, the President of the Republic.
To meet current Air Force requirements, a number of pro-
jects are already in progress. An air defense data-processing
64
and presentation system (STRIDA) is being developed. The
first series production of the Franco-German Alphajet (trainer/
light ground attack aircraft) will begin sometime in late 1977
or early 1978, 65 with 142 deliveries scheduled for the 1977-82
66
time frame. The new Mirage-2000 interceptor is scheduled
67
for its first flight in early 1978, with first series pro-
68
duction to begin early in 1980. The Super Crotale ("Rattle-
snake") SAM will be ready for delivery after 1982. And the
study of the 200KT medium-range (100km) nuclear standoff
missile will be completed by 1978. It is to be operational
onboard the Mirage-2000 by 1985- According to General
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Elie Humbert, a commander of one of the Plateau d f Albion
missile complexes, French authorities are also considering a
new land-based mobile missile which would operate from a maze
70
of underground tunnels on the periphery of Prance.
6. French and NATO Defense Policies: Convergence ?
At a session of the Atlantic Council in 1976, the
Secretary General of NATO, Joseph Luns, congratulated Presi-
dent Giscard d'Estaing on his military program, not only for
its scope but also for its orientation and its accent on rein-
71forcing the conventional forces. It would appear that
Giscard' s Defense Policy of 1976 has many fundamental points
in common with the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance Defense
Policy of 1975. (It is interesting to note that the NATO
defense policy was announced in May of 1975, and that just
two months later the French President ordered a major review
of his nation's defense plans.) The similarities become al-
most glaringly apparent as one reads the NATO document
:
...deterrence to all forms of aggression cannot be
based upon strategic nuclear forces alone... The Alliance
must be able to respond in an appropriate manner to
aggression of any kind; the response must be effective
in relation to the level of force used by the aggressor
. .
.
[NATO defense calls for] a balanced force structure
of interdependent strategic nuclear, theater nuclear and
conventional force capabilities .. .however, major emphasis
is placed on maintaining and improving Alliance conven-
tional forces .. .This will require some modest annual in-
crease in real terms in defense expenditures.'^
In a recent interview, the Supreme Commander of NATO
forces in Europe, General Alexander Haig, reportedly stressed
that the key to NATO's policy is doubt and uncertainty;
NATO must keep the Soviets guessing as to which one of a
number of responses it might use to counter any given threat.
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He emphasized the need for troops to be operationally ready,
"to be in the right place at the right time." He also sug-
gested that NATO nations commit themselves now to coping
with the Soviet challenge by increasing their defense spend-
73
ing by five percent. Giscard's defense program coincides
so closely with all these priorities (even down to France's
programmed 5>5% annual increase of the defense budget) that
one is tempted to examine Franco-Allied military relations a
bit further to determine if these words are manifest in any
cooperative actions. For the political reasons explained
earlier, the answer will not be found in any officially pro-
claimed "reintegration of French military forces with NATO,"
rather in a_d hoc
,
pragmatic arrangements between France and
her allies
.
The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces has stated
that "an independence of decision. .. does not necessarily
lead to an autonomy of action." Explaining that France left
the integrated NATO military command structure in order to
gain greater freedom of decision, he pointed out that France
continues to participate in all other Alliance activities,
even to the extent of maintaining liaison missions at the
major levels of military command; it has withdrawn only from
74
the integrated military organization proper.
Two notable figures in French defense matters have
voiced strong skepticism of France's ability to stand, in
fact, as a true military neutral while maintaining her member-
ship in the North Atlantic Alliance system. Raymond Aron
points out that if France had really wanted to be neutral,
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she would have withdrawn from the Alliance in 1969, when each
member nation was supposed to review the preceding 20 years
and determine the desirability of continuing its membership.
Instead, in June 197^, France joined the rest of the Alliance
in signing the Declaration on Atlantic Relations which states
that:
...the members of the Alliance reaffirm their convic-
tion that the North Atlantic Treaty provides the indispens-
able basis for their security ... the members of the Alliance
reaffirm that their common defense is one and indivisible.
An attack on one or more of them. .. shall be considered an
attack against them all... -)
M. Aron goes on to bemoan the lack of any precise military
doctrine in Prance because no one has been able to resolve
the question of why, within the context of the Alliance, a
state has to defend itself and not be protected by its Allies.
He makes the significant suggestion that there has been a
covert resolution of this problem through some kind of
secret intergovernmental solution which probably involves
"the divulgence of certain orders given to the French forces
stationed in Germany." (The French Army deploys about
58,000 men in two mechanized divisions to West Germany; these
forces, not substantially affected by the new Program Law,
77
remain under strict French command.) General Stehlin also
pursued this argument by saying:
Since France is out of NATO and its military forces
are not integrated with the allies' order of battle or
the NATO forward defense strategy, it would be unimaginable
that France could use her tactical nuclear weapons (which
would risk impacting somewhere near Stuttgart, for example)
without an explicit understanding with her Western partners
. . . [Emphasis added_|7°
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Let us now direct our attention to the current condi-
tion of French involvement in European military affairs; does
the resulting evidence support or disprove the above-cited
suspicions of special arrangements and "understandings" be-
tween France and her allies?
7- France and the North Atlantic Assembly
Although France is often portrayed as having broken
off all contact with the North Atlantic Alliance system, in
fact nothing could be more misleading. To begin with, France,
like all other NATO countries, sends parliamentary delegates
to the North Atlantic Assembly. This is an interparliamentary
forum where delegates from the member-country parliaments
meet regularly to discuss issues of common interest. Every
nation has a representative on each of the Assembly Committees.
While the Assembly has no formal relationship with the rest
of NATO and cannot therefore automatically receive information
79
or reports fromthe NATO Council or its Committees, the
Assembly does provide the Council with recommendations on a
yearly basis. (See Figure 2.)
The French delegates appear to be taking their role
in the Assembly quite seriously. Although they have typically
been elected to only one committee chairmanship during the
period 1974-77, the French have been successfully voted into
one of the Assembly's two vice-presidential seats for the
past two years, and from 1967 until 197^ the Assembly Treasurer
was a Frenchman. The French delegation appears to be a very
high-caliber, stable group. Some of the members have been
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such as M.Bernard Destremau (French Secretary of State to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Defense Com-
Q-i
mittee of the Western European Union) . Under French initia-
tive a series of practical steps have been taken to bring
the Assembly into closer and more regular contact with the
national Permanent Representatives to NATO and with the
82
Secretary General of NATO and his Secretariat. To be sure,
these contacts between French parliamentarians and NATO offi-
cials are not the secure government-to-government or military-
to-military channels necessary for the coordination of mili-
tary plans and operations which Raymond Aron suggests must
exist. But the fact remains that they are important channels
through which the French government can learn of NATO's
military policies and can perhaps effect some indirect influ-
ence. For, the NATO Assembly committees discuss such problems
as the current strategic relationship between the U.S. and
the USSR, interalliance problems (including tactical nuclear
weapons, defense cooperation, U.S. troops in Europe and the
special status of France and Iceland), and the implications
83
for NATO of the 1973 Middle East conflict. Committee
members visit NATO facilities throughout the alliance and
receive briefings from the commander-in-chiefs of the various
NATO commands. Lately there has been some allied concern re-
garding the possibility that Eurocommunist parliamentarians
from Italy and France may one day become delegates to such
organizations as the NATO Assembly.
It should be noted that within the context of the
North Atlantic Assembly, France hosted a tour of French
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nuclear installations in January 1975 for 2k Assembly delegates
representing nine member countries. The Assembly newsletter
reported afterwards that the visitors "were given a detailed
insight into the organization and command structure of the
84
French Strategic Nuclear Force." (The itinerary for this
tour very closely resembled that of the French Parliament's
tour taken in 197^ and described by Paul Stehlin, then a
member of Parliament.)
8. France and NATO
The highest authority of the NATO structure is the
NATO Council. One Permanent Representative (of Ambassadorial
rank) from each member country sits on the Council and dis-
cusses all matters, both civil and military. At least, this
was true until France and Greece withdrew from NATO's inte-
grated military structure. Now, when civilian matters are
being discussed in the Council, all 15 nations are repre-
sented. But when military matters dealing with NATO's inte-
grated planning are to be considered by the Council, the
French and Greek representatives leave, and the remaining 13
85
nations meet as the Defense Planning Committee. While it
appears that France is carefully excluded from NATO nuclear
planning activities (i.e. the Nuclear Defense Affairs ' Commit-
tee, the Defense Planning Committee, the Military Committee
and the Nuclear Planning Group), she participates in all
other NATO committees outside the military planning and
86
command structure. As an example of her participation
in non-nuclear/defense-related NATO activities, one can note
her considerable contribution to the development of NADGE:
196

a single, integrated semi-automatic Air Defense system for
NATO. Designed to provide continuous early warning and
tracking of hostile aircraft and missiles, the system in-
volves a large number of sites that supplement and modernize
air defense elements of nine European NATO countries. It
follows a continuous North-South sweep through Norway, Den-
mark, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Italy,
Greece and Turkey. However, France is "integrated" only with
respect to reporting] she will not participate in the control
87
of retaliatory forces. When France was asked to join in
the development of NATO's integrated communications system
Q Q
(NICS), she refused.
France continues to contribute to the NATO Logistics
Data Bank, which the Alliance maintains as an inventory of
the industrial potential of member countries and which aids
standardization efforts. There is an annual program whereby
the French Ministry of Defense provides computerized input
to NATO, using standardized NATO procedures and nomenclature.
The prestigious French daily Le Monde reports that some
Frenchmen dislike furnishing the information, but "the
French Ministry of Defense reminds them that France is still
oq
a member of the Atlantic Alliance."
On the subject of standardization, NATO formed EUROGROUP
in 1968 in an effort to deal with specific problems concern-
ing closer defense cooperation between the European NATO
members. Since EUROGROUP is a child of the Defense Planning
Committee, France was not included. However, the French
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government realizes that no European arms industry (and
particularly not her own) can survive outside the potential-
ly lucrative program for standardizing the production and
procurement of NATO's arms . ^ It is therefore obvious that
France wanted to be part of this collective venture, but for
a reason of her own: France does not see the problem of
standardization in the same light as do the rest of her
allies. For France, this is a topic of purely economic
consequence, as explained by M. Jean-Laurens Delpech, Minis-
terial Delegate for Armaments:
For France ... standardization means the group of rules
and procedures that permit the production of unified and
interchangeable elements. But NATO defines it as the
procedure by which the member nations can realize the
closest possible cooperation of resources furnished by
research, study and development; it is the procedure
that will allow them to adopt on the largest possible
scale ... common (or compatible) administrative and logis-
tical procedures on the operational level; common (or
compatible) technical procedures and criteria; common
(or compatible or interchangeable) arms, materials,
parts and supplies; common (or comparable) tactical
doctrine, complete with a corresponding structural
compatibility. 91
In the face of such intransigeance, NATO conceived
of the European Programme Group which takes the project of
standardization out of the realm of the military-related
EUROGROUP activities and puts it into a more neutral sphere
92
of Atlantic Alliance cooperation. France can also freely
become a member of an Ad Hoc Committee on Equipment Inter-
operability that has been set up under the direction of the
93
NATO Deputy Secretary General.
There is however, another organization that has been
serving as a forum for French-EUROGROUP cooperation since
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the founding of EUROGROUP. This organization, FINABEL, 9
was first established in 1953 by an agreement between the
Army Chiefs of Staff of France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium
and Luxembourg. (Germany joined in 1956 and Britain in
1972.) The Purpose of the organization is to coordinate
views on military equipment characteristics as well as to
reach agreements on such matters as logistics and tactics.
FINABEL is headed by a French Army Colonel, the headquarters
is in Brussels, and the official language is French. The
overall direction and final approval of FINABEL work is
given by a Chiefs-of-Staff Committee which meets, in prin-
ciple, once a year. A Principal Military Experts Committee
(meeting on the one-star level) functions on behalf of the
Chiefs-of-Staff Committee to generally supervise and control
the activities of the Working Groups and Groups of Experts.
The tasks are divided according to weapon-type and mission;
for example: surface-to-surface artillery, night vision
devices, armored personnel carriers, etc. There is also a
Logisticians Committee which reports directly to the Chiefs-
of-Staff Committee on logistic studies.
This work and the tactical, mission-oriented approach
to armaments cooperation is very similar to that pursued by
NATO representatives in EUROLONGTERM, a subgroup of EUROGROUP
In fact, when NATO began developing its defense plans and
programs for the 1990s and realized that these included arms
standardization, NATO wanted France to participate in EURO-
GROUP, the organization in charge of the project. Since
EUROGROUP was the product of a Defense Planning Committee
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meeting, Prance refused on the basis that it was too closely
associated with NATO's integrated military activities.
FINABEL was chosen as a forum for these discussions since it
includes France, whose alignment and cooperation was deemed
95imperative
.
When a project for standardization is agreed upon
within EUROGROUP, the subsequent EUROGROUP document is trans-
lated into French and submitted to FINABEL for its considera-
tion. (This entire procedure is done for the direct benefit
of the French and for them alone. All the other members of
FINABEL are also members of EUROGROUP and have already stud-
ied the project and formulated an opinion before it is ever
submitted to FINABEL.) When a EUROGROUP document is received
by FINABEL, it is assigned a FINABEL number in place of its
EUROGROUP number and it is assigned to the appropriate task
group. It is NATO's hope that even if the French do not opt
to participate in the various EUROGROUP standardization
efforts, at least they have thus been informed of the orien-
tation of her allies' policies, tactics and plans; NATO hopes
that this knowledge will serve to prevent France from pursu-
ing a dangerously opposite military orientation isolated from
that of her allies - a possibility that could too easily occur
if France is allowed to remain out of touch with current NATO
defense planning.
On the formal, official military level, France has
established important bilateral arrangements with certain of
the NATO countries, such as the cooperation agreement with
97
West Germany. 96 The two armies train together on occasion.
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In addition, France maintains military missions at the various
NATO Commands. These include the French Military Mission to
the NATO Military Committee and the mission to SHAPE. Although
these missions are generally termed "liaison" in nature, it
appears that there can unfortunately be no real, two-way
"exchange" of information. Recent interviews with two senior
NATO officers (one American, the other German; one assigned
to SHAPE during the 1960s and early 1970s, the other assigned
to FINABEL from 197^ to 1976) reveal the mood of frustration
that prevails among NATO's decision-makers regarding France's
98
special place in the alliance. Realizing that the French
liaison officers are not at liberty to give anything in
return, NATO, for fear of allowing France unknowingly to go
astray, invites her nonetheless to selected meetings of the
Military Committee and SHAPE and puts her on the distribution
99list for certain selected military documents. ^ But it is
always a special case, necessitating a special inquiry into
the releasability of information, translation of documents,
etc. NATO officials lament that communication is hampered
by the fact that no one feels he knows what can be discussed
with the French and what cannot. Viewed from the French pers-
pective, however, the arrangement seems quite satisfactory,
for they are able thus to receive far more information than
if they were not present at all. And, this allows France to
keep up to date on some of the allied defense plans while at
the same time maintaining the politically crucial image of
independence. The success of this divorce from the dictates
of the interallied military command structure is manifested
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in the Allies' inability to persuade Prance to acquiese or
to give any indication of support to NATO military plans.
For example, when the French are approached regarding the
use of French territory for contingency purposes, they re-
frain from giving any concrete sign of approval. The
impression that France is operating independently in a most
favorable collective forum was very firmly conveyed by the
comments of the two officers interviewed.
Detailed coordination would also seem imperative in
strategic nuclear planning. In the event of a nuclear
attack on Europe from the Soviet Union, the U.S., NATO and
France would probably all launch their strategic bombers,
strategic and tactical missiles, and cruise missiles. With
no prior collaboration regarding the planned flight routes
or projected targets, the allied forces would risk mutual
destruction as they flew through the chaotic nuclear holo-
caust over Eastern and Western Europe. It seems reasonable
to expect that somewhere there does exist at a very high
level, and stamped with the highest security classification,
a close cooperative planning effort between NATO's nuclear
powers. But if it does exist, French domestic political
forces would require that any such cooperation be well
guarded against disclosure to the French public and the world
Only recently has there been even the slightest hint
of a French shift towards more positive interaction on the
military operations level. The Paris daily Le Monde re-
ported earlier this year that the French Navy has subjected
itself to NATO inspections and inventories "all along."
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During the major French air defense exercise, DATEX 1976,
the final phase of the exercise involved a massive attack on
French territory by sea forces including the U.S. Sixth
Fleet and the air forces of Belgium, Great Britain, Italy,
Spain, the Netherlands, Germany, Canada and the U.S. 17th
102
Air Force. In 1975, a French squadron was a "guest team"
in the 2ATAF/4ATAF photo-reconnaissance competition ROYAL
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FLUSH XVIII. During 1976, French forces participated in
TEAM WORK 76 and DISPLAY DETERMINATION, two large-scale air-
naval exercises which took place within the general frame-
work of maneuvers organized on the pattern of NATO's AUTUMN
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FORGE. In a newspaper interview earlier this year,
Brigadier General Fricaud-Chagnaud, French military attache
to Washington, stated that at least one French regiment had
105
also participated in NATO's 1976 REFORGER exercise.
C. PLAN OF ACTION
Since 1972 there have been some major revisions to the
original Leftist plans for national defense as spelled out
in the Common Program. The reasons are fairly straight-
forward. The terms used In the 1972 agreement on defense
policy were chosen for their ambiguous quality in order to
provide three different political parties with a minimum
basis for common action. As the March 1978 elections came
in view, however, the PCF became concerned for its weakened
position in the Union and began to concentrate on the neces-
sity of rendering more precise the terms of the program




1 . Force de Frappe
In 1972 one of the new points upon which both the
PS and the PCF could agree was their common opposition to
the French nuclear strike force. Their reasons for opposi-
tion were fundamentally different: the Socialists, because
of humanitarian and moral grounds; the Communists, because
of "internationalist" ideological opposition to any non-
Soviet nuclear forces on the European continent. Since 1972,
however, these party positions have changed.
The PCF abruptly ended its anti- force de frappe cam-
paign in April of 1976. This does not mean the Party began
endorsing the nuclear program; it merely ceased condemning
1 n/T
it. In a January 1977 article entitled "French Communism's
'New Policy'", PCF foreign-policy leader Jean Kanapa conspicu-
ously omitted any reference to the force de frappe
,
preferring
instead to criticize Giscard d'Estaing for having "abandoned
107General de Gaulle's defense strategy of tous azimuts .
"
Four months after the publication of this article, the PCF
was ready to break out of its secrecy and announce a funda-
mentally new plan for the defense of France. As noted
above, Jean Kanapa revealed the new policy in a report to
the PCF Central Committee on May 11, 1977. Regarding the
force de frappe , he said:
...[France's nuclear strike force] now represents
the only real deterrent against any threat of aggres-
sion which the country will have for some time to come
...Considering the present state of national defense
and the lack of a collective security system in Europe
we are definitely in favor of the maintenance of nu-
clear force's operational capability at a quantitative
level which could be determined only by the require-
ments of the country's security and independence (such
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preservation implies maintaining nuclear arms and pro-
viding for scientific and technological progress).
This level will... be situated at the minimum necessary
. . .Taking into account the construction of the planned
sixth missile-launching submarine, this point has al-
ready been reached. Mirage-IV aircraft will not be re-
placed once they become obsolete...
The Pluton tactical missiles will in no case be
transferred outside the national territory [of France]...
...It will be necessary to render [the French nuclear
force] really independent. This would imply ... equipping
it with an independent detection system in the event of
an attack and an independent locating system for warships
...Technically, France would be able to acquire this
equipment ... through the construction of observation radar
aircraft (which would be used only in the event of a
crisis) and the putting into orbit of three satellites
whose task would be to observe, pinpoint and transmit
information.
The nuclear military doctrine will again become a
deterrent strategy in the strict meaning of the word...
The nuclear strategy is an omnidirectional strategy
which does not determine in advance any main adversary
. . .The determination of targets and the orientation
of missiles will be reexamined. Furthermore, the pre-
sent 'anti-city' strategy .. .will be abandoned...
The decision about using nuclear arms cannot be
left to one man—the President—as is the case now. .
.
The responsibility for such a decision should be left
to a special high committee consisting of the Presi-
dent, the Prime Minister, the National Defense Minister,
ministers representing the governmental coalition and
the Chief of the General Staff... 108
This policy reversal was justified by PCF Secretary General
Georges Marchais on 2 June, when he said:
...As a communist party, as a working class, we are
very attached to peace, to security, to peaceful coex-
istence, to disarmament. The workers have nothing to
gain from the arms race. The workers favor peace...
Nevertheless ... since we do not live in a world where
universal and controlled disarmament exists, we have a
duty to guarantee the security of our country, of its
territory and its people. Consequently, France must
have a national defense.
...Because of the policy pursued by the [past govern-
ments] which favored a nuclear strike force, we have
practically no conventional army left. According to
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specialists, if we were to find ourselves in a situa-
tion similar to the one which we experienced in 19^0,
France's power to resist would be less than it was then.
I need say no more.
This being the case, we considered that we had a
duty to make the necessary decision, namely, to allow
our country to have a real defense, a real force of
dissuasion. Consequently, we pronounced ourselves in
favor of retaining the nuclear strike force ... 1(~) 9
Realizing the impact these Communist policy proposals
were having on the French public at large, Marchais tried to
attentuate the Party's position somewhat on 10 August by de-
claring that France would promise to abandon her anti-city
strategy and promise to refrain from being the first to launch
nuclear weapons, but only if all other nuclear powers of the
110
world would make the same promises.
Kanapa's announcement caught the French Socialist
Party by surprise. The Party had not planned on making any
pre-election revision to the defense policy section of the
Common Program; the 1972 negotiations had proven this area
to be one particularly lacking in possibilities for agreement
and joint planning. But one the Communists opened the debate,
the PS accepted the challenge. By July 1977, specialized PS
study groups were ready with a preliminary Socialist Party
defense plan: the defense of France should be composed of a
strategic nuclear force, a popular mobilization force and an
active defense force. 11
Looking first at the argument supporting the necessity
of a strategic nuclear force, one reads:
There exist today... two great world powers which,
while alternating between negotiations and arms races,
have between them a balance of terror that has made a
direct attack on either of their territories an
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impossibility. But there is the hypothesis of a limited
war using tactical nuclear weapons on territory which
would be to them foreign soil. It is in the interest of
France that she refuse to risk being a part of that
"foreign" battleground. This situation justifies the
maintenance of the French nuclear dissuasive force.
French strategic nuclear dissuasion is based on the
postulate that the conquest of France would cost an ag-
gressor a sizeable risk to his own human and industrial
resources. . .The role of such a French force is, in the
event of a crisis to force a potential aggressor to the
negotiating table. H2
(It Is important to remember that this pro-nuclear argument
was written by a study group and has not yet been incorporated
into official PS policy.)
For almost 20 years, the French Socialist Party has
been an opponent of all types of nuclear weapons. It was in
character, therefore, for Mitterrand to offer this reply to
the French Communists' sudden enthusiasm for the force de
frappe :
Some socialists, including myself, wonder whether nuclear
arms are not a Maginot line - where a feeling of safety
and security prevails ... ^3
Mitterrand maintains, in any case, that the retention of the
nuclear strike force is an issue to be decided by the entire
French electorate (i.e., by referendum) after the March
114
elections. In answer to the tous azimuts strategy of
employment, Mitterrand has said, "I do not see the need to
115
point our missiles at our own allies." Other PS officials
argue that targeting on a worldwide scale would seriously
diminish the effectiveness of the relatively few French
weapons. Furthermore, to "neutralize" the French nuclear
force as the Communists have proposed doing (by rendering
it strictly national and omnidirectional), would be to rob it
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of its dissuasive nature and thus of any chance of contribut-
-i -i c
ing to the establishment of an equilibrium in Europe.
Now that the Union of the Left has broken apart, it
is doubtful that the PS and the PCP will be able to reach
any general agreement on defense policy before March of 1978.
When the talks ended in September 1977, the two sides had
established the basic principles of their respective defense
plans which were summarized as follows by Le Monde :
[The position of the PS and MRG]
- Universal and controlled general disarmament is the
government's objective.
- Action will be taken to organize international nego-
tiations that will lead to this disarmament.
- In the meantime, nuclear armament will be maintained
in its current state with the final decision belong-
ing to the French people. Mr. Mitterrand has suggested
recourse to a referendum.
- Refusal of the tous azimuts policy.
[The position of the PCF]
- France must become involved in the disarmament con-
ferences .
- Nuclear armament will be maintained and procedures
adopted to render it independent.
- Approval of the tous azimuts defense policy and refusal
to integrate the nation's defense with any bloc whatso-
ever.
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- Refusal of recourse to the referendum.
The Communists have consistently maintained that "we in no
way intend to substitute adherence to the Warsaw Pact for
membership in the Atlantic Pact. We absolutely reject this
alternative." 118 The PS leadership is not entirely convinced,
however, for the PCF proposal that France promise to refrain
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from being the first to use nuclear weapons closely resembles
119
a Warsaw Pact proposal of 1976.
If the Left should win in 1978, would NATO have any
allies in the new government?
2. NATO
a. PCF
As discussed earlier, the French Communist Party
officially agreed in the 1972 Common Program to respect the
current alliance arrangements of France while seeking the
simultaneous dissolution of both the Warsaw and North Atlan-
tic Pacts. These public assurances, however, do not preclude
France withdrawing from NATO should the opportunity present
itself. In 1969, the North Atlantic Alliance celebrated its
20th anniversary and all members became free to choose bet-
ween continued participation in or withdrawal from the
Alliance; the PCF pressed for "non-renewal" of France's
membership! 20 In Georges Marchais' 197^ book entitled
Le Programme du Parti Communis te Francais , one reads:
It is profoundly dangerous that recent history has placed
our country in a very unilateral network of relations -
by that I mean the Atlantic Alliance led by the United
States and the little Europe of the big capitalists. All
the same, we do not plan to cut these ties like you cut a
knot with a sword. But we do say it is high time to stop
this sliding towards national abdication. . .The men in the
current 'governmental' majority have carried out a sur-
reptitious reintegration of France in NATO...
It is to be feared that things will go still further
and that, tomorrow, with Mr. Giscard d'Estaing, France
will be living on Washington time and will find herself
enclosed by the iron ring of a new West European Holy
Alliance . .
.
Passionately attached to the independence of our
country, we say: it is not in Washington, or Brussels,
or Moscow - in spite of the ties of solidarity that
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unite us with the first socialist people in history -
that French policy should be decided. It is in Parisin the capital of Prance and no where else!
That is why, with respect for Prance's current
alliances, a democratic government will begin immedi-
ately to put the country on the road to independence
from every politico-military bloc whatsoever . 121
Two years later, French Communist Jacques Denis declared
that the PCF would demand France be withdrawn from the
Atlantic Alliance the moment detente should begin to falter. 122
One month after this statement, the PCF decided that, while
it saw "no incompatibility as such," should the participation
of Communists in the French government cause France's Atlantic
Treaty partners to consider it necessary to renegotiate the
terms of the Alliance, the Leftist government of France would
welcome such an approach to the problem. D Jean Kanapa wrote
in January 1977:
A government which includes the Communists will guarantee
[France's] security through an up-to-date defense policy
using all the necessary means at its disposal, a security
which would be genuinely national, one not integrated into
NATO (in accordance with the provisions adopted in 1966)...
French Communists feel that France should propose to
the Soviet Union and other countries which are signatories
of the Warsaw Treaty the conclusion of nonaggressipn
pacts and other treaties not to resort to force. ^
In Kanapa' s landmark speech of 11 May 1977, he stated that:
The maintenance of the 'independent' nuclear force makes
it ... indispensable to put an end to all the numerous albeit
discreet measures which have led to de facto reintegration
of France into NATO, especially with respect to determina-
tion of strategies. It also goes without saying that any
form of 'joint European defense' must be ruled out, since
such an orientation would not only lead to greater inte-
gration of France into Atlantic strategy but would also
allow the Federal Republic of Germany access to nuclear
arms . .
.
German imperialism has already become a financial,
economic and even military giant since its power in the
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military sphere is now considerable .. .Giscard d'Estaing's
policy, whose aim is to turn Prance into a stepping stone
for West Germany, is... a policy of national capitulation,
a policy of the old right .. .whose descendents exclaimed:
"Sooner Hitler than the Popular Front."
The omnidirectional defense doctrine has been re-
placed by the doctrine of "forward battle" side by side
with the Bundeswehr against the socialist countries which
have been marked out as the only potential adversary . 125
b. PS
Robert Pontillon, the National Secretary of the
Socialist Party in charge of international relations, re-
vealed during a press interview in October 1977 that one of
the fundamental causes for the September dismemberment of
the Union of the Left was an irreconciliable disagreement
over defense policy. He stated that:
The Kanapa report ... does not only represent an inadmis-
sable distortion of the 1972 agreements in this area:
it is sketching out a defense policy that 'is hopeless,
imaginary and dangerous . 126
According to Pontillon, there were five key defense points
which the Socialists found to be "inadmissable" : the tous
azimuts doctrine, the counter-force instead of counter-city
strategy, the collective decision governing nuclear force
employment, the promise of non-first use of nuclear weapons
127
and the abandonment of the Nadge system.
In 1972, the PS and the PCF accepted the same
commitment to respect Prance's alliance obligations. Where-
as the PCF apparently plans for this respect to be as short-
term as possible, the PS regards French membership in the
Atlantic Alliance as a relatively long-term, necessary evil
Reportedly, the entire Socialist Party agrees on that one
point. 128 In May 1977, the left wing of the PS (CERES) was
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known to be undecided as to the military commitments France
should accept vis-a-vis her allies; the rest of the Party,
however, was in favor of the participation of French conven-
tional troops in a "battle in Europe" and not opposed to a
129defense plan involving European cooperation. By July, the
PS special study group on defense was proposing the idea
that, in addition to the nuclear strike and popular mobiliza-
tion forces,
[France must have] an ability for active defense...
[which] will permit us to fulfill our duties, namely
vis-a-vis the Atlantic Alliance and the Treaty of
Brussels . .
.
It would seem both dangerous and of little value to
provide a priori a tactical nuclear contribution to the
NATO zone ... because such a position would lead us inex-
orably into the process of transfer of decisionmaking
power, paralyzing our freedom of choice.
This kind of defense appears to conform to the
political goals of security and freedom of action which
are so necessary to the French Left.
There is reason to respect the moral motives of
partisans for disarmed neutrality, but it is to be
feared, however, that such an example would not be
followed by the other nations. It therefore seems un-
fortunately preferable that, all the while conducting
an active policy of security and disarmament, we must
keep a full stock of means by which we can stop the
beginning of a war. 130
Mitterrand has stated that he does not believe in "the total
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autonomy of French defense." Pontillon explained that,
for the Socialist Party,
For France to fall back on her borders makes no sense
at all. For, the "threat," as the military say, can
take two shapes: a direct pressure on our borders, or
else on the borders of countries in the Alliance of
which we are a member. Well, in getting out of the
Alliance, we accepted that our neighbors could be
attacked without our having to budge, and that we
would defend ourselves alone in the hypothetical case
of a direct threat to our borders. That is unthinkable...
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Mitterrand. . .believes in alliances, and national dis-
suasion only has meaning for him insofar as it is a part
of a system of alliances and solidarity. What Mitterrand
says is this: even having a national nuclear strike
force, France cannot reason separately from her alliances.
National independence can be nothing more than autonomy
of decision. -1
3 • French Armed Forces
One part of the defense policy of the Common Program
over which there was never any disagreement between the PS
and the PCF was the establishment of a conscripted military
force 1 -^ in which every citizen is obliged to serve, but
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only for six months within his own geographical region
and strictly for the defense of the nation (i.e. no internal
135peace-keeping functions).""" PS and PCF consensus ended
here, however, for their plans for employing and equipping
the armed force differed significantly.
a. PCF
PCF Secretary General Marchais stated in 197^,
Far from wanting to "break" the army, we want to give
the nation the army it needs and, to do this, we want
to make sure the army gets the necessary armaments,
structures and conditions for activity ... 13°
But then in the next breath, the Party speaks of "lighten[ing]
the heavy burden which today is forced upon the masses by
military expenditure" J ' and "manag[ing] to do whatever is
necessary without increasing the military budget as compared
138
with the budget as a whole." The Communist Party also
declares that it plans to exercise the strictest control
over the military budget and to nationalize all the arms
139industries
.
One of the French Communist Party leaders, Jean
Marrane, wrote a book in 1977 entitled L'Armee de la France
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demote rat ique , Marrane reportedly states that all private
armaments industries, as well as national defense-related
banking and industrial centers, would be nationalized by a
Leftist government-. He bitterly criticizes French arms
, 140 . .
exports, but he does not acknowledge that, even if the
arms industries become nationalized, the unit costs for
arms and equipment for French defense will be exorbitant if
France is not allowed to sell sufficiently large quantities
of arms, and therefore enjoy large-scale production. Marrane
speaks of the future French armed forces being built on four
"pillars": military service, military training, reserves
and active duty. Each one is to be equal and indispensable.
Following the Party line which assures an army "closely
linked with the nation, Marrane is criticized by a re-
viewer for having resorted to the use of a Gaullist tone
when he enjoined every citizen to have "the fervent desire
not to be left out of the army." And, as if he were from
the Gaullist school of defense strategy, Marrane denounces
the tactical nuclear missile Pluton which "keeps France from
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being the mistress of her strategic nuclear force."
b. PS
The Socialist Party also plans to nationalize
143
the arms industries. But whereas the PCF appears to be
preoccupied with the economics of defense, a PS special
study group has developed a philosophy of national defense:
The concept of security and defense must be based, first
of all, on the will of the French people to refuse to
submit to any form of foreign oppression whatsoever...
The national will is manifested by the national mobiliza-
tion force. This force will be constituted essentially
214

of draftees carrying out a short national service in a
decentralized geographic framework. . .Decentralization
should permit logistic and bureaucratic procedures to
be reduced to an indispensable minimum. In case of
need, this decentralization will permit a smooth mobil-
ization, adapted to different situations and, if need
be, differentiated according to the regions.
This popular mobilization force will take on a dis-
suasive value, because an eventual aggressor will rea-
lize that if he tries to penetrate onto our territory,
he will have to face a series of aggressive actions
that will lead to an unendingly growing number of men
who will keep him from reaching his strategic objec-
tive. The concept of popular mobilization is founded
on confidence in the people and is, consequently, in-




The purpose of this study was to discover the past and
present foreign and defense policy orientations of the two
major parties of the French Union of the Left in order to
predict the most likely defense policy to expect from a
Leftist government in France in 1978, should the Union win.
A. ELECTIONS
Since the breakdown of the Leftist Union appears to be
due, to a large extent, to PCF maneuvers to that end, I do
not expect to see any Communist participation in the next
government of France. As explained in detail in earlier
chapters, the Communists would be now only the junior - not
the directing - partner in a coalition with the Socialists
and the MRG. Since Mitterrand and the Socialist Party
stubbornly refused to give in to PCF demands during the 1977
meetings for the revision of the Common Program, the PCF
could not feel certain of the exact type of program with
which it would become associated as a government participant,
It seems likely that the strong support that has been
growing for the non-Communist Left over the past five years
will not dissipate before March 1978. (In 197^, after the
last presidential elections, many analysts speculated that
had the voting age been lowered to 18 years old, Mitterrand
would have won; for, polls showed he had strong support
from the age group less than 21 years old. Two months after
being elected Giscard d'Estaing lowered the age limit. This
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could perhaps have an important effect on next year's out-
come.) Even though they are no longer a part of a winning
coalition, the Socialists will still probably garner a large
percentage of the votes.
Gaullist candidate Jacques Chirac originally campaigned
primarily on the threat of Communist participation in govern-
ment; now that the PCF is gone from the scene (albeit
voluntarily), Chirac might be amenable to forming a last-
minute Right-Center coalition. Giscard d'Estaing, however,
understands the social and political forces alive in France
today and he would probably be ready to name Francois Mitterrand
his prime minister should the non-Communist Left make the
expected gains at the polls. For, the possibility of a
Center-non-Communist Left rapprochement has been a favorite
idea of the President's for at least the last two years. He
made it a central theme in his 1976 book Democratic francaise .
Mitterrand has been very careful to refrain from making
any sign of truce with the current government; for, the
leader of the Socialist Party must continue to appear suf-
ficiently strong and dedicated to fundamental reforms and
socialist ideology in order to attract a portion of the
public that was planning to vote for the PCF. It is inter-
esting to note that an October 1977 public opinion poll
revealed that ^3% of the people voting for the PS hoped the







Once the elections are over, it is possible that Mitterrand
could be reconciled to the idea of sharing his government
with a few moderate representatives of the Center. In the
area of defense, I believe there would be no serious dis-
agreement between Giscard and his Socialist Prime Minister.
Of the three key national security ministries (Defense,
Foreign Affairs, Interior), the Defense portfolio could be
given to a Socialist like Charles Hernu, PS Minister of the
Armed Forces. Should the Socialist Party succeed in garner-
ing a strong portion of the vote, it is possible that the
Foreign Affairs Ministry could also be headed by a Socialist.
There has been mention made of two prime candidates for the
3 4
post: the pro-U.S. Defferre or the Atlantiste Robert
5Pontillon. (Even before the break-up of the united Left,
it was deemed very unlikely that a Communist would be named
to either the Defense or the Foreign Ministry post. In his
book Si demain la gauche... , Gaston Defferre mentions that
The only point made clear by Goerges Marchais in 197^,
at the time of the last presidential election, was that
the Communists would not claim rights to any one of the
three big ministries: Foreign Affairs, Interior,
National Defense.
In' addition, an interview by the author with a senior French
military officer revealed a sense of certainty in official
French quarters that a Communist Party member would never be





How well would the general defense and foreign policy
orientations of Mitterrand coincide with those of Giscard
d'Estaing? Both men are personally committed to the build-
ing of a strong, united organization of Europe, politically
and economically. Both are advocates of close relations
with the United States and the North Atlantic Alliance.
Mitterrand and Giscard are patriots who support the reten-
tion of the force de frappe as a dissuasive force oriented
eastward. Both currently envisage immediate, concerted
efforts to rebuild the nation's conventional forces. The
two men agree that France must retain her independence of
decision in the event of war; but they also acknowledge
that, in the event of war, there would be only one battle-
field to be protected by all. Placing emphasis on a few
socialist, internationalist themes, Mitterrand would probably
press for permanent French representation at the disarmament
and MBFR talks and a signature to the nuclear test ban
treaty. As evidenced throughout this study, the French
Socialists have strong faith in the power of negotiations
and international conferences as methods for attaining peace.
This should combine well with Giscard' s propensity to call
international meetings of European heads of state to discuss
specific issues of immediate importance, rather than relying
on more normal diplomatic channels.
The pro-US and Atlantiste orientations of such prominent
Socialists as Defferre and Pontillon should also coincide
effectively and profitably with Giscard' s own well-demonstrated
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preference for closer solidarity among Western European and
Atlantic allies.
D. DEFENSE 1978
With a Socialist like Charles Hernu as Minister of
Defense, the army would probably undergo some changes,
depending on the degree of Socialist support that exists in
Parliament to convince Giscard that reforms are really neces-
sary. As mentioned earlier, the Socialists could decide to
institute a regional, popular mobilization scheme of military
service. This would coincide well with the Socialists' and
Giscard's desire to build a strong national defense force
tied firmly to the roots of French society. Such a mobiliza-
tion plan, in addition, would hamper the development of a
strong military institution that could threaten the existence
of the governmental system, especially in the event the Left
should return to a position of power and responsibility in
the country. A senior French military officer recently said,
however, that the armed forces of France would do nothing to
oppose a Leftist government that had been voted into power.
"We are only the instrument of the State; we are here to
.,8
serve.
It is interesting to note that the Socialist Party study
groups proposed that this regional army be only one part of
a greater defense scheme for the nation. Taking the example
of Charles Hernu, he is one of the Socialists who strongly
favors the integration of nuclear weapons into the overall
9
French defense strategy. He is also one who worries about
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the nation's "national insecurity" due to its weakness in
conventional forces. The majority of the Socialist Party
is like Hernu in totally rejecting the PCF's proposal that
France promise non-first use of nuclear weapons; he maintains
that there is too much imbalance already between the East
and West European forces, and the existence of a French force
de frappe serves to reestablish the equilibrium somewhat.
In November 1976, Hernu proposed to the Socialist Party
that, should a Leftist government come to power in 1978,
the Ministry of Defense should be made responsible only for
the armed forces; a separate, politico-military headquarters
would be created specifically to control the use of the
nation's nuclear forces. This new headquarters would be in
12
sovereign control of their use.
If a Socialist like Hernu, Defferre or Pontillon should
become Defense or Foreign Minister in the new government,
he would be in a position to personally pass or veto any
arms sale from a French industry. For, as director of the
nation's defense or foreign affairs, he would sit on the
Interministerial Commission for the Study of War Materials
Exportation. All major equipment contracts must be approved
by this commission, comprised of the Ministers of Defense,
Foreign Affairs, Finance and External Commerce. Each member
13has a veto and one is sufficient to cancel a contract.
Although the Socialists and Communists are traditionally
against arms sales, there is reason to believe that if the
Socialists came to power, they would not want to be res-
ponsible for the closing of many factories and the increased
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unemployment that would result from wholesale cancellation of
arms sales on the principle that it is not right. (The Commu-
nist-affiliated labor union, CGT, already supports arms sales
in defiance of PCP directives to the contrary; they argue
111
their first duty is to ensure jobs.) It is my belief that
the Socialists would refrain from sending arms to direct bel-
ligerents in the Middle East during a war; but as far as con-
tinuing the arms sales to Iraq and Africa and major oil-export-
ing nations, I believe they will do so, if only due to the
economics of the matter.
Finally, it appears that the United States would find a
Gis card-Mitterrand government to be one of the most pro-US,
pro-NATO governments that France has ever had. Unlike the
chauvinistic nationalism and patriotism of the Gaullists and
the Communists, the Socialists, as Annie Kriegel said, feel
a certain affinity to the American idealistic character.
There is one report that states the Socialists, in contem-
plating the future of France and NATO, came to the conclusion
that "as and when necessary," they could always effectively
get France into the Alliance by way of bilateral relations
15
with the Americans.
Mitterrand, throughout his statements, has been consis-
tently in support of NATO. In August of 1977 he stated:
I deem it necessary that we be members of a security
system, a defensive alliance, that conforms to our
interests. To leave the Atlantic Alliance without
having another alliance to go to does not make any
sense. What other alliance can anyone suggest?




Although the likelihood of a Leftist victory at the polls
in 1978 has diminished, the possibility of a Center-Left
coalition remains very much alive. The Paris daily Le Monde
reported in November of 1977 that, in spite of the Leftist
split, the PS and the MRG plan to continue their political
alliance. ' It seems reasonable therefore to believe that
the tremendous public support which has developed over the
past five years in favor of the Socialist Party will not de-
crease significantly over the next four months. Opinion polls
taken since the Leftist split tend to confirm this assessment
of the political situation. If it is true that the PCP has
indeed given up all desire of participating in a 1978 Socialist-
dominated government, then even if the PCF should receive its
predicted 19$ of the votes, it would not challenge the Social-
ist bid for office. Should the PS emerge from the elections
as the largest single party in France, it would be free, as
an essentially social democratic party, to turn to the small
MRG and Giscard's own center party for coalition support.
Although Mitterrand denies the possibility of any such coali-
tion in 1978, he has been quoted as describing his party in
the following words:
The Socialist Party is the heir and successor to social
democracy in France... The French Socialist Party... is
not a Marxist party. If there are obvious differences
to be made between German or Swedish social democracy
and French Socialism, we are still members of the same
family . 1°
The French Socialist Party and President Giscard d'Estaing
share the same fundamental defense goals: i.e., the importance
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of universal military service and the development of a well-
trained and well-equipped conventional force; and a strong
program for the defense of France that includes both a
guarantee of independence of decision and membership in a
viable collective security system (which today takes the
shape of NATO)
.
Both Mitterrand and Giscard are recognized supporters of
a united Europe and traditionally loyal friends of the Third
World and the United States. The cause of democracy should
have nothing to fear from the ascendency of the French
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